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20 OCTOBER 1986

EAST EUROPE REPORT

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USSR-GDR RAIL, FERRY LINE NEARING COMPLETION

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 1 Aug 86 p 6

[Article by Frank Herold: "First Appearance of Ferry Mukran at the Wharves of Klaipeda"]

[Text] Precisely at 3 pm on 21 July the ferry Mukran was off the port of the Lithuanian city Klaipeda, and a little later it passed through the narrow entrance between Curische Nehrung and the mainland. Without any load the 506 km from the island of Ruegen to Klaipeda were covered in about 15 hours. It will take about 20 hours when at the beginning of October ferry service is initiated with 103 Soviet wide gauge freight cars on two decks. With the arrival of the Mukran, there began the last phase of preparation for putting this new link between the GDR and the USSR into service.

This time the journey terminated for the present at one of the wharves in the commercial port, which is rich in tradition, where we visited Werner Albrecht, testing manager of the Wismar Mathias-Thesen Shipyard, on the Mukran. The next day the documents and maps for traversing the 10 km-long, narrow channel and the turning maneuvers off the bridge of the new ferry terminal were to be discussed with the Soviet port authorities. In turn, the plan provided for testing maneuvers in the 500-meter turning basin from which in the past 2 years 3.5 million cubic meters of sand were dredged. Werner Albrecht explained to us that "although our ship is 185 meters long and 26 meters wide, the size of the basin is fully adequate because we can virtually turn on the spot. At first we will do maneuvers during the day, and after the leading lights have been set, there will be night maneuvers.

GDR Specialists Took Over the Steelwork

While the crew of the Mukran, the experts from the Wismar shipyard, and several supplier enterprises were making preparation for these tests, 10 km away a great deal of work was going on in the new ferry terminal. In the last days of June the specialists had completed the assembly of the double-deck ferry bridge. Now as we stood at this spot again 1 month later, all connections had been completed and the finished touches were being put on the hydraulic facilities and controls.

Construction manager Kastutis Valiulis said that "such a fast tempo was possible because we were united in all phases with our colleagues from the GDR--in essentials and in the technical decisions." The small group of GDR specialists is managed by Ernst Schulze who represents the main contractor, Stahlbau Dessau [Dessau Steelworks]. This factory delivered to Klaipeda the portal and the ferry bridge, which weighed a total of 1,000 tons.

Ernst Schulze has been on site since November of last year and remembers many a hectic day: Those were exciting moments when the special ship Brocken brought parts of the great portal through snow and ice, or when the 45-meter long pontoon with the parts for the bridge was floated into position. Ernst Schulze also praises the cooperation. "In this instance we are dealing in many cases with completely new engineering solutions. The awareness of this responsibility spurs both sides on to great performance," he emphasizes.

Now the issue is to test and optimize the interplay of ship and shore facilities and to adjust the automatic equipment--an additional major technical accomplishment. In the "hinterland" as well as has been largely completed. Two years ago, the area on which today the first rail switching yard is located did not even exist. Some 1.2 million cubic meters of sand had to be filled in to make a spit that is 1 km long and 3 km wide. A slender tower which can be seen from the harbor entrance towers over the grounds which hold a total of 43 km of tracks and 135 switches. Here, too, as in the other service buildings, completion of the interior has begun.

The members of the Fritz Schmenkel Komsomol Brigade are counting the days until ferry service begins. They had 2 full months to complete the largest joint construction project of both countries in the transport sector. Construction manager Valiulis explains that "for us here in Klaipeda, 3 October is the deadline: the commitments to international competition of the working people of Klaipeda and Mukran call for this. Many a technical detail must still be solved by then, but we will be as punctual as the ferry."

Transport Time Reduced to One-Sixth

The importance of this new link is clear to everyone at the Klaipeda construction site: Both sister countries included the project in their respective 5-year plans. At first the Mukran will commute alone. Five additional ferries, whose keels will also be laid in Wismar, are to follow by 1990. The group of six can then transport annually 5.3 million tons of cargo in the railroad cars. By way of comparison that is a larger amount of goods than were transshipped each year in the last 5-year plan period in the Wismar port.

Barely 1,000 people will work in the new ferry complex in Kleipeda--including the personnel for the huge freight depot. The transport times for good will be reduced to one-sixth of the current situation. And in the next few years the exchange of goods between the USSR and GDR, as agreed in numerous documents, will continue to grow steadily. In Klaipeda as in Mukran, people are making preparation for it.

IMPROVEMENTS IN WATER TREATMENT; PROTECTION OF POTABLE WATER

Industrial Substances Removed

East Berlin BAUERN-ECHO in German 20 Jun 86 p 6

[Article: "Numbers and Facts"]

[Text] In the past 5 years, 500,000 households have been connected to sewers and sewage treatment plants. Many residents were actively involved in these efforts by way of the citizens initiative. The further rise in the performance of sewage treatment plants will also be achieved mainly by the use of scientific-technological advances. New processes are increasingly used for waste water treatment. They include such biotechnological processes as enzymotic sludge stabilization. By comparison with the earlier outside drying of the sludge, treatment time is cut from about 50 days to a few hours. Moreover, construction investments drop by 60-70 percent.

The innovator system, the MMM [movement of the Fairs of the Masters of Tomorrow], and inventor efforts are extremely important for the speed-up of scientific-technological advances. The social profit from the innovator movement rose from M42.4 million to M59.2 million in the past 5-year plan period.

Every second young person employed in water management is involved in the MMM movement. The profit arising from their social work amounted to M34.8 million in 1985. The young people in the young researcher collectives are increasingly engaged on automation solutions. A good example is the micro computer information system for production dispatchers in the Water Engineering and Water Management Planning Combine VEB. This yields a profit of M190,000 per annum.

The rising educational standards of the working people are proving a decisive precondition for the impressive growth of performance and efficiency in water management as the result of the mastery of science and technology. More than 22 percent of all employees are college and technical school graduates, almost

1,600 more than in 1980. The proportion of skilled workers rose by 1,740 and now amounts to 92 percent. Altogether 93 percent of all employees in water management boast of completed training.

The recovery of valuable substances from waste water is the most efficient type of water protection in terms of the national economy, because it also serves the further development of raw material reserves. At the present time we recover about 50 percent of valuable substances from sewage. Satisfactory progress is being recorded in particular with the recovery of oils, organic greases, sulfite waste liquors, pulp residues and even heavy metals.

In the Bitterfeld Chemical Combine VEB, for example, an efficient process permits the recovery of 100 tons tin per annum from the sewage resulting from Wofatit production. This raw material is reprocessed in the Freiberg Mining and Foundry Combine. The working people of the Schwedt Paper and Cardboard Works VEB--a major water user--recover from the waste water 15 tons fibers per annum. This is reused in manufacture. They thus develop raw materials reserves to a value of M2 million per annum.

The 1986-1990 5-Year Plan provides for the national reproduction process to be carried out with the same water consumption as in the preceding 5 years. It will therefore be necessary to variously lower the specific water needs of industry by another 25 percent, especially in the strained river catchment areas of the industrial conurbations. With the aid of process analyses it is intended to lower water losses in the factories by 10-15 percent. It is imperative, moreover, to reduce by another 30-35 million cubic meters the extraction for manufacturing purposes of potable water from the public network. Nonpotable water is to be used instead or, better still, the absolute demand lowered.

Rational water use by industry also made it possible to make available 20 percent more water volume for irrigating farm land. Already more than 1.1 million hectares are being irrigated to achieve higher and stable yields. This amounts to more than 18 percent of all farm land and requires more than 1.6 billion cubic meter water per annum. At the present time this represents 18 percent of the available water supply in a drought year.

Government, Industry Cooperate

East Berlin BAUERN-ECHO in German 13 June 86 p 6

[Article by Dr Eckardt Clausnitzer, deputy Minister for Environmental Protection and Water Management: "Well Organized Protection of Potable Water Stocks"]

[Text] The stable and high-quality potable water supply for the general public represents one of the decisive tasks of water management. A great deal

of money is spent each year to steadily improve the standard of potable water supplies. At the present time some 92 percent of all households obtain water from the central network. In order to realize the housing construction program, it is necessary in good time to connect the new residential buildings to this network and to guarantee waste water treatment and removal in accordance with the need.

We are gradually expanding potable water storage and distant water supply systems. The latest example is the Eibenstock Dam that contributes specially to stable potable water supplies in Karl-Marx-Stadt bezirk. By 1990 900,000 citizens will be connected to the central network and 400,000 to sewage removal and treatment plants by, for example, the inclusion of the potable water program in rural areas (primarily carried out by the citizens themselves), the development of performance reserves in the regions as well as material reserves. At the same time we focus on the task of reconstructing and expanding existing waterworks and pipeline systems so as to satisfy the demand for potable water, that is growing due to more inner-city housing construction, modernization and reconstruction, and to further lower water losses.

Unequivocal Regulation by Water Law

The well organized protection against pollution of all resources of ground and surface water is of preeminent importance for the stability and quality of potable water supplies. The 1982 water law established unequivocal rules. Protection areas exist in the GDR for all sources, wells, rivers and dams that yield potable water. In preparation of new waterworks, district or kreis assemblies also define so-called potable water exclusionary areas. This protection is indispensable, because up to 90 percent of the available water resources are used in drought years to supply water to the general public, industry and agriculture.

We now have a total of 9,000 potable water protection areas in the GDR, they are specially signposted. Some restrictions are in force in these areas to protect the stocks of potable water. They relate specially to the catchment area, the narrower or wider zone of protection. Accordingly manure spreading, waste water irrigation, the establishment of dumps, swimming, camping and so on are banned or significantly restricted.

The Great Responsibilities of the Commissions

The protection zone commissions established in every district and kreis hold a great responsibility with regard to the confirmation of potable water protection zones. They must check at least once a year whether the legal regulations are being observed. If defects are noted, the State Waters Control or the protection zone commissions assign the appropriate tasks. The main concern is always that of protecting potable water resources against pollution, by efficient sewage treatment processes facilitating the repeated use of water and thereby also reducing the national cost of water processing. By keeping pollutants at bay and recovering valuable substances from waste waters, more and more enterprises help protect our natural resources. In

recent years, for example, the "Otto Grotewohl" VEB Boehlen and the Espenhain Brown Coal Processing Works commissioned new industrial sewage treatment plants. Since 1985 one of the biggest plants for the biological cleansing of industrial sewage in Europe has been operating at the Buna Chemical Works VEB near Schkopau. It is able to daily treat as much sewage as carried off from the households of almost 3 million residents.

Municipal sewage treatment plants are also being constructed, rationalized, reconstructed or expanded in Berlin, Muenchehofe near Berlin, Leipzig-Rosenthal, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Erfurt and many other cities. The construction of the most modern GDR sewage treatment plant at Berlin-North also makes it possible to eliminate roughly 2,500 hectares sewage fields. Farm land is won thereby, recreational woods will be planted and environmental conditions considerably improved. Already 400 hectares have been reforested.

Provisions for Crop Cultivation

The protection of ground water is particularly important, because it represents our main reservoir for the production of potable water. It takes a long time for pollution to make itself felt, but once it is, it is very hard to remove. The appropriate provisions with regard to crop production in potable water protection zones were therefore established. They include EDP controlled fertilizer application and crop sequences that are coordinated with the State Waters Control from the aspect of the respective soil structure. The greatest attention is devoted to preventing pollutants from entering the water. The measures adopted include in particular the rational and scientifically justified use of synthetic and natural fertilizers as well as the construction of warehousing and storage capacities for all manure and farm waste products. The protection of potable water stocks is a social concern. Each citizen can contribute to it by correct behavior.

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MACHINE CONSTRUCTION ANALYZED; DECENTRALIZED COMPUTER CONTROL

East Berlin FERTIGUNGSTECHNIK UND BETRIEB in German Vol 36 No 7, Jul 86 pp 391-97

[Article by Prof E. Gottschalk, Dr of Engineering, GDR Chamber of Technology, Otto Von Guericke College, Magdeburg. Original title: "Preconditions for an Effective Production Organization--an Analysis of the GDR Machine Building"]

[Text] - Creation of stable processes in organization

- better orderliness in material economy
- more stable technological documentation
- creation of real values in planning work
- creation of controlling models for CAM systems
- implementation of an efficient gathering of operating characteristics using paper as less as possible
- appropriate utilization of computers--decentralized and for proved management levels
- improved structures of qualifications in manufacturing process control

0. Introduction

As a part of production organization, production process planning ensures completion of the complex production process; it serves to coordinate interaction among the materials to be processed, the working tools and the labor force within the main and auxiliary processes. Production process control plays a significant role in terms of creating CAD/CAM systems. Its position within the enterprise and its functions can be described as follows (Fig. 1):

Technological production scheduling and planning provide the production process control target figures for ensuring an effective production process. Based on these figures the "Disposition" function generates the control commands for carrying out the production tasks for each day or shift. Production control, with its functions of availability and progress control, gathers information on the current status of the production process and supplies a status report on how production is proceeding as a basis for further control commands and for cost accounting within the enterprise. The "Fault Management" function takes into account the realities of an actual faulty--too often faulty--production process. Production process control must implement the objectives of enterprise management; these objectives have a reciprocal relationship to one another and can have a significant influence on the effectiveness of an enterprise (Fig. 2).




Fig. 1 Rough Outline of Production Process Control

Good adherence to deadlines (a prerequisite for asserting oneself in the marketplace), short product throughput times, thorough utilization of enterprise system capacity and low material stockpiles are the objectives which production process control must meet.

Internationally, however, "thorough utilization of enterprise system capacity," a unilaterally highly placed objective, has lost in importance because the constraints of international competition require "good adherence to deadlines," which in turn depend on "short product throughput times" and leads to what is becoming a more and more significant objective, namely the maintaining of low material stockpiles.

Production process control is thus becoming an important intensification factor--nowhere is the relationship between investment and its results so positive.




Fig. 2 Objectives of Production Process Control (according to Wiendahl)

In Japan, therefore, production organization and in particular production process control is rightfully called the "third pillar of progress." Development trends in the metal processing industry, in particular more automated production complexes, integrated production sectors, the use of robots and the increasing use of decentralized computer technology, have led to more rapid development in the area of production process control--but have also helped uncover current weak points in this area.

The level of production process control in the enterprises of the machine construction industry is characterized by a broad spectrum of controls ranging from conventional, manual and oral operative controls to computer-aided controls to entirely computer-directed controls. When a question of investment is involved, it is still typical for the technical/technological aspect to be a priority in terms of the work effort and the attention of management, while organization and control assume a subordinate position. But precisely these aspects have considerable influence with respect to the effective use of investment funds.

If universal CAD/CAM systems are now created, computer-aided production process control will become the focal point of CAM. This means, however, that CAM must reach a level at which computer-aided work methods are effective--computer systems alone accomplish nothing--and the current level is not adequate for creating efficient CAM systems. In essence there are nine requirements to be met if CAM systems are not to simply add "computer-aided" to inadequate processes. What are these nine requirements?

1. Creation of Stable Organizational Processes

Upon examining the enterprises' "Handbooks on Enterprise Organization," it is apparent that for a number of enterprise processes there is no organizational study of the flow of material and information; rather, events proceed in operative fashion and "the way our forefathers did them."

Looking at the faults which occur in integrated production sectors in the GDR, we see that 76.71 percent of all faults are organizational in nature (Table 1). The same situation, with 43.3 percent organizational faults (Fig. 3), is shown by an analysis of the use of assembly robots. But this is true not only in parts manufacture but also in foundries. The smelting operation is a representative example; 87.2 percent of all faults are organizational in nature in smelting plants with a high level of automation (Fig. 4). It can thus be concluded that a low level of production organization condemns the high technical level of enterprise systems to reduced effectiveness.

Table 1. Technical and Organizational Faults in IGFA's Studied

Type of Fault	Percentage	
Machines and tools	7.43%	
Machine controls	11.76%	Technical faults
Production control and guidance systems (PKLA)	3.55%	
Shelf pickers	0.55%	
Machine not manned	10.74%	
Incorrect data input to PKLA	31.57%	Organizational fault
Shelf picker not manned	11.84%	
Incorrect items on shelf	4.76%	
Incorrect documents	1.47%	
Material not available	7.03%	
Economic plan not available	9.31%	
	100.00%	

The basis of all production process control is therefore a clearcut organizational breakdown and a step-by-step approach to enterprise processes taking into account the interrelationships among the following:

- enterprise organization
- production organization
- production process control

The quickening pace in terms of utilizing industrial robots has shown how much the basic production worker is used as a controller, regulator and "trouble-shooter within the organization." When he was released from operating and supplying the machines, he continued to be needed as an organizer and supervisor because these functions cannot be included in the automation concept.





Fig. 3 Technical and Organizational Faults in Production Cells Using Loading Robots (based on 39 cells)

Key:

- | | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| 1. Robots and robot controls, 18.3% | 6. Material not available, 8.8% |
| 2. Setup man not present, 4.4% | 7. Program not available, 3.1% |
| 3. Tool missing, 3.4% | 8. Tools, 2.1% |
| 4. Means of transport not available, 7.4% | 9. Peripherals, 8.4% |
| 5. Maintenance personnel not available, 16.2% | 10. Machines and controls, 27.9% |
| | 11. Technical faults, 56.7% |
| | 12. Organizational faults, 43.3% |

Fig. 4 Technical and Organizational Faults in Smelting Area of Foundry



The automation concept had to be that way, however, because the organizational concept was that way. With increasing automation in machine construction enterprises, therefore, one must:

- first integrate (functional and technical integration)
- then organize (detailed process sequences)
- and only then automate!

2. More Order in Materials Management

In looking at the structures, numbers of employees and their qualifications, and the office equipment involved in materials management, one gets the feeling that rationalization within the enterprise has passed this important area by. How else could it be that the following figures appear (Table 2):

Table 2. Realization of Monthly Plans (based on 22 sectors)

No. of production orders per month	Percentage	Reason
Started as planned	38.4	
Started early	4.0	Assembly requirements
Started additionally	5.1	Assembly requirements
Started late	50.5	Lack of material disposition
Incomplete start	2.0	
	100.0	

Out of all of the production orders contained in a monthly plan, 50.5 percent are started late and 2 percent involved an incomplete start because the materials were not yet available on the planned insertion date. This kind of organization in the scheduling departments, which is also explained by their low data processing level, cannot provide effective production performance.

3. More Stable Technological Production Base

As can be seen in Fig. 1, technological production scheduling provides important production target figures for production process control; adherence to these figures is justifiably demanded as "technological discipline." But even the best attitude toward discipline breaks down when "external operative intervention" is required due to unstable technological production scheduling; in the first place this disrupts the production process and in the second place it makes the control process unnecessarily more hectic. Table 3 shows an analysis of several integrated types of production in which "external operative intervention" was studied. This "intervention" accounts for only 10.78 percent of all faults but severely affects the organization of computer-aided systems and planned process steps.

4. Produce Real Planned Values for Throughput Times

A central objective of production process control is to minimize product throughput times. Just as in production planning, computer-aided use must be made of planning figures produced by technological production scheduling in terms of arranging for machines and work stations to be manned. However,

Table 3. Breakdown of "External Operative Intervention" (based on 22 sectors)

Step taken	Percentage
Change in lot priority	3.08
Rushed throughput	10.77
Separation of lots	9.23
Added production phases	15.38
Deleted production phases	23.09
General change of technology	23.07
Cancellation of lot	1.54
Temporary removal from production	10.76
Reworking due to technological changes	3.08
	100.00

these technological planning figures rarely coincide with reality; as a result, "pro forma" use is made of them, but in practice they are not followed. If they are based on deadline planning and utilization schedules, the result is the notorious fault circle of production process control (Fig. 5, according to Wiendahl).




Fig. 5 Production Process Control Fault Circle (according to Wiendahl)

Key:

1. Poor adherence to deadlines (deviation from control of deadlines)
2. Increase in planned throughput times
3. Orders are released earlier
4. Machine and work station loads increase
5. Order backlogs increase
6. Actual throughput times become longer and more varied

Poor adherence to deadlines or the operative struggle to meet contract and delivery deadlines leads to increases in technological throughput figures being ordered once the deficiency is recognized; according to the fault circle shown, this increases controls with respect to the final deadlines---a vicious circle which can only be broken by means of systematic throughput analyses and by combatting the causes.

An analysis of the throughput times in heavy machine construction shows the following values:

If the overall throughput time up through assembly is considered 100 percent, then

- 10 percent involves assembly (processing)
- 10 percent involves transport to and among the different types of assembly equipment
- 40 percent involves waiting periods following production phases
- 40 percent involves waiting periods prior to production phases.

This 80 percent share of the throughput time attributed to waiting periods is broken down as follows:

- 42 percent is attributed to fault-induced waiting periods involving parts and assemblies
- 38 percent is caused by inadequate coordination in the control model and by disproportionality in terms of time

This means:

- First of all, that the 38 percent must be reduced through the creation of a control model. This is only possible in conjunction with parts production controls.
- The 42 percent of fault-induced waiting times are broken down as follows:
 - 28.9 percent are organizational faults
 - 7.6 percent are contract changes on short notice
 - 3.8 percent are design errors
 - 1.3 percent are technological faults
 - 0.4 percent are faults in the assembly equipment

The absolute critical factor here is to reduce the 28.9 percent waiting time attributed to organizational faults by establishing quickly reacting fault management functions within production process control. Both requirements--namely establishing and implementing a control model and establishing effective production process control functions--are based on prerequisites which will now be gone into in greater detail.

5. Creation of Control Models for CAM Systems

That the use of EDP, even when used in production in decentralized fashion, is still no guarantee for effective control is well known and has been proven in practice. Control means realizing control strategies which are derived from control models. For years parts manufacture has involved the development of series models representing all theoretical nuances. Their practical significance is slight because they are either too far removed from the actual process or, if they can be put into practice at all, result only in part in an

optimum situation. Walking through the production workshops in the machine construction industry, one is struck by the material stockpiles in the shop. Insertion strategies based on actual throughput times are lacking. Fig. 6 shows a parts production analysis of how clerks manage insertion tasks with respect to production orders.

At what point in time the managing clerk submits the order was studied. Depending on the planned throughput values and the resulting final deadline, 4213 production orders were classified as distributed either at the proper insertion time, too early or too late. Fig. 6 shows that 56.6 percent of all orders are submitted too early, i.e. when the material is released or comes in, in hopes of achieving improved adherence to deadlines. In reality these production orders clog the workshop and contribute to the production process control fault circle. The "let's be sure mindset" of these managing clerks leads to considerable uncertainty. To find the causes of early insertion one need only study the workload times per production order (Fig. 7):

- 56.6 percent of the orders are inserted too early; they account for 71.9 percent of the workload
- 34.8 percent of the orders are inserted too late; they account for 22.5 percent of the workload




Fig. 6 Distribution of Insertion Deadlines in Parts Production (based on 4213 production orders)

Key:

1. Workload insertion, rel. frequency in percent
2. too late
3. too early
4. hours
5. At proper time
6. Days
7. Basis: 46,174.5 hours workload




Fig. 7 Distribution of Inserted Workload in Parts Production (based on 4213 production orders)

Key:

1. Insertion deadline, relative frequency
2. Too late
3. Too early
4. Correct insertion deadline
5. Days
6. Based on 4213 production orders

The greater the workload represented by a production order, the greater the attempt to insert it independently of the planned throughput figures.

The causes of late insertion are also interesting (Fig. 8):




Fig. 8 Causes of Late Insertion of Production Orders (based on 1464 production orders)

Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Based on 1464 late production orders, 2 to 38 days late | 5. Blocking of unfinished parts by the technical control organization |
| 2. Material lacking in part or entirely at insertion deadline | 6. Transport delays |
| 3. Economic plan lacking at insertion deadline | 7. Change in priority |
| 4. Documents and programs lacking | 8. Machine occupied with first operation |
| | 9. EDP listing error |
- Again there is insufficient material availability, this time 50.2 percent
 - again, instability in terms of technological production scheduling measured by the lack of an economic plan with 18.3 percent and a lack of documents and programs with 1.4 percent for a total of 19.7 percent
 - as well as the lack of a control model, measured in terms of changes in priority with 12.8 percent and competitive situations regarding orders at the machines with 8 percent for a total of 20.8 percent.
6. Effective Production Data Acquisition, Reducing Paperwork Whenever Possible

How can you properly control production and successfully use control models if you do not know the real-time status of the process?

Progress reports and availability updates from the production process itself are required for turning control models into control strategies--production control reports reflecting the actual status of the process which are produced

quickly in accurate, comprehensive form. Although automation-related solutions have been used successfully in production control in the GDR for more than 10 years, the level of production control in the broad field of machine construction is insufficient.

At the present time only 21 percent of the enterprises have production control systems. A prerequisite for CAM systems, however, is complete, real-time production data acquisition.

There is currently a very obvious decline in this level beginning with parts production and proceeding to assembly and on to the foundries. Table 4 shows an example of the level of production data acquisition in moulding shops.

Table 4. Level of Production Data Acquisition in Moulding Shops

Data acquisition, moulding shops, %	Material in use	Model stockpiles	Progress controls	Faults & utilization	Quality
No acquisition	36	22	4	32	11
Hand-written records	32	41	43	19	22
Conventional documentation	30	34	48	34	67
Automatic recording systems	1	0	0	8	0
Manual EDP input	1	3	5	5	0
System for automatic reporting to EDP	0	0	0	2	0
Machine-readable documentation	0	0	0	0	0

As can be seen, the categories "no acquisition" and "hand-written records" clearly predominate. However, if the "conventional documentation" category is added, an average of 95 percent of production data acquisition is in a form which is entirely unsuited to CAM systems.

It must nevertheless be said that the presence of production control systems and their ties to process computers are no guarantee that information as to the actual status of the production process will be provided. Following the introduction of DARO manual computer input stations in a heavy machine construction enterprise, for months 300 of the approximately 380 items input per shift were knowingly or accidentally entered incorrectly.

The result was a duplication of effort on the part of the "hand-written/operative" and "EDP-supported" organizations whereby the former was naturally granted priority and management even considered dismantling the manual input stations.

Only consistent, increased discipline provided the breakthrough. Data acquisition in terms of the production process also includes fault reporting. If the duration of technical faults is analyzed (fault duration is the time from the beginning of the fault until production is resumed), the ratio of fault duration to maintenance period is on the average 12 to 1, i.e. repair takes

one hour; the machine is down for 12 hours because eleven hours are required for notification, paperwork, diagnostics, calling the manufacturer's service department (e.g. because the enterprise itself does not yet have an electronics engineer available) and to transfer control of the machine or system.

Maintenance organization is also part of effective production organization and should not be excluded when creating CAM systems.

That production data acquisition is also the basis for CAM/CAM system data-banks needs no further explanation.

7. Proper Use of Computers--Decentralized and at Established Levels

The increasing availability of decentralized computer technology (KRS 4201, PRS 4000, PBT 4000, then K1600, office computers and personal computers) now as in the past continues to promote the development of production process control--but not by itself.

Qualified examples, such as the SKET or SKL parent enterprises, are proof of this.

Typical errors which apparently continue to occur from one instance of application to another are:

- First hardware is ordered and only then does the search begin for useable software.
- After the standard software is obtained it is determined that full use cannot be made of it with respect to its application within the enterprise.
- Then qualified people are sought to produce in-house software but only a vague idea of the required software capacity is present.

Software specialists for "production planning" and "production control" always answer the question of how much software capacity is needed with, "More than you think!"

The desire for the "maximum amount of equipment" is also typical. In the meantime methods have been developed for prior determination of the level of equipment required for control purposes depending on the level of the technological process and the type of system in which it will be used.

The proper use of EDP systems is planned at levels clearly emphasizing the various different breakdowns, as shown by a series of progressive examples of IGFA controls (i.e. the VEG Gear Factory in Gotha). The decentralized nature of EDP and its increasing user-friendliness have produced dispatcher centrals which take on the character of a control station; this trend toward tight control is to be continued in introducing further flexible production systems.

Control stations must be properly integrated into the multi-level CAD/CAM system (Fig. 9), as is already the case in a number of existing projects in the GDR.




Fig. 9 Multi-Level Concept

Key:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Enterprise Level | 18. Control computer for automatic stock management and transfer |
| 2. Control of order progress
- material availability for orders
- balance sheets | 19. Shelf |
| 3. Information level | 20. Transfer facility |
| 4. Enterprise computer (w/peripherals) | 21. Commissioning station |
| 5. On-line or off-line | 22. Program distribution for CNC, DNC |
| 6. Enterprise orders | 23. Machine 1 |
| 7. Production plan | 24. Machine n |
| 8. Design databank | 25. Testing and measurement locations |
| 9. Technology databank | 26. Robot 1 |
| 10. Materials management databank | 27. Robot m |
| 11. Control Level | 28. Adapter unit for production data acquisition |
| 12. Production computer (w/peripherals) | 29. Terminal unit 1 |
| 13. Dispatcher central of IGFA | 30. Terminal unit k |
| 14. Video terminal | 31. Automatic data acquisition |
| 15. Intercom | 32. DIALOG terminal |
| 16. Process Level | 33. Other communications equipment (intercoms, telephone) |
| 17. Master or control computer for transport equipment (shelf-picker) | 34. Alarm systems |
| | 35. Tool management |

There are three levels from the bottom up:

- the process level with
 - control computers for automated transport equipment
 - control computers for automated stock management and transfer facilities
 - decentralized program distribution units for CNC-DNC machines, for robot controls and for controlling peripherals, as well as tool storage, test and measuring equipment, safety equipment, etc.
 - production data acquisition with manual input stations, terminals, limit switches, sensors, approach switches, laser guns, CCD cameras, etc.
 - equipment for receiving control commands (which may be identical to production data acquisition equipment) and
 - other communications equipment (such as intercom systems, telephones, alarm systems, etc.)
- above that the control station level with:
 - managing clerk's console, terminals and communications equipment
 - process computers as production control computers with peripherals
- above that the level of the enterprise computer or central computer as a central facility in which planning, cost accounting and production scheduling processes take place within the CAD/CAM system framework and in which the schedule and planning databanks are administered.

In terms of its possibilities, the control station level is particularly important for production process control. At the same time, the amount of technical equipment is relatively modest because it is integrated into the multi-level concept; but the potential for interactive work at the video terminal can be great. Throughput planning, scheduling, workload planning, workload balancing, deadline shifting, availability and progress controls--all this can be worked out at the video terminal using graphics and interacting with the process computer and the enterprise computer.

However, these are not yet fully developed CAM systems but rather the initial steps toward that end.

8. Improved Qualifications Structure for Production Process Control

If it is true that everything depends on the employees, then this is also true with respect to the need for raising the level of production process control.

Up to now some neglect in this area has been permitted. A study was made of qualifications in the areas of design and technology on the one hand and production process control on the other hand (Table 5).

Table 5. Qualifications Structure in the Areas of Design/Technology and Production Process Control (based on 7 enterprises)

Qualifications

Type of Employee	College Grad.	Technical School Grad.	Master Workman	Occupation	No Occupation
Design/technology	39%	47%	12%	2%	0%
Production process control	2%	18%	46%	30%	4%

This table shows that the qualifications in the area of production process control are clearly lower than those in design and technology.

Why is this so?

One reason is age relationships, as shown in Fig. 10. While there is a proper distribution of age categories in design and technology, production process control shows an untenable age distribution--which is also an indication of the importance the enterprise places on these positions. There is certainly no question that the structures involving age and qualifications can be correlated with one another. Not investigated was what qualifications the employees in the areas of production planning and control actually have. The results would probably be clearcut. The need for higher qualifications appears not to be very great in some enterprises, although it is well known that expertise requirements increase drastically when integrated production and decentralized computer technology are introduced. When the Otto von Guericke College of Magdeburg (Department of Enterprise Structures) in 1984 offered a post-graduate degree in "production process control engineering," several of the enterprises notified responded with the comment "no need." The courses were taken, however, by people whose enterprises had already made good progress in the area of production process control. As long as this situation is tolerated, requests for more effective controls will remain in the realm of pipe dreams.




Fig. 10 Age Structure in the Areas of Design/Technology and Production Process Control (based on 7 enterprises)

Key:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| 1. Relative frequency | 4. Years |
| 2. Design/technology | 5. Age |
| 3. Enterprise management
(production process control) | 6. (Based on 7 enterprises) |

9. Say Good-Bye to Outdated Perceptions

Tucholsky said, "Never trust an expert who says 'I've been doing it that way for 20 years'--you can also do something the wrong way for 20 years!"

With the development of universal CAD/CAM systems, one is forced to relinquish outdated perceptions. Such perceptions are:

- "Any lowering of a single throughput time, any single increase in capacity utilization, is favorable in terms of the final result."
The truth is that only overall product throughput time contributes to increased effectiveness and single increases in capacity utilization often contribute to increased throughput times.
- "Any reduction in the standard mean time is favorable in terms of increased performance within the production system."
Rather, it is possible that a one-sided attitude toward time reductions can lead to an increase in overall organization-related costs (e.g. automatic operating time in production cells with robots as a function of tool service life).
- "When EDP is introduced, more information must be given to management so that better decisions can be made."
The fact is that managers cannot handle the flood of information that now threatens to overrun them and that decisions will continue to be made empirically. It is a matter of making selective choices. What is overlooked here is the reliability of the information resulting from an inadequate level of data acquisition.
- "Organizational solutions and their use in EDP must be adapted to existing plant and enterprise structures; otherwise they will not work."
The truth is rather that organizational solutions "do not work" because they are plopped down onto structures in need of change. The attitude, "We have always done it this way," plays a major role here.
- "Once the microcomputers and video terminals are in place, consistency will improve."
It is true that hardware is certainly necessary, but it only becomes useable when software is added--software which is based on algorithmic organization steps and which must be largely prepared in-house. This requires trained specialists.
- "Anyone can organize and implement production if he just has experience with the enterprise and force of will." (See also Table 5 and Fig. 10)
If this were true, the level would meet our expectations.

10. Summary

Increasing the level of production process control in the enterprises of the machine construction industry is an objective requirement for increasing effectiveness. Results in terms of capacity utilization, throughput times, stockpiles and adherence to deadlines can be structured much more favorably when computer-aided production planning and production process control within universal CAD/CAM systems is successfully introduced and implemented.

Organizational problems still affect even modern production sectors too much, throughput times are still too long, adherence to deadlines is still too poor and stockpiles are still too high. Progress in this area will not come all by itself. International comparisons must be made not only in design and technology but also in production process control and production organization.

New prerequisites must first be met before effective CAD/CAM systems can be implemented. This report attempts to provide food for thought in terms of bringing this about.

DUTCH SCHOLAR QUESTIONS 'ECONOMIC MIRACLE'

The Hague INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR in Dutch Vol 40 No 7, Jul 86 pp 444-448

[Article by Dr Ruud Knaack, member of the academic staff of the Economics department of the University of Amsterdam: "The Hungarian 'Economic Miracle': Fiction or Reality?"]

[Text] When the situation in Hungary is discussed in the Western press, one can regularly come across the opinion that the Hungarian economy since the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism has been very successful, that relations with foreign countries are stable, and that the internal climate is relatively tolerant. This is also the opinion of many Hungarians themselves. Surveys show that the Hungarians perceive in particular the economic situation in their country to be better than that of other socialist countries.¹

This high opinion of the Hungarian economy cannot be based on the good macro-economic performance of the official, "first economy." These results lag significantly behind the results in other countries adhering to socialism with the exception of Poland. From this, it follows that an explanation for the high esteem given the Hungarian economy will have to be found outside the macro-economic atmosphere of the official, first economy.

The First Economy

The biggest problem with which the Hungarian economy had to struggle during the first half of the eighties was the deterioration of its international financial position. In 1982, Hungary experienced a liquidity crisis. This was caused by the fact that since the Polish crisis Western banks were less and less willing to meet the East European countries' need for loans in hard currency. In 1982, the East European countries received 20 percent less in loans than the year before.² Besides that, the Soviet Union was less and less willing to buy Hungarian agricultural products for hard currency. The Hungarian need for loans is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Need for Loans, 1981-1984 (in billion dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Current account	0.7	0	-0.3	-0.4
Interest & Principal	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.6
Gross loan requirements	4.5	3.4	2.8	3.2
Hard currency reserves	1.4	1.7	1.2	1.6
Unused credits	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.3
Means	2.1	2.1	1.7	1.9
Net loan requirements	2.4	1.3	1.1	1.3

Source: "Recent Trends in the International Financial Situation of Eastern Europe," in: "Financial Market Trends," March 1985, Table 8.

The Hungarian need for loans was the direct result of the balance of payments problems of the seventies. Except for the years 1972 and 1973, the current account balance was continually negative. Running parallel to this was the fact that the foreign debt burden was growing continuously larger. Whereas the hard currency debt was still negligible in the early seventies, in 1982 the net debt burden was \$7.8 billion. This debt burden would have been even greater, if Hungary hadn't had a positive trade balance with the other Comecon countries in hard currency trade. The deficit during the period 1974-78 would have been about 30 percent higher per year, if Comecon trade in hard currency had been balanced.³

The Hungarian foreign trade problems were largely caused by a continued deterioration in the terms of trade. In the period 1974-75, the dollar terms of trade deteriorated by 20.3 percent, while after 1975 the ruble terms of trade also gradually deteriorated.⁴ A partial explanation for this deterioration is Hungary's dependency on oil and raw materials imports. Other factors, however, played a part as well. An indication of this can be found in the fact that the deterioration in the terms of trade continued in the eighties, despite the drop in oil and raw materials prices during that period. The negative trade balance was also caused by the bad showing in exports, especially of Hungarian industrial products. Many industrial products couldn't compete on the world market, and could only be sold at drastically reduced prices.

Hungary's financial problems in the early eighties are demonstrated by the fact that in 1981 loan interest and principal amounted to about 60 percent of income from exports. It was impossible to reduce the burden of these debts by drastically reducing imports. Such imports were necessary to keep the Hungarian economy going. Hungary, in 1982, was the second East European country, after Romania, to become a member of the large international financial needs. That policy was successful. By being able to get billions in loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Bank for International Credits, Hungary didn't have to resort to drastic import restrictions or a restructuring of its debts.⁵

The unique position which Hungary held in international markets meant, therefore, that Hungary was able to handle its balance of trade more smoothly than

many other East European countries. The surplus in the current account was smaller than in 1984-85. In view of the fact that this surplus had been accumulated because of import restrictions, this balance of payments policy did have a negative effect on economic growth. This surplus moreover, was in all East European countries decidedly lower during the eighties (see Table 2).

Table 2. Growth of net production (in percentage points per year)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1976-80</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Bulgaria	6.1	5.0	4.2	3.0	4.0
Czechoslovakia	3.7	-0.1	-0.3	2.2	2.3
GDR	4.1	4.8	2.5	4.4	4.7
Poland	1.2	-12.0	-5.5	4.5	3.7
Romania	7.3	2.2	2.8	3.4	3.8
Hungary	3.2	2.5	2.3	0.5	1.8

Source: H. Hohmann and C. Meier, "Economic Situation, Foreign Trade and Foreign Policy in East Europe: The Political Economy of the Comecon Summit Conference," in: "Berichte des Bundesinstituts fuer Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien" [Reports of the Federal Institute for Eastern Economic and International Studies], Cologne, 55, 1984, p 11.

Given the fact that Hungary had to resort to less drastic import restrictions than the other East European countries, one would have expected the rate of growth in Hungary's net production in 1983-84 to compare favorably with the rate of growth in the other Eastern European countries. However, in this period the average rate of growth was the lowest of all the East European countries, except Poland. One has to keep in mind, though, that the growth rate figures of the other East European countries were probably more inflated than those of Hungary.

The enormous export effort, combined with the deterioration in the terms of trade and the freeze on imports, led to a situation in which the 1981-84 national income lagged notably behind the GNP. (see Table 3)

Table 3. Some data on changes in the Hungarian economy in the period 1981-84 (in percentage points)

<u>Item</u>	<u>1976-80</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Net Production	2.8	2.5	2.6	0.3	2.9
Usable Production	1.7	0.7	-1.1	-2.7	1.0
Consumption	3.0	3.0	1.4	0.6	1.0
Investments	-2.9	-8.6	-2.4	-20.4	-(8-9)
Real wages	0.7	1.1	0.7	- 3.2	- 2.3
Prices	6.3	4.6	6.9	7.3	8.5

Source: United Nations, "Economic Survey of Europe in 1984-1985," Tables 4.1.4, 4.1.8 and 4.5.1; A. Wass von Czege, "Hungary's Economic Development 1984-85," in "Suedost-Europa" [Southeast Europe], No 3-4, 1985.

The growth rate in usable production decreased from 0.7 percent in 1981 to minus 2.7 percent in 1983. This decrease came at the expense of net investments. These fell in the period 1981-84 on an average of approximately 10 percent per year, causing investments in national income to decrease from 23.6 percent in 1976-80 to 11.8 percent in 1984.

The decrease in investments has resulted in outmoded machinery. This is clearly one of the dilemmas of the present Hungarian economy. The stagnation in growth leads to obsolescence of machinery, with adverse consequences for export opportunities and future growth of the economy, or it leads to stagnation in consumer goods imports thus causing strains on Kadar's "social contract."⁶

In 1981-84, real wages dropped an average of 1 percent per year. This real wage drop was caused by the fact that wage increases fell behind rapid price increases. In 1981-84, prices rose (officially) an average of about 8 percent per year. These price increases, and also those in preceding periods, were defended by the government with the argument that by allowing this to happen, price subsidies could be eliminated. These price subsidies are an extremely heavy burden on the state's budget. Yearly, the subsidies devour almost 30 percent of the state's budget.⁷ This argument turned out not to hold true in reality. In 1981-83, price increases had no effect on the total expenditure for subsidies. Also in 1980, the year of the highest price increases, the planned decrease in subsidies wasn't reached.

The above-mentioned imbalances in the Hungarian economy were fully manifested in 1985. The growth of net industrial production in 1985 was one percent lower than in 1984. Industrial production hardly increased; agricultural production rose by 2-3 percent. The balance of payments with the West again showed a deficit of \$300 million, despite a surplus of \$300 million in the trade balance with the West. The difference was caused by a debt of about \$600 million in interest and principal. Rays of hope came from the positive trade balance with other Comecon countries and the fact that in 1985 a halt was called to decreases in real wages.

Also in 1985, the inflation rose to a high level again: at least 7 percent. This was caused largely by price increases in government services (utilities, transportation, and postal services). Thus on 1 January 1985, the cost of electricity and natural gas went up by 18-30 percent, the cost of public transportation increased by 55-60 percent and the postal service rates by 70 percent.⁸

The Second Economy

You can ask yourself why the Hungarians continue on this path, in spite of the apparent disappointing results. For this at least two reasons can be found.

In the first place, economic reforms have run parallel to a liberalization in the political atmosphere. Since 1 January 1985 the government has been

experimenting with various forms of worker management. Exempt from these reforms are national utility companies and those industries which have been labeled by the government as being strategically important; for example, industries which produce military hardware. Management in these industries is appointed by the ministries. In the rest of the large and medium-sized industries, part of the ministerial responsibility is passed on to newly-created councils, in which half of the members are chosen by the employees and the other half is made up of representatives of management, the party, the union and the youth organization.

In principle, the council may make decisions on all key issues and choose managers from among party-sponsored candidates. In small industries, those having 300-500 employees, the employees can choose the managers directly in a general election. Of the industries which originally came under the ministry of industry, two-thirds are now managed by a council, 17 percent through a general election, and 13-15 percent have remained under administrative management.⁹

In comparison with other East European countries, the Kadar regime is fairly tolerant of opposition groups. For instance, hardly any action is taken against Hungarian "Samizdat" [underground] literature.¹⁰ Also because of this tolerant climate, the Hungarian Samizdat literature reflects the opposition's efforts to attain a certain level of dialogue. Thus this literature serves a useful purpose as a supplier of ideas to the rulers.

An improvement took place in connection with election procedures for Hungarian representative bodies. Until recently, elections took place for which almost exclusively only one candidate was nominated. In 1980, for example, in only 15 of the 355 districts was there more than one candidate up for national election. In the 1985 elections, multiple candidates were required for each district.

In the second place, the situation for consumers in Hungary is considerably better than that in other East European countries. Hungary's food supply in particular is unsurpassed. Not only is the quantity and variety of goods available larger, but the quality of the goods is often better.

This favorable situation is caused not only by the fact that, as a result of economic reform, state industries and agriculture function better. An important part in offering quality products is played by the "second economy."¹¹ The size of this second economy, is estimated to be between 20 and 35 percent. Everybody can start his own little workshop, provided he has a "declaration of morally good behavior," (thus no criminal record), or can handle the extra work in the evening hours along with his regular job. About half of the population earns something extra in this way. In 1983 there were already 22,000 private enterprises in existence, which employed about 130,000 people. The size of such private enterprises might not involve more than 12 persons. However, larger units can be created through the forming of working groups.¹²

Furthermore, it is not unusual for employees of a factory to stay on after regular working hours to use machinery, and to produce goods for their own

profit as a work collective. In this manner, workers in a leather goods factory in Budapest work more than 60 hours of overtime, and thus they increase their earnings from 5,500 forints to 8,000 forints per month.

Another type of frequent overtime work takes place in the building industry. The housing situation in Hungary is bad. The Hungarian rental houses are smaller, and there is a longer waiting period for housing than in the GDR.¹³ That is the reason why affluent people prefer to build their own houses in their spare time, after work. In this way 40 percent of the newly-constructed apartments have been built by the people themselves.¹⁴ The cost of newly-built housing is, however, very high. The building costs run from 18,000-30,000 forints per square meter. Furthermore, only half a million forints can be borrowed at 8 percent interest. Monthly housing costs amount very quickly to one whole month's salary. That's why it is a dire necessity for many to earn some extra money in the second economy.

Much leisure time is spent in the so-called "allotment plots." Hungary has around 1.8 million allotment plots in which half the population, more than five million people, regularly spend many hours. The yield from these allotment plots is not to be neglected. The city-dwellers alone grow 18.2 percent of the country's total agricultural production¹⁵ on their allotment plots. Altogether the private agricultural sector is accountable for almost 40 percent of national agricultural production.¹⁶

The economic reforms have led to a schism between those who did profit by the reforms and those who didn't.¹⁷ The differences in income in Hungary are already greater than in the Netherlands. The high incomes have been earned especially in the second economy. The hourly wage in the second economy is five times higher than in the first economy. Altogether, the majority of the population is living well thanks to the second economy; 45 percent of Hungarian families own a car. Those who didn't profit by the reforms were people who only had one income from a payroll, or who were dependent on state benefits. The real wages have gone down by more than 10 percent since 1978. The 2.2 million old people lead a very difficult life. Pensions increased annually by 2 percent, while the inflation increased by about 8 percent. An 80-year-old person gets only 60 percent of what a person who retires now receives. If the monthly income amounts to 5,500 forints, then the average pension is at present about 2,700 forints. It is estimated that half of all pensioners receive a pension which lies at or below the official poverty level. It is, therefore, not surprising that about 20 percent of Hungarian pensioners have some extra job. Although it is common knowledge that the elderly almost starve, hardly any measures have been taken to correct this situation. Clearly, Hungary doesn't care about social policy.¹⁸

Evaluation

The reforms in Hungary were supported by the majority of the population. This support does not come from the macro-economic results of the first economy. According to the official figures, these results were the worst of all East European countries, except for the figures from Poland.

Rather, it must be concluded that this support comes from a combination of carefully planned political reforms and the growing prosperity of Hungarian society.

The above-mentioned facts make it clear that everything is relative when one evaluates an economic system, using traditional criteria to explain the cause of the growth in national income. These criteria hardly give an indication of the prosperity of a country, since they leave out of consideration the quality of production and the entire unofficial sector, including work done at home.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Radio Free Europe Research Eastern Europe/Hungary," 11 January 1985, p 12.
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13092/12859

CSO: 3614/128

IMPACT OF DRUG, MEDICINE SHORTAGES REPORTED

Hard Currency Needed for Imports

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Aug 86 pp 1, 2

[Article by I.M.: "Allocated Foreign Exchange Urgently Needed"]

[Text] (Own Information) In March of last year [1985], the government passed Resolution No 36/85 pertaining to the development of the pharmaceutical industry. One hundred fifty-six million dollars for the purchase of raw materials and semi-finished products as well as \$31 million for the import of machinery and equipment for the pharmaceutical industry were written into the Central Annual Plan. The program is to be implemented at a cost of 91 billion zloty of which only 6.6 billion is to come from the central fund. The remaining sum represents enterprise personal funds, bank credit, and reduced rates for payments into the budget.

A year has already passed since the government resolution was passed and, unfortunately, not many accomplishments may be noted in the implementation of the program.

Up to 8 August, of the \$156 million allocated for the purchase of raw materials only 56 million has been received--not one million went for the import of machinery.

Manufacturers are lacking the raw material for the production of many drugs. The supplies received by pharmacies are far from adequate and irregular. In such a situation, it is difficult to talk about exports which were to be one of the fundamental sources of self-financing of the pharmaceutical industry's development program.

Fr. Kubiczek, first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers Planning Commission, informed reporters at a press conference held on the 6th of this month [August] that \$327 million is projected to be allocated within the framework of the operational program for the import of indispensable drugs, equipment, etc. for the second payments area. This is more than had been allocated to the ministry of health and social welfare, and the pharmaceutical industry jointly for the purchase of prepared medicinal drugs.

However, the point of the matter is that this is already the eighth month of the year and there is no sign of the foreign-exchange currency. It flows more freely for the import of prepared drugs, although, the allocated sum of \$105 million is smaller than the amount required for implementation last year. For the coverage of the current year's needs, the ministry of health and social welfare should have \$230 million, especially since medicinal drug prices are growing on world markets.

On 23 July, the government made a decision regarding the allocation of an additional \$6 million which the ministry of health and social welfare wants to use for the purchase of urgently needed drugs of the cardiological, oncological and anesthesiological group as well as blood-derivative drugs and those necessary for the diets of children with absorption disorders [zaburzenia wchlaniania]. However, to date the allocated foreign exchange has not reached its recipient.

At the same time, that part of the Government Resolution No 36/85, which pertains among other things to the creation of a central development fund for the supplemental financing of investment tasks that are not efficient but socially indispensable, is not being implemented. What matters here is that a fund be created from the financial means of individual pharmaceutical enterprises that would enable small, devastated plants to modernize and to expand domestic and export production.

On the other hand, a foreign-exchange fund has been created. It is made up of allowances [opdisy] in the amount of 50 percent from the exports of individual manufacturers. The situation in the area of pharmaceutical production does not, for the time being, foresee a speedy improvement in the flow of supplies. As long as there will not be available foreign-exchange for the purchase of indispensable raw materials and machinery, we will experience shortages of medicinal drugs and there will be no possibility of serious exports.

At the same time, there are not enough funds for the import of prepared drugs. This is particularly strongly felt because we need to buy life-saving drugs. Therefore, we are waiting, following the announcement made by the vice-chairman of the Planning Commission, for the bank to set in motion the letter of credit, all the more that we shall feel the effect of the trade talks no sooner than several months from now.

Regional Sampling of Shortages

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13 Aug 86 p 1

[Article by I.M.: "Supplies Do Not Meet the Need"]

[Text] (Own Information.) In the continuously crowded pharmacies of Poznan, clients often do not obtain the medicine they are looking for. To be sure, the supply of vitamins has been improved somewhat and some antibiotics are available. However, oncological drugs are sold only in pharmacies that carry

imported drugs. Corinfar and sustac are available. There is a complete lack of bandages and dressings as well as remedies for diarrhea reports our representative in Poznan.

"Our greatest problem," writes a representative of TRYBUNA LUDU from Katowice, "is the storage of antibiotics in suspension for children. The supply of oncological drugs is particularly bad. There is a shortage of the greatly sought after drug called "denol" which is used for peptic ulcers and the drug, voltaren, used for rheumatic fever is scarce. There is also a shortage of drugs for the treatment of hypertension such as heamiton and depegyt, among others. There is no syncumar which is indispensable in postoperative states in heart surgery. The supply of propranolol meets 30 percent of the demand. The supply of vitamins is better."

The paper's representative in Gdansk entitled his correspondence regarding the supply of medicinal drugs: "It Takes a Lot Running Around." We find out from the text that although theoretically most drugs are to be found in pharmacies, it is difficult to have a prescription filled in just one pharmacy. In the area of Trojmiasto, the greatest shortage is that of oncological drugs. In general, there is a lack of contraceptives for women.

Our correspondent in Krakow notifies us that for 2,100 drugs and medication distributed by Cefarm, there is, as a rule, a constant shortage of 1,000 positions in various assortments. The difficult situation is intensified by the irregularity of supply deliveries.

The supply of corinfar has improved. A comparable drug, cordipin, is available as well as the Polish cordafen. Curanty, cinorizine, prodictine--these are heart remedies that provide for approximately 30 percent of the need for them. The supply of oncological drugs is very bad. There are approximately 20 drugs in this group. During the best months, the supplies of these drugs provide for slightly under 50 percent of the need. Vitamin supplies meet the same percentage of the need.

It follows from the reports of our representatives that the supply of medicinal drugs in four urban centers of the country is bad. This also concerns life-saving drugs. It is high time that we pass from promises and predictions of improvement in this area to its implementation and this is associated with the setting in motion of the foreign-exchange letter of credit [akredytywa] by the bank that would allow the purchase of raw materials and life-saving drug preparations.

9853/13104
CSO: 2600/635

ERRONEOUS THEORIES ON SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 9, 5 May 86 pp 32-35

/Article by Dr Alecu Al. Floares: "Consolidation and Improvement of Socialist Ownership"/

/Text/ Development, modernization and consolidation of socialist state and co-operative ownership and improvement of social and production relations in their entirety are constant efforts of the RCP and its general secretary Nicolae Ceau-sescu in the task of building the fully developed socialist society and of Romania's advance toward communism. Those efforts are reflected in both theory and practice and both in the economic policy and general strategy for national development and in the legal and legislative field.

The opinions and conclusions in the party and state documents of the last few years, the measures taken to further improve the economic-financial mechanism and to strengthen workers self-management and economic self-administration as reflections of the requirements for further development of socialist ownership, the new regulations on wages on the overall and direct contract systems, etc. also demonstrate the constantly growing concern for consolidation and protection of public property and the national wealth as a whole.

The Objective Basis for Harmonizing General with Individual Interests

Ownership relations play the critical, controlling role in the uniform system of economic and socialist production relations. In Marxist political economics the category of ownership is defined as the sum of the relations among the members of a society in connection with people's acquisition and control of the material values and especially the production means. In that sense ownership covers both the object, namely the material values (tools, raw materials, fuels, consumer goods), and its content of social relations generated by it among the members of society in the social production system in connection with acquisition of the production means.

The relation of ownership, which is not the same as the object of ownership or ownership in the legal sense, reflects the position of the members of society in regard to the production means, the particular way the producer is associated

with the production means, and the way the results of production are acquired. Socialist ownership is a qualitatively new form growing from correlation of production relations with the nature and developmental level of the productive forces and representing the sum of the relations among the members of socialist society in connection with joint acquisition and control of the production means and results of production either by society as a whole or by various groups of associated socialist producers in the case of cooperative ownership.

As we know, in a certain period an effort was made to rate the various forms of socialist ownership, and cooperative ownership was declared "inferior" to the entire people's ownership. Development of cooperative ownership was slighted for a long time because of that view. It is to the credit of the Ninth Party Congress and Nicolae Ceausescu that they realized the bad effects of that idea and took the needed steps for balanced development and further improvement of both forms of ownership.

Experience tells us that once socialist ownership is established the members of society acquire a new, hitherto unknown social status. On the one hand, the indivisible nature of ownership, the direct connection between its extent, quality and structure and the workers' incomes, the abolition of any form of exploitation of man by man, the workers' rise to the rank of owners, producers and beneficiaries of the entire national wealth, and the coordination of the extremely varied existing interests secure the equality of all members of society in regard to the production means. On the other hand, the labor force that mans the production means belongs to every worker, so that there is a unity between the production means and the labor force in that the latter is used, when socialism makes labor the sole source of prosperity, through productive use of the production means, which have become common property.

Being subordinated to some basic common goals, relations among the united socialist producers are necessarily ones of collaboration and friendly mutual aid, taking the form primarily and predominantly of general interests of the entire community. Satisfaction of all the other interests, personal, group or class, depends upon their observance. Although all members of society are in an equal position as regards the production means and can enjoy that position equally, the essential differences that still exist between physical and intellectual work, industrial and agricultural work, and skilled and unskilled labor give rise to certain contradictions, nonantagonistic to be sure, in the full coordination of those categories of interests, and a regular effort is required in order to resolve them.

One of the chief problems of the category of socialist ownership is that of the ways and means of regularly enhancing the individual and collective material and moral incentives to further development and efficient use of the production means. As we know, generalization of socialist production relations in Romania has made radical changes in that direction. The general interests are paramount now, and their satisfaction makes it possible to satisfy the collective and personal interests as well. The general interests of the entire people are based on the position of the members of society as united socialist owners and are ultimately aimed at the individual, the betterment of his material and cultural living standard and quality of life, and accordingly the general progress of society, which is also reflected in the way the national income is allocated to the development fund and the consumption fund.

Collective interests are either those of a class such as the working class or the peasantry or those of social groups such as the members of an agricultural or artisan cooperative, the collective of an enterprise or the collectives under a unified agroindustrial council. The individual interests of each member of society are based on the workers' personal property and are determined by each one's position in the social division of labor and the quantity and quality of his activity and that of the members of his family.

The three categories of interests are harmonized by a general process of resolving the contradictions that arise among them. It can be said that the degree of awareness plays an important part in this at the present developmental level of the productive forces in Romania. Some instances of grafting, stealing from the national wealth or shirking work still indicate a low level of awareness on the part of some members of society and their inadequate understanding of the need of a consistent effort to consolidate socialist ownership, which is the foundation of all socioeconomic development, successful construction of the new order, and the nation's progress and prosperity.

The RCP and its general secretary think that in addition to more intensive political-educational work among the entire population, harmonizing social with personal interests also requires greater material incentives, improvement of the system of Romanian socialist democracy, self-administration and workers self-management, and consistent application of the new economic-financial mechanism. Socialism has created a qualitatively new democratic structure in Romania, in that every worker has both the opportunity and the duty to participate in making decisions and in implementing them as well. The exercise of this right and this opportunity, which the new order alone can guarantee, depends upon the degree of political and occupational training of each member of society.

Socialism, for the triumph of which the RCP has never ceased to struggle in the 65 years of its glorious existence, has proclaimed, established and secured equal opportunities for every worker and every member of society to fully enjoy the benefits of the new order. Implementation of these possibilities ultimately depends upon each one's work, degree of training, ability to understand the social processes and phenomena, and level of social and individual responsibility.

The Entire People's Cause

Both the object of socialist ownership and the social relations that its development requires are in a process of constantly changing interdependence that affects the whole system of social and production relations by determining socioeconomic development as a whole. Accordingly the party general secretary pointed out in his Report to the 13th RCP Congress that "Socialism is producing a new form of ownership of the production means, namely workers joint state and cooperative ownership. This form of ownership of the production means is one of the basic and controlling objective laws as compared with other objective economic laws."

This view, on which the RCP bases construction of the fully developed socialist society and Romania's advance toward communism, is objectively determined by the creative power that can be unleashed by realizing that the nation's progress and

the welfare of every individual and the entire people directly depends upon how the workers perform their essential functions as united socialist producers and joint owners of the entire national wealth. Application of a new economic-financial mechanism, development of workers revolutionary democracy, elevation of the workers general assemblies to the status of supreme decision-making forums, provision for the workers' contribution of social shares to the formation of the economic units' development fund, and introduction of the pledge-contract regulating the legal relations among the ministry managements, enterprises and workers collectives have created a qualitatively new and original framework favorable to regularly increased responsibility for the future of socialist ownership and to a powerful incentive to its development. This framework favors the workers' effective participation in organization, planning and management of all activity in the socioeconomic units in keeping with the demands of uniform management of the national economy on the basis of the Unified National Plan for Socioeconomic Development.

The results of production revert to the owner-producers. The members of society are the united beneficiaries of the results of production and of the administration of the object of socialist ownership. As collective beneficiaries of the results of production, the workers make decisions concerning both the portion of the social output allocated to continuation of the production process on a larger scale and the portion that reverts to them, collectively and individually, to meet their necessities of life. According to the socialist principles of remuneration reflected in the legislation in force and in the Law on the Overall and Direct Contract Systems, every worker directly benefits by a portion of the social output in proportion to his contribution to the development of social production and to national socioeconomic progress. This enhances the workers' sense of responsibility and concern for development of ownership and the results of its productive use. As the party general secretary pointed out, "The workers in an enterprise must realize that they are the owners of that enterprise and are directly responsible for the maintenance and protection of their ownership and its development, and that it is their duty to keep enhancing economic effectiveness with the means that they have, accordingly providing both for the resources needed for their remuneration and share in the profits and the quotas for accumulation and development of the productive forces, and for satisfaction of some general needs of the state and national defense as well."

Nicolae Ceausescu pointed in his speech at the Plenum of the RCP Central Committee in November 1985 that we must firmly foster the feeling of ownership of the workers in all sectors and their sense of responsibility for development and protection of state and cooperative socialist ownership. This is particularly necessary because the progress of the Romanian order, general improvement of the living standard, consolidation of national independence, sovereignty and defensive strength, and the advance toward communism heavily depend upon strengthening both forms of socialist ownership. Accordingly the party general secretary has pointed out the need of firmly rejecting the theories circulating here and there, albeit not in Romania, about the "necessity" of reducing the role and importance of workers joint ownership and reverting in one way or another to forms of private ownership. Nicolae Ceausescu said, "Such trends or theories entirely contradict socialist principles and the fact that the Romanian people have permanently abolished capitalist ownership of the production means and their distribution and will no longer allow it in Romania under any circumstances."

It is to the credit of the RCP that it realized that reduction of responsibility for the future of socialist ownership took place in a certain period when it was defined solely as state ownership, which could give some people with less socialist awareness the impression of separation of ownership from owners. The rejection of such interpretations and the RCP's declaration that the state is an instrument in the hands of the working class and the entire people for administering and protecting socialist ownership and for organized socioeconomic development enabled every worker to understand that it is his right and duty to function in his threefold capacity as owner, producer and beneficiary and that he is responsible for the future of the enterprise where he works as well as the future of the national economy as a whole. The workers' contribution of social shares to the economic units' development funds and sharing in the profits accordingly even further stimulates their awareness as true owners and their interest in increasing the efficiency of the economic activity and the volume of profits and in exemplary fulfillment of the plan tasks.

The Basis of Rapid Development of the Productive Forces

As we know, when Romania began to build the new social order socialist ownership was accomplished by nationalizing the main production means and cooperativizing the small producers. Once the expropriators were expropriated, production relations were radically changed but the productive forces remained underdeveloped. Actually, production relations were far more advanced than the productive forces at the time. To remain at that level meant to opt for a socialism of poverty and to condemn the country to economic and social backwardness. For as we know with low developmental levels of the productive forces international economic exchanges are also unequal, and states that are underdeveloped have to pay a "tribute" every time to the rich countries in one way or another and they come to be politically and economically dependent upon them. The history of mankind demonstrates that the productive forces play a controlling role in the division of the world into rich and poor, privileged and cheated, and rulers and ruled.

In view of such reasons and facts the RCP, especially after the Ninth Party Congress, developed and advanced a scientific view of accelerated development of the productive forces through socialist industrialization and modernization of agriculture and the other sectors. Meanwhile the congress developed a new idea of the sources of financing development, sources on the basis of which its own effort was made of allocating one-third of the national income to the fund for socioeconomic development. As the party general secretary pointed out in his Report to the 13th RCP Congress, "Accumulation and accordingly allocation of a high percentage of the national income to development are objective necessities and laws of socialist construction for general social progress and improvement of the people's material and cultural welfare."

The realism of the RCP's position and the viability of its general secretary's original idea are indicated by the extent of socialist ownership after more than 20 years since the Ninth Party Congress. The fact is conclusive here that in the 1965-1985 period fixed assets were increased from about 500 billion lei to 2,780,000,000,000 lei, or by about 6 times, and the national income was increased by 5 times. In 1985 Romania's industrial output amounted to 1,221,000,000 lei, practically equivalent to the entire output of the 1950-1964 period. Great construction projects have been implemented or are under way that will symbolize

for years the heroism of today's generations and the capacity for action of a free and independent people who are complete masters of their fate, as well as the possibilities created by rapid development of the productive forces on the basis of socialist ownership, such as for example the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the great hydroelectric power plants including Iron Gates I and II, many railways including the Transfagarasul line, thousands of industrial capacities, the great industrial districts and combines, the Bucharest Metro etc.

A chief part in this process of intensive national industrialization has been and is played by rational and harmonious geographic distribution of the productive forces, economic and social improvement of all areas and localities of the nation, and provision for every worker regardless of nationality to have equal opportunities to develop his creative powers. This is illustrated by the present production capacities of such counties as Bacau, Dolj, Galati, Iasi and many others that used to account for only a small percentage of the country's ownership and output, while today each one of them produces more than all Romania did in 1938.

Further Improvement of Socialist Ownership

Alongside accelerated development of the productive forces, socialist industrialization and modernization of all sectors of the national economy, the RCP promoted extensive actions to improve social and production relations, such as the programs and measures to improve distribution relationships through more intensive promotion of the principles of socialist justice and remuneration in proportion to quantity, quality and social importance of work and to the actual contribution to development of socialist ownership. Accordingly generalization of the overall contract system as a way of organizing and remunerating labor enhances the incentive as to the quantity and quality of the activity of each member of society and of that of his collective as well, and it also has a formative-educational role because each member of the collective has an interest in the others' work. This helps to form a mass opinion in favor of an advanced attitude toward work and a greater sense of responsibility for socialist ownership as well as one against any instances of shirking work or absenteeism, so that incomes will directly depend upon the work performed and the results obtained in production and upon fulfillment of the plan tasks.

Socialist ownership is being developed and improved within a specifically and historically determined framework involving a multitude of factors and all the interdependent aspects of ownership relations. Along with quantitative and qualitative development of the object of state and cooperative ownership and with harmonious distribution of the production means throughout the country, the party and state are making a regular effort to improve the relations among the state socialist units and among the cooperative units, between the state units and the cooperative ones, between the latter and the state as the entire people's representative, and between the economic units and the workers as well. Experience proves that development and improvement of the object of the workers' joint ownership and of socialist ownership relations vividly reflect the socialist economic democratism that is the source of the national economy's progress.

Exchange of goods between city and village plays a considerable part in relations among the classes of Romanian socialist society. Supply of every rural locality both with tractors, agricultural machines, mineral fertilizers and other

chemicals and with consumer goods reflects the contribution of the working class to agricultural development and to the higher civilization of the Romanian village. Meanwhile the agricultural products delivered by the rural socialist units and the contracts concluded by the population with the state to deliver agricultural products reflect the care and attention with which the peasants honor the high quality of the working class as an ally.

The development of both state and cooperative ownership plays an important part in the process of improving ownership relations. As we know the RCP has used original methods of developing and modernizing both forms of ownership and of correlating them as well. The formation of organizational structures providing the framework for collaboration among various forms of ownership is a convincing example of this. Thus the possibility has been established in cooperative agriculture of combining the efforts of several units in order to construct some common capacities requiring a high volume of investments that each separate unit cannot allocate. Intercooperative economic associations were already formed in the last decade to breed livestock, to organize large vineyards and orchards, and to form complexes for raising vegetables. The new units' ownership involves an advanced form of concentration and a high level of modernization of production. It belongs to the associated cooperative members and is administrated by their elected representatives. The annual profits obtained by the associations are distributed to the coowner units in proportion to the funds contributed and are used to repay the credits received to implement the investment project and later to increase the coowners' own incomes.

Socialist ownership is also being developed through programs to correlate state and cooperative ownership. The state and cooperative united agroindustrial councils were already formed at the start of the last decade in agriculture in order to coordinate political, economic and social activity on the level of a number of communes, cooperatives and state agricultural enterprises. Within the united agroindustrial councils the state and cooperative agricultural units preserve their autonomy and ownership and are cooperating more and more closely in chemization of production, use of irrigation systems, expansion of land improvement etc. on the basis of their combined mechanical and technical resources. The united councils are engaged in uniform organization of all agricultural sectors while making the necessary arrangements for concentration, zoning and specialization of production and economic and financial consolidation of each agricultural unit. The fact that such units have proved their viability was confirmed by the opinion of the party general secretary, who said in his Speech at the Third Congress of People's Councils that "We must make every effort to secure the best possible operation of this structure, to improve it, and to see that the masses take an active part in all that is decided and accomplished in Romania in all fields."

Forms of cooperation between state and cooperative ownership are also being promoted between industrial enterprises and artisan cooperative enterprises or agricultural cooperatives directly. Some artisan or agricultural cooperatives are recovering and processing byproducts from industrial units and forming sections to produce them, the incomes being shared according to quantity and quality of the work. And so various forms have appeared that are intensifying economic relations of collaboration between state and cooperative ownership and between the working class and the peasantry. This is consolidating the entire people's unity even further in the process of socialist and communist construction.

The RCP is celebrating its 65 anniversary with a long list of achievements in the struggle for the Romanian people's social and national liberation and for construction of the new social order. That list is headed by the creation, development and improvement of socialist ownership as the granite foundation of the nation's all-around progress and the workers' material and cultural welfare.

5186

CSO: 2700/278

SPECIAL STATUS FOR R&D UNITS DOING NATIONAL SECURITY WORK

Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish No 24, 26 Jun 86, item 116 pp 365-367

[Executive Order of the Council of ministers, dated 7 June 1986, on the Applicability of Provisions of the Law on Research and Development Institutions to Research and Development Institutions performing Scientific Research Work Wholly or Substantially in Behalf of the National Defense and Security]

[Text] Pursuant to Article 76, Act 3, of the Law of 25 July 1985 concerning research and development institutions (DZIENNIK USTAW No 36, item 170), the following is ordained:

1. 1. Research and development institutions, which are mentioned in Article 1 of the Law of 25 July 1985 concerning research and development institutions (DZIENNIK USTAW No 36, item 170), referred to hereafter and "the Law," and which perform scientific research and conduct research and development either wholly or substantially for state defense and security, referred to hereafter as "defense related work," are, according to the Law, defense industrial research and development institutions.
2. Research and development institutions of the defense industry perform missions defined in Article 2 of the Law, focusing particular attention on scientific research and research and development in the area of weapons, technical accessories and special equipment.
3. Research and development institutions, according to Act 1, are defined by the Chairman of the Defense Industrial Committee of the Council of Ministers at the recommendation of the agency exercising supervision over the research and development institution; the chairman advised by the chairman of the Planning Commission with the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Finance in agreement with the Minister of National Defense and the Minister-Director of the Office of Scientific-Technical Progress and Applications on the status of the defense industrial research and development institution. That institution, conducting financial management on the basis of principles envisioned in the budgetary law, which is dealt with in Article 16, Act 1, of the Law, cannot be considered a research and development institution.

4. The status of a defense industrial research and development institution is fixed by the Defense Industrial Committee of the Council of Ministers in coordination with those key and central agencies of state administration involved. The status of the defense industrial research and development institution defines the particular duties and authority of the defense industrial research and development institution and its workers.

5. The Chairman of the Defense Industrial Committee of the Council of Ministers, granting the status of a defense industrial research and development institution, as well as other agencies, referred to in Act 3, and acting in accordance with a recommendation for the granting of such status, or considering such status, are subject to the following criteria:

- 1) the share of the institution's defense requirements as part of overall defense needs,
- 2) the importance of defense related work from the perspective of the needs of the Armed Forces and security agencies of the Polish People's Republic, as well as those from international obligations.
- 3) the importance of cooperation with other research and development institutions or enterprises having the status of an enterprise of the defense industry from the perspective of defense related work,
- 4) development opportunities from the perspective of planned future defense related work.

6. Agencies, which recommend the granting of the status of defense industrial research and development institution, referred to in Act 3, are subject to the criteria arising from the areas of their activity and cited in the recommendation itself.

7. The Chairman of the Defense Industrial Committee of the Council of Ministers, in reaction to a proposal on the part of an interested member of the committee, may suspend either wholly or partially the authority specified in the status of a defense industrial research and development institution for failure to complete defense related work on time, if the institution itself is a fault.

8. The Chairman of the Defense Industrial Committee of the Council of Ministers can, at the recommendation of the agency exercising supervision over the research and development institution and in coordination with the Ministry of National Defense, remove the status from those defense industrial research and development institutions which cease performing defense related work in accordance with that status.

*2. The regulations in the area of norms and standards, different from those in this order, apply to the defense industrial research and development institutions.

*3. A defense industrial research and development institution, which implements defense related work, conducts its activity in accordance with state plans for deliveries, research and development efforts and applications, as well as for special investments for state defense and security requirements.

*4. 1. The agency exercising supervision over the defense industrial research and development institution can set the requirements for the institution to join an association of defense industrial enterprises.

2. The director of a defense industrial research and development institution, which joined an association of defense industrial enterprises, as specified in Act 1, becomes a member of this association's council.

*5. The approval of the Chairman of the Defense Industrial Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of National Defense, as envisioned in Article 7, Act 3, of the Law, is required to combine, break up, restructure, or eliminate a defense industrial research and development institution.

*6. 1. The dissemination of the results of work done by the defense industrial research and development institution in the area of defense related work requires approval from the Minister of National Defense.

2. The implementation of tasks with regard to the export or import of equipment, services, or scientific-technical know-how by a defense industrial research and development institutions is set forth in separate regulations.

3. Changes in the activity of a defense industrial research and development institution in defense related work require the approval of the Minister of National Defense.

*7. The competitive requirements, specified in Article 18, Acts 4-7, of the Law, do not apply to the advancement of a candidate for the directorship of a defense industrial research and development institution.

*8. Scientists, appointed to a defense industrial research and development institution, are subject to a 3-month probation period, as specified in Article 40, Act 1, of the Law; they may also be released from duty if proved incompetent, or as a result of losing access to state secrets.

*9. The regulations of the order of applying to the Minister of National Defense also apply correspondingly to the Minister of Internal Affairs if the research and development institution conducts scientific research for the benefit of state security.

*10. This order becomes valid on the date of its publication.

President of the Council of Ministers: Z. Messner

12247/13104
CSO: 2600/6334

POZSGAY: POLITICAL REFORM DISCUSSION EASIER AFTER CPSU CONGRESS

Budapest TARSADALMI KUTATAS in Hungarian No 2, 1986 pp 97-99

[Article by Imre Pozsgay, secretary general of the Patriotic People's Front:
"The Doing, Not the Promising, Is Difficult"]

[Text] My situation at this writing is somewhat easier than the one in which Csaba Gombár and László Lengyel found themselves when they wrote their article "A Contribution to the Problems of Social Reform." They were still quoting Gyula Andrassy who said: "It is easy to do, but difficult to promise." By this they wished to indicate their intention to discuss an issue that life has unquestionably raised, but about which there is no decision as yet whether it might be better advanced through tactical measures behind the scenes, rather than by announcing an open program. They present historical examples for both cases. The very existence of their essay, and especially its content, attests to the fact that only an open program of social reform, one without any mimicry, can provide a solution to the contradictions and dysfunctions that have accumulated to date. They profess to conceive all this not as a social plan of the "command planning" type, but "on the track of various political bargaining processes." I concur with this, with the gist of their article, and with their most important findings.

Then why do I find myself in an easier situation than the authors did? Because I am writing my contribution after the 27th CPSU Congress, where a comprehensive radical reform has been announced to accelerate entire society's development, through quality and efficiency. Comparing these truly historical initiatives with the Hungarian experience, we come to the conclusion that it is no longer a question of civil courage to speak of social reform. Thus it is no longer necessary to hide, to be a tactical reformer. One who does not talk about it, and acts instead. But even if it is no longer necessary to hide, we still have to expect obstacles. Instead of obstacles in the nature of political and ideological principles, we are much more likely to encounter the resistance of reality bound and determined by interests, which of course includes also political and ideological reality. After all, if the process is to remain smooth or reform-like, then the attained situation must be regarded as a condition of further progress, even if this situation includes also erroneous decisions and institutions that have been proven unsuitable long ago. In other words, the future reform will truly be a process of political bargaining, because the present one includes also the interests associated with retaining

the inefficient institutions and the methods that are hampering progress. These interests will have a say in shaping the new decisions.

In addition to the very favorable effect of the 27th CPSU Congress as the international example, what else is helping to strengthen social reform's bargaining position in Hungary? The complicated and difficult situation itself, as it now stands, favors reform. As we very well know, it has perpetuated the elements of stagnation. Fundamental things, first of all the opportunities for economic growth, have failed to materialize. The economic equilibrium restored through restrictive measures might be upset any minute if the restrictive hand relaxes its grip. And by now it is already evident that these are not problems and contradictions solely of economic origin, which could be solved by tinkering with these or those mechanisms or regulators. No, they are of social origin. Therefore the situation is crying out for social reform.

The situation may favor reform, but to no avail if decisionmakers and public opinion fail to perceive correctly its internal interrelations and cause-and-effect relationships. For the present reality, in addition to serving as the reform's starting point, could also support retrograde movements. Public opinion is familiar mainly with the phenomenal, superficial aspect of reality. It sees that economic growth has slowed down; that there is inflation; that real wages are declining and real income is stagnating; that the living standards and living conditions of large social groups have worsened; that there are shortages; that mobility, labor discipline, and performances are lacking; that morality is lax, as is discipline in cooperation and mutual deliveries between enterprises, etc. At the same time public opinion also knows that we are living under the conditions of a reform launched for a 20-year period. The reform, however, is being hamstrung by its latent tactical necessities, by the unsaid aspects of its real problems, and by the inability to identify its opponents. A large proportion of the public blames the reform for the negative phenomena listed above, whereas they arose to a large extent because the reform had ground to a halt. But this is something that is hardly ever discussed in public.

The reform does not have much chance of unfolding further, unless a suitable openness is created for it, and thereby a large base of supporters who understand what the reform is all about and really want the solution it offers. Since socialism's institutions have been created from above, as the work of the central political will, the necessary comprehension and initiative decisions must likewise come from there. In other words, the next move is up to politics once again. The authors, too, raise this question when they say that the political institutions are in a continuous phase delay. They are right. The cause of this phase delay, in my opinion, is that for a long time it was not possible to regard socialism's ownership relations, distribution relations and basic political institutions as unalterable and irreversible facts that could have endured the openness of democracy, without gains for the forces favoring restoration. Therefore politics saw the system's security in being constantly on the defensive, and in the immutability of its institutions.

One of the principal functions of the state and politics is to maintain balance and stability. But this function switches to its exact opposite where stagnation takes over the principle of balance and stability. For, as we very well

know, social contradictions do not cease to arise under stagnation. Because they are not resolved, the contradictions accumulate as an explosive force, rather than acting as a driving force. Instead of calling on politics to abandon its post, we should request it to contribute toward well-directed motion and a secure recovery, by initiating sensible changes and discarding the sandbags of the power interests and ideologies associated with stagnation.

An important lesson of the 1985 elections is that specifically the introduction of changes at the right time can increase to a large extent the basic institutions' credibility, and can demonstrate that changing them does not place these institutions at risk. The change, of course, must be directed at the essence, even when it is understood from the very outset that the "bargaining process" may produce also a compromise. The new electoral law's political concept, for example, contains a compromise with the old law, and a very significant change as well: that the broadening of the voters' direct democratic participation and the inclusion of their initiatives are not a threat but a stabilizing and identification-increasing factor in establishing the system of representation in the National Assembly and the councils. And most importantly: it has been demonstrated in this area that the reliable and successful operation of basic institutions and their political activity depend not on a nomenklatura list drawn up on the basis of some cadre-policy plan, but on representation which is established with public participation and is constantly answerable to the public. This does not make cadre policy superfluous, but merely--and this is a no small thing--subjects it to constant public scrutiny.

The new electoral law is a good example because its first application revealed that abuses of authority are also possible. And this raises the questions of providing guaranties to ensure the institutions' democratic operation. The authors approach these questions from the aspect of the division of roles and functions. The essential thing, in my opinion, is to ensure that at no level can there emerge and operate uncontrolled power which is able to disregard reality until a catastrophe threatens. And this ties in with a question that also the authors examine: Who are the subjects of legislation, government and self-government? Are there sovereign citizens and their independent organizations, which are a guaranty against the distortion and degeneration of power?

Further clarification of the party's role is of fundamental importance in answering this question under our political system. By developing its own internal democracy, the party must arrive at new forms of relationship between its membership and society. This presupposes that the state extricate itself from the present grip; and that in control there be, instead of directives, a public partnership in which the party's guidance and influence extend only as far as its power of persuasion. The 27th CPSU Congress, too, has demonstrated that clarification of the relationship between the party and the state, according to new requirements, is a decisive question from the viewpoint of social reform and society's qualitative development.

The further development of democracy is a prerequisite for redefining the party's place and role according to the new requirements. In addition to this prerequisite, I agree also with the authors' conclusion that there are three points where further progress could be made in democratization: in making the political representation of interests more continuous; in developing the

horizontal representation of interests; and in the application techniques of direct democracy. This development program would result in there being no institution above the law, in depoliticized office staffs, and in combining the principle of professionalism with the institutions of democracy.

Csaba Gombar and Laszlo Lengyel's essay certainly contains debatable statements and illusory proposals. But to me it has been more important to see the sound analyses and the erudition broadening our self-knowledge. Their application can contribute to the unfolding in Hungary of a social reform that is based on political stability.

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CSO: 2500/484

NYERS ON POLITICAL REFORM

Budapest TARSADALMI KUTATAS in Hungarian No 2, 1986 pp 100-103

[Article by Rezso Nyers, a member of the MSZMP Central Committee and consultant to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economic Sciences: "Definition of the Economy, Politics and Reform"]

[Text] We have been living and working for some time in a lengthier process of economic reform, and yet there still remain many question marks as to where the reform is heading and regarding its expansion. There is much warranted debate on the reform's substantive questions, the difficulties of practical implementation, the occasional conflicts between the principles and methods, and the effects of the reform's alternating periods of momentum and slowdown. All this in itself does not matter. The trouble is only our failure to cope with the task of clarifying the problems conceptually, and handling them politically. Or we are so late in coping with this task that we are unable to exert suitable influence on practice. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to really budge from the "lagging situation" that arose in the 1970's. I do regard frank and more thorough debate on reforms as essential.

Reforms' Social Context, Role

It should be stated in advance that I do not equate the concept of reform with the "radical correction of some erroneous practice," although this is the interpretation that is gaining ground in political practice. Which is understandable, because reforms almost always contain such changes. This sort of thing may unquestionably be perceived as feedback, correction or streamlining within the process of evolution, and not as the interruption and rearrangement of the process itself. A good example is the streamlining of Hungary's economic management in 1957. And, it seems, we will be able to include in this category also the significant changes that are now beginning in Soviet economic management, although eventually these might turn out to be even more far-reaching. But correcting feedback in itself is not really reform.

The most essential substantive characteristic of reform, in my opinion, is that the process of a social subsystem's evolution is interrupted and does not continue within the old structure; instead, after structural rearrangement, it starts anew within a new framework, one which is in accord with the political, moral and legal principles of the given society as a whole. The need for

such reforms has arisen in the socialist countries of East Europe, in the interest of achieving intensive economic development. The essence of these reforms is to replace the method of central economic planning in physical units, with a method that brings about an interaction between the plan and the marketplace. From the significance of the change follows its difficulty; and from the difficulty there follow the uncertainty of formulating a program, and the weaknesses, mistakes and unevenness of the program's implementation. But all this can excuse neither communist politics nor socialist social sciences, for the delay or inconsistency of the process of reform. Thus reform cannot be equated with maintaining at all cost the continuous development of an activity that should be changed.

The rather ambiguous concept of social reform requires clarification, in my opinion. We may speak of a two-pronged reform process that truly embraces entire society. If we view society as a whole, then Hungary and the other socialist countries appear to need two reforms affecting entire society: one is a reform of the way the economy is managed, and the other is a reform of the way the principle of democracy applies under socialism. These are reforms that cannot be confined to one or the other social subsystem. Both reforms must be carried out within entire society, otherwise they will wither away sooner or later, and practice will revert to what it was before. Thus my interpretation of the reform's social content is that management must change within entire society, in the social and cultural sphere as well as public administration, and perhaps even in the sphere of security; this necessitates specific partial reforms to develop the harmony between function and management; and should this process bog down, then the economic sphere's reform would also grind to a halt. The reform process that implements socialist democracy in a new way cannot be confined solely to the political subsystem, either; instead, it will require changes in the economy, culture, the voluntary public organizations, and public administration as well. And it is essential to note that economic reform and the reform of democracy are twins: they either exist together or do not exist at all, and primarily herein lies the economic reform's enormous political significance.

Is there need for a social reform that would alter society's evolved group structure? No, in my opinion. Such a reform is unnecessary because the long-term, 40-year trend of society's group structure--even though it does manifest some important unfavorable phenomena as well--is pointing in the right direction, is favorable and should be maintained. Even with all its contradictions, society's group structure is heading toward socialist equal rights and social equality. This process of evolution requires correcting feedback to reward the value of the quality of performance, to raise the social status of intellectual work, and to let the small-business sector become a system-conforming factor in its important complementary role. At the same time, the social structure must be protected constantly, so that emphasis on the principle of economic efficiency does not divert social stratification from the socialist requirements, and the price system's reform does not lead to a radical change in income distribution, increasing--instead of reducing--the ranks of the permanently disadvantaged.

The target model of the process of social reform is the modernized socialist (or more accurately: socialism-building) society. Thus by no means a mixed

society formed as some combination of the affluent society in, respectively, the socialist and the capitalist sense. Hence it follows that the need for reform is evident in the economic conditions, as well as in the intellectual sphere and the system of political institutions. The reforms to be introduced in the structure and operation of the intellectual, cultural and political institutions cannot be divorced at all from economic reform and the economic system's operation; at the same time, the economic mechanism as a whole must aid sensible reforms in the noneconomic institutions' structure and operation. In this respect the harmonization or coordination of the conceptual plans for various reforms is unquestionably necessary. And, in my opinion, Csaba Gombar and Laszlo Lengyel are right when they find such coordination wanting.

Reforms Vague, Lack Unambiguity, Consistency

I concur with the view that our situation regarding the implementation of reforms is rather vague, and unambiguity is lacking in the assessment and acceptance of the reforms' social impact. This cannot be judged serious as yet, for we are still in the very middle of a lengthier reform process (a peculiar and long "social march"). Trouble would arise if we were to become reconciled to this vagueness, and were to abandon efforts at introducing unambiguity, because in this case conditions would revert sooner or later to their original form, and we would find ourselves staying put, instead of achieving the desired progress. For this very reason, one of the most important medium- and long-range tasks of Hungarian politics today is to promote and push through both the economic and the democratic reform process simultaneously. This objective must figure prominently also in the progressive intellectual movements.

The vague situation that the economic reform process has created is partially a result of introducing reform measures piecemeal. In other words, of permitting only partial interruption of the economic processes' earlier evolutionary trends, in doses such that the favorable trend of the overall economic process is not jeopardized. This is due in part to attempts to "ward off" the effects of the worsening external economic conditions (through stronger curbs on import and investment). In this respect we may speak of an inherent contradiction in our situation: on the one hand, the present external economic effects are restricting the reform process by limiting the economy's room for maneuvering; but, on the other hand, we would be able to relax or loosen the external economic constraint specifically by introducing reform methods, i.e., by accelerating the reform. For the acceleration of economic growth is possible only if also the reform is proceeding dynamically, and we must be able to end the vagueness of our situation primarily in this sense.

We find in fact an even greater vagueness if we compare the economic changes with the functioning of the political institutions and with the change in society's mentality. The substantive orientation of our policies is more progressive than what the present system of political institutions, and the present methods and style in politics, would be able to translate into practice, into real life. We may cite as examples the party's economic policy, external economic policy, social policy, education policy, or even more generally its popular front policy. In all these policies we are undertaking political objectives far more progressive than what we are able to achieve. There is indeed a need to reform the political institutions, and methods and style in politics.

Need To Reform Political Methods, Institutions

The problem of the political system should be approached, in my opinion, from two directions: What does it offer and could offer the citizens? And to what extent does it serve and could serve the development of society as a whole?

I do not regard as apt or to the point the formulation which seeks the subjects of political reform, identifies them as the citizens and their immediate collectives, and contrasts the latter with "removed groups" and "undertaken interests." It is not clear just what each of these terms means. It is of course correct that primarily the political role of the citizens and their immediate collectives has to be increased. But where do we include the party, the trade unions, and other voluntary public organizations? These are immediate organizations and simultaneously also indirect representatives of their membership, or indeed of an entire social stratum. These organizations, too, must be the subjects of the reforms, the more so because the role of the immediate collectives could hardly be increased without reforming or significantly modifying all the organizations. Incidentally, I do not dispute the need to curb the representation of interests undertaken by the "removed groups"; i.e., the fact that these groups cite all too frequently, and often without any foundation, the interests of the working class or peasantry or working people, without actually having consulted those whom they claim to be representing.

A socialist society, too, must have organizations and movements that are built from their grass roots upward (these ought to constitute a majority), but in addition to them there is need for centrally formed and controlled organizations as well. Examples of the former are the autonomous and self-managing organizations; and of the latter, the party, the National Assembly, and the central administration. All need changes in their methods, and reforms in certain matters.

Within political reform, the objective in the case of the autonomous and self-managing organizations is to achieve actual autonomy that transcends the perfunctory frameworks and ceremonies. This will be a by no means small task, over a longer period. In many instances the relationship between the governing bodies of the national voluntary public organizations and the immediate collectives is based on the principle of democratic centralism, which often is an obstacle to initiative from below. A federal solution seems more suitable for many organizations that are organized nationally or by megyes.

Hungarian society cannot dispense with the party's leading role. Not because the party's leading role is incorporated in the Constitution, but because the country sorely needs this function. The question is what changes will the expansion and development of autonomous and self-managing organizations, and the increasing administrative and management responsibilities of the state and council agencies, require in the methods of party work. It appears that fundamental changes are necessary in comparison with past practice, and often even with present practice as well. The party organizations may neither usurp nor limit the decisionmaking authority of the autonomous organizations, state agencies, and voluntary public organizations' governing bodies. The party members who hold office in state, voluntary public or economic organizations must have an opportunity to express their personal standpoints in the process of making

decisions, but political responsibility cannot be interpreted to mean that the party members must adopt their standpoints in accordance with separate instructions from the party on every matter. After all, the essence of the party's leading role is that it must manifest itself in political initiatives, in the formulation of programs, and in the integration of different social interests and views; and the party must do all this not over society's head, but under voluntary public supervision and control.

The methods and style of political action must become more democratic in setting the guidelines for preparing the state and council budgets, in making decisions that have the greatest social impact, and in shaping income policy and tax policy. The assertion of this principle in budgeting will require a major reform.

In the light of the present and future tasks, we must subject to serious critical analysis the organization, structure and methods of government administration.

Changes in the nature of reforms are necessary in the longer-range development of the functions of health care and social policy, and also in the operating mechanism of cultural and sport activities.

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REPORTS-ELECTION CAMPAIGN BEGINS SOON

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 12 Aug 86 p 1

[Text] (Own Information). In a month the second phase of the party congress campaign will begin--it is being opened by provincial reports-election conferences.

It is a well-known fact that when elections come into play, the attention of delegates is concentrated on them. The tasks of the conferences are very serious. It is up to them to translate the resolutions of the 10th Congress into the conditions, needs and possibilities of the region; to work out the concept of the implementation of congress decisions while drawing conclusions from the experience of the ending term of office. At the same time, the atmosphere of the party is such that there is no reason to fear whether there will be willing discussion participants. On the other hand, the central directive rules out (economizing measure, of course) the organizing of conferences that would exceed one day thus necessitating lodging.

The executive board of the Provincial Committee in Gorzow Wielkopolski has given serious consideration to all of these circumstances. As its point of departure, it has adopted the assumptions that in accordance with the statute, the conference constitutes, above all, a gathering of delegates and only in further succession, their meeting with invited guests who represent various organizations and provincial institutions. Taking into account the time allotted for deliberations, the concept of dividing the work of the conferences into topic groups was discounted and this idea was moved to an earlier time period.

The provincial conference will convene in Gorzow in mid-September. In the days preceding it every delegate has the right and obligation to participate in one (or if he wishes--in more than one) of six groups headed by Provincial Committee secretaries. Initially, the executive board proposed four such groups (tasks of the provincial party organization in strengthening democracy and national accord; in the upbringing of youth and in developing science, education and culture; in the implementation of socioeconomic tasks; and in improving party work). However, the delegates themselves demanded that the topic range be expanded. The province of Gorzow is an agricultural and forest region with the huge participation of the state sector. These problems will become the topic of interest of the subsequent group. The sixth group came about from the successes of the province in the competition for the Minister

of Efficiency and the group's topic is as follows: party tasks in stimulating social activity.

The delegates will be provided with the accomplishments of the work of the groups in the form of bulletins prior to the commencement of the conference deliberations. There is no doubt that these accomplishments will become an important aid in the formation of the resolution whereas all the delegates will have the peace of mind that they had contributed to it with their ideas.

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DISSIDENT, EMIGRE SCENE SURVEYED IN YUGOSLAV WEEKLY

Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene No 20, 30 May 86 pp 8-11

[Interview with Jan Mickiewicz by Miha Kovac and Gorazd Suhadolnik: "Peace, Peace, But There Is Still No Peace"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Jan Mickiewicz proclaims himself a European. He was born to a Polish couple in Sweden during the war. He began to attend school in the Netherlands, and in fact still lives there. During his student years he spent more than half his time in Poland, and became familiar with the customs, language, history, and culture of that country. He came into contact with the independents. He was a member of Solidarity from its very establishment, and offered the independent trade union his services as a translator during its initial illegal activity. He had to return to the Netherlands because of the imposition of martial law.

[Mickiewicz] Knowing both sides of European culture, I became convinced that a sensible mutual future for Europe had to arise by solving the problems together. I am thus not concerned just about support for my friends in Poland, but also about my personal survival as a European. The more Europeans know about each other, the better they will realize that neither geopolitical divisions, nor different mentalities, nor differences in appearance are important. What is important is the common interest -- creating a future for Europe. I am consequently trying to understand the problems of the West and the East jointly as much as possible. I think that individual citizens bear the responsibility for most of the problems in the West. This means that the democratic system can survive only if the ordinary citizen participates in it, and the system does not view itself as something natural and eternal. In the East, the societies want to reach the level of a democracy, and so the primary responsibility for the absence of democracy lies with the authorities, who are afraid to come into direct contact with the societies and make use of their creative potential. The symmetries of the mechanisms causing the problems in the West and the East consequently cannot be seen. The peoples of Europe will only be able to express their views and desires on a united or at least secure and peaceful Europe after they have solved their own problems.

"Underground" and "Aboveground"

[Question] Five years have passed since the establishment of the Solidarity independent trade union. What is the present situation in Poland like, and what is happening with the independent activities?

[Answer] The Solidarity trade union is still active, although illegally, i.e. "underground." It is present everywhere: in factories, in local areas, in the provinces, and at the national level. Different groups cooperate with each other, exchange information, and coordinate their activities as much as possible. Solidarity is still headed by a national leadership, composed of five or six people and representatives of the provinces. It is estimated that several thousand real activists are working for Solidarity, and about 100,000 are active half legally and half "underground"; and many more people support the trade union's activities on an ad hoc basis. In addition to Solidarity, other different independent activities are also being carried out: groups that are partially financed by Solidarity print publications and newspapers, which do not deal just with trade union subjects, but also literary, historical, political, and sociological subjects. An example of an independent activity is the scientists who are trying to restore independent education: they are preparing alternative textbooks. A considerable number of organizations (committees) for the defense of human rights and prisoners are also active.

[Question] Wasn't Polish society demoralized after the imposition of martial law? How strong are the independent movements?

[Answer] The movements enjoy quiet support. It is true that after five years of a struggle in which nothing has changed either economically or socially, Polish society is partly exhausted. Nevertheless, modern Polish literature is a good example of social support for independent activities. Most writers have stopped publishing through the state publishing houses. They only publish in the "underground," or in the West. The independent involvement of writers is also causing a lot of difficulties for the writers' union. When the old union was abolished and the new one was established, only a few writers joined it. The right to join was given to many untalented and unambitious writers from little towns. There was a funny turn of events at the last writers' congress: the real writers who still wanted to remain in the union were removed from elected positions, and they were replaced by people who are unknown in Poland, and are not even real writers, but rather politicians. This proves that the union cannot attract well-known writers who would be completely loyal and who would not sympathize with their colleagues in the "underground" and with society in general. The authorities are consequently faced with the problem of having trouble finding more or less respected people who would want to participate in the official organizations. The same situation as with the writers' union can also be observed among journalists. On the other hand, this shows how the apathetic, active, and semi-independent parts of society cooperate with each other.

[Question] What is the situation in Poland like in regard to repression? Are a lot of people still in prison?

[Answer] The number of political prisoners is not declining; only their names change. The authorities periodically announce an amnesty, and then release a lot of people who were arrested; then they arrest a lot of new ones again. The police avoid larger general actions against the resistance opposition movement, but still periodically attack all of the members and supporters of the independent activities in one of the provinces. The people arrested can then expect to be sentenced to prison for a year or a year and a half; usually they are sentenced to one to two or two and a half years in prison for illegal activities--for distribution, printing, or organizing meetings. A lot of people always meet the same fate repeatedly--they are jailed over and over again on the same charges.

[Question] Is the Committee for the Defense of the Workers [KOR] still active according to the same principles?

[Answer] The committee itself was disbanded at the first national Solidarity congress. The members of KOR, however, are of course still active. They represent one of the most active experienced forces supporting Solidarity and the independent activities. KOR thus no longer exists officially, but we can speak informally of its existence. In some places, for example, intellectuals have organized for self-defense and to support the workers. They organize "floating universities," seminars, etc.

[Question] How is the church involved in the events?

[Answer] The church, of course, is in an awkward position--under pressure from the authorities, who are forbidding it any sort of political activity in support of Solidarity or Polish society in general. On the other hand, it is also experiencing pressure from Polish society itself, which wants something similar to liberation theology from it. It is not surprising, therefore, that the term "liberation theology" first appeared in Poland after the imposition of martial law. The church is trying to solve the problem in such a way as to keep its ties with the Polish authorities; Cardinal Glemp and General Jaruzelski often have official meetings, and the same thing happens between representatives of the church and secular authorities. There is also always a discussion of the excessive influence and involvement of the clergy, who should not be involved in politics. The church defends itself with the position that the house of the Lord is a place where the truth must come to light. This should not be associated with Solidarity and the other independent movements in Poland. Many activities, however, would not be possible without the church--it offers facilities for independent activities, concerts, theatrical presentations, seminars, and meetings, and possibly even for printing illegal publications. About 200 priests probably cooperate actively with Solidarity. Not everything is that simple, of course; there are many different and conflicting opinions and positions in the church as well. Some priests are opposed to involving ordinary people in independent activities. Actually, the decision as to what will be done in a given church is left to the parish priest. The situation is very convenient, because the church hierarchy does not directly order activities for individual churches. The church is thus keeping its historical role of supporting the Polish nation, and only then Polish society, and last of all the Polish government.

Freedom and Peace

[Question] In the East, peace movements are obviously not strong and well-developed, and above all they are vulnerable to the policy of the communists. What are things like in Poland in this regard?

[Answer] The cause of peace is not too popular in Poland. Not just because of the internal problems, but also because of the doubts about pacifism, which have a historical basis for Poles--the developments that led to World War II, Munich in 1938, and the absence of a strong opposition to the Nazis and the Fascists. Nevertheless, many discussions in regard to this have developed in Poland. I think that at present two conflicting positions are rapidly developing. One says that we have never expected any sort of outside assistance, and consequently we should solve Poland's problems ourselves and concentrate on our own activities until another opportunity arises for stronger democratic movements. In contrast to this, one can observe a democratic minority with an anti-traditional orientation which thinks that Poland is not the center of the world, that it is only part of it, and that it is therefore necessary to seek a solution for the Polish problem within overall European politics. After a very long time, that tendency is now growing for the first time. Thus, in quite useful areas, you can observe much more recent initiatives that are not modelled after the traditional theories and ideologies, but are seeking a path, and are familiar with Western experiences. They are more inclined toward autonomous emancipation movements. One of the latest examples is the independent movement Freedom and Peace [in English in original], which is naturally very dependent on the Polish situation. Its main activities are concentrated on democratizing the Polish army and Polish society in general. This peace organization has explicitly expressed a desire to cooperate with other peace movements, in the West as well, in order to seek a European-wide independent peace program.

[Question] Can you tell us anything more about Freedom and Peace?

[Answer] The movement is headed primarily by student activists from the (now) illegal student union NZS [Independent Association of University Students]. They are mostly involved with the political aspects of the Polish army, and are particularly engaged in opposing the military oath that demands loyalty to the military Warsaw Pact and the alliance with the Soviet Union. This is foolish, of course, since an oath to one's own people logically excludes sworn loyalty to a military alliance, which is furthermore even explicitly temporary. The young people have used this contradiction for a protest against the way that the Polish army is structured. The Polish authorities, of course, are attacking the peace activists, but they are also rejected with incomprehension by most of society, which because of its historical awareness has great respect for the Polish army. The little movement must therefore struggle against two forces, and is having more and more success with Polish society. The movement was started by a few people who came to the defense of a student friend, who was sentenced to prison for rejecting the military oath. The movement became a national one, and is now active among 100 to 150 really staunch members in four or five Polish cities. The groups have combined their activities, and their popularity has particularly grown because of the

petition that they circulated throughout Poland in defense of people who reject the military oath. In the same petition, they also published an appeal for the introduction of civilian service. In one week the petition was signed by several thousand people, including leading figures in Solidarity, which officially supported the movement. The "underground" press offered the peace activists facilities for printing articles and pamphlets. Freedom and Peace explicitly includes ecology as an element of peace policy; consequently, the Chernobyl catastrophe was also a stimulus for the interest of Poles (in the peace movement).

[Question] Is any explicitly ecological group active in Poland?

[Answer] Small ecological groups are active among students and scientists. Since the official press -- naturally in its own way -- says a great deal about ecology, so far these groups have not become popular. The Chernobyl catastrophe gave people an opportunity to explain to the authorities that they were the ones who bore normal human responsibility for such disasters, and in doing so they could use a vocabulary that was not highly political.

[Question] Let us return to the peace movement. What general attitude can be observed among Polish youth in regard to the army and its influence?

[Answer] Polish youth has traditionally considered military duty to be a national obligation and not a state one. This belief was retained after World War II. In the 1960's the vast majority of youth, more than 90 percent, thought that performing military service was a normal positive duty. At the end of the 1970's, because of the well-known events and the military's part in the struggle against the workers' revolt, only 70 percent of young people still had a completely favorable view of the army. After the imposition of martial law, which was of course primarily a military affair, in 1984 only a little more than 40 percent of young Poles had a positive view of performing military service. Obviously a majority of Polish youth believes that the Polish army no longer belongs to the nation, but is rather a tool of the political system. The peace movement is therefore concerning itself not only with conscientious objection, but also with the militaristic ethos that has become established in Polish society. It explains to people that militarization is dangerous, and that prejudices against minorities and neighboring countries are likewise destructive to the peace policy and to stability in Poland and in Europe. In that way Freedom and Peace will be able to persuade them of the necessity of establishing ties with other peace movements. Of course, above all it will have to win respect in Poland.

Disarmament, Freedom to Travel, Human Rights

[Question] We are also interested in the international aspect of this matter. Some people in the West think that the peace movement cannot be successful unless it also develops in the East. What general possibilities do you see for the joint success of the two movements (from different systems)?

[Answer] I think that the Western peace movement will never achieve attainable goals unless it accepts the principle that true security, peace, and disarmament can only arise when social monitoring and its determination

can express them and demand them from the government. This principle is important, because otherwise the Western peace movements in general will only hope for changes in the established order in the East, and they will not believe that the establishment in the West cannot be changed without social pressure. This symmetry must exist in principle. What we can do today is another question. If we agree in principle to the statement that the peace movements are an important factor in disarmament and in ensuring general security, we must offer support to the Eastern movements, in spite of their smallness, and encourage them in their activities. This is the practical obligation of the Western peace movements. If the Eastern peace movements are for the time being fighting primarily for survival against government oppression, against the criminalization of peace activities, then it is obvious that more assistance must come from the West, and not vice versa, although the Eastern movements can contribute a great deal by explaining their own circumstances, and can also explain why it is important for the repression of them to end (this would be the first sign that the Eastern governments have tolerated the goals of the independents, and that some sort of dialogue can begin between the state and society). The above-mentioned principle is consequently not just theoretically important; it should be adhered to in all areas of practical activities. The Western peace movement sometimes forgets this, especially if it finds out that a small peace movement (for example, the Dialogues [English in original] group in Hungary) currently has no chance of growing into a significant social movement. The fascination fades, and the Western movement begins to look in some other country, where perhaps something different is happening. I received a letter from Freedom and Peace saying that people in the West should not get the impression that Freedom in Peace will quickly grow into a large movement, since it is not yet time; and that Freedom and Peace needs assistance from the West, peace materials, texts, information on peace activities and armament... because it is not possible in practice to find out anything about this in Poland.

[Question] Probably one of the greatest problems of this type is the free flow of information. How, then, can small peace movements in the East establish an exchange of information?

[Answer] The mail, telephones, and certain kinds of travel are available, of course. Also, the Eastern states are open to different degrees: the GDR, for example, is extremely difficult to reach, and the activists there in fact do not have any possibility of traveling to the West. It is easier in Poland, and the Hungarians also travel relatively freely. We do not really know anything about Romania and Bulgaria....

[Question] We would rather forget that!

[Answer] Perhaps so. The Czechs are represented in the West by Charter 77. The problem is deeper, however; it has to do with contacts between societies. Some of the peace movements, in their programs' principles, consequently stress the necessity of developing cultural, sport, and scientific contacts among individuals and cities. This ought to be the contribution of the so-called giant from below. The peace movements should probably not consider this problem in general, but rather recognize it as a result of the absence of human rights in Eastern Europe in general. Free travel to and from Eastern

countries is certainly only part of the problem, since I doubt whether someone traveling by himself can stimulate or create opportunities for the organization of emancipation movements in Eastern societies. Also for that reason residents of Poland were not allowed to travel out of the state at the end of the 1970's -- officially the ban was interpreted as a consequence of the economic crisis. I think that the Eastern movements and independent organizations should send demands to their governments and national conferences, citing the Helsinki agreement. In addition to principles and various tactics, the movements must not forget that this is primarily a question of human rights. In this sense unhindered travel is a fundamental problem.

[Question] You think, then, that the peace movement is closely allied with the struggle for human rights?

[Answer] This tendency has been manifested in the development of Western peace movements for the last five years. In order to achieve this, however, considerable "pressures" were needed from documents and stories (from East Europeans living in the West, and Westerners who were confronted with Eastern experiences), along with a gradual change in the definition of "peace": from the original "nonexistence of nuclear wars and disarmament as a guarantee of peace" to "peace, stability, and social rights." This definition has been accepted by Westerners in theory, although in practice they have difficulty in asserting it. They should not be condemned for this, because it is difficult to understand the truth about Eastern Europe unless you have lived it. This is another reason for the vogue of trips and contacts, of an exchange of experiences among ordinary people, who can most easily explain the small matters of everyday life, and the way in which life functions within the system.

Milan Seminar

[Question] You have just arrived from Milan, where you participated in East-West dialogues. Please tell us something about that meeting.

[Answer] The purpose of the Milan seminar on the Helsinki agreement was very specific. In contrast to the previous seminars, we devoted it to encouraging peace movements to consider the political aspects of the nuclear problem. The seminar was intended to be a preparation for concrete actions. We also tried to formulate a memorandum that could be signed in both the East and the West, and that could be used in the program for the Vienna conference. That will begin in November as a continuation of the Helsinki and Madrid conferences on security and peace in Europe. It was shown in Milan that it is one thing to talk about a new definition of peace and to organize some concrete actions between Eastern and Western groups, and another to formulate a document on the basis of principles with which both independent groups will agree. The process of creating a joint document revealed very concrete problems. For instance, it is not easy to combine different positions: the Western principle that disarmament is the first concern differs from the Eastern one, which puts human rights and the forms of totalitarianism in first place. Consequently, in drafting the memorandum, we tried to follow the Helsinki issues: the security issue, the economic cooperation issue, and the issue

of human contacts and rights. That is not easy either; it is difficult to grasp the area of economic cooperation with the terms of human rights and disarmament, but completely different problems are important: the protectionism of the West, the technological backwardness of the East, etc. Of course, in order to achieve a true policy for security and peace, economic problems must also be solved, and vice versa. In regard to human rights, it is necessary to determine the symmetry or lack of symmetry between the East and the West in the above-mentioned different positions on the relative priorities of democratic rights and the necessity of disarmament. On disarmament, the Westerners have a tradition of all sorts of strategies regarding unilateral and multilateral steps, disarmament, peace strategies, information on armament, weapon systems, etc. The Easterners will concentrate on the phenomena of totalitarianism, and their possibilities in regard to disarmament. In every area, we are faced with the identical problem of combining the two principles into one. In Milan, in three days, we did in fact recognize--and this is the most valuable thing--that it is necessary to have mutual understanding and respect for different positions.

[Question] Where do you see fundamental misunderstandings between the Eastern and Western cultures?

[Answer] In very crude terms, the greatest misunderstanding is manifested in the belief of West Europeans that Eastern Europe is much poorer but fundamentally the same: it is only a little grayer, the trade is not as interesting, the infrastructure is chaotic, and there is an enormous bureaucracy, and in this regard Eastern Europe can be seen as a poorly organized copy of Western society. I think that such a view disregards the fundamental political problems in the East, and that there is also a misunderstanding of the specific Eastern mentality, which I think is very positive in regard to relations among people--the solidarity among people that I call civil society in the East. People are not necessarily friends, but they nevertheless help and support each other. On the other hand, people in the East make the biggest mistake when they idealize the image of the West. For them the West is a place you travel to, they offer you work, you earn a lot of money, and your problems are over. This picture is also wrong, because the materialist attitude toward the West does not allow the Easterner to see the true values there and the problems that a person has in keeping those values. In the final analysis, these misunderstandings are also caused by fundamentally different political systems, since the lack of information about the "other side" is mutual. This also has to do with different mentalities, which are not necessarily dramatically different. The political systems likewise develop social everyday life; this aspect, however, is much easier to understand. Westerners are continually surprised by Eastern hospitality, while Easterners can learn from the Westerners that well organized work is not necessarily a disgrace, but instead also brings benefits. I consequently think that a combination of the positive elements in Eastern and Western cultures could benefit both sides. The area of culture is the most complicated, of course. It is a very tricky subject. In general, we can state that all Europeans have the same traditions of a Judaeo-Christian development, enlightenment, and all sorts of humanistic theories. This is our common tradition, and all the differences are understandable (or maybe not). I cannot understand how the East and the West developed away from each other

in this regard. Today, however, there are obviously many differences between them. A large part of Western culture today is very superficial, it follows fads, and desires for another reexamination of Western cultures are evident. They are actually at a standstill, more and more quickly seeking new spectacles, without any sort of proven theories about increased cultural development--not just culture in the sense of art, but also social and philosophical culture, with respect to life. I think that East Europeans now have another opportunity to show their experience. We know of a very foolish current example: the Western countries are increasingly being faced with race problems. The Dutch suddenly discovered that they did not have any experience in coexisting with other cultures. If they looked, for example, at the history of the Belorussian and Ukrainian cities, where different cultures merged and very unique arts, literatures, and other cultures were born, they could learn a great deal about the possibilities of cooperation among 20 percent Germans, 20 percent Jews, 15 percent Poles, 20 percent Russians, Lithuanians, and all types of people and languages mixed together, who lived in peace and cultural exchange. Perhaps Central and Eastern Europe do not really have a great deal of current experience, but they certainly do have a lot from the beginning of the century.

Polish Emigres

[Question] It is well known that all of the East European countries have relatively very strong political emigre groups. What is it like with Poland?

[Answer] There is still a strong wave of emigres from just after the war. The Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Russians who remained in the West still have primarily sentimental ties to their native countries. They would like to visit their families, but they live in the conservative belief that they have been assimilated in the West. Such emigres, however, are not of much interest for our conversation. Today's emigres, you know, are of a completely different type. I am thinking of the Czechs after 1968 and the Poles after 1981. Most of these people are much more politicized. They work in their new countries for the opposition movements; they either formally represent those movements or they only work for them quietly. They seek financial support and publicity for the democratic opposition. The Polish opposition is the strongest. It is symbolized by the network of Solidarity information offices with the coordinating office in Brussels. The activists contact governments, political parties, parliaments, and trade unions. In that way they try to provide information about what is happening in the East, and to increase the political and moral support for the opposition in Poland. There are more and more Polish emigres who have begun to understand that contacts among East Europeans are just as significant as contacts between the East and West. There are more and more Poles working for Solidarity's support offices; nevertheless, this really only represents support, and consequently one cannot expect these activities to make any crucial change in the situation in Poland. This, of course, is an old Polish problem that began in the 19th century. The activity of the Polish emigres is nevertheless important, also because in a way it can have a direct effect upon the emancipation movements in the West, relaying information to them, telling them about previous experiences, and promoting contacts between Western and Eastern movements.

[Question] Could you be more specific about the emigres' influence in Poland?

[Answer] The books that are printed in the Polish underground, with very limited resources, are also printed in the West. From there they come back to Poland in large numbers. Several Polish publishing houses, in fact, are active in the West. The work of an independent writer thus reaches the readers much more easily. Poles in Poland receive information about the activities of the emigres through the BBC service, and also personally from Westerners who travel in Poland. I doubt that Polish society expects to be saved by the emigres, but it has more and more respect for their technical, material, and moral contribution. The actions of East Europeans in the West certainly have a positive influence upon the survival of the opposition movement in Poland.

9909

CSO: 2800/280

PUBLICATION CASTIGATES EMIGRE MARXIST PHILOSOPHER

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13 Aug 86 p 3

[Book Review of "Literat cywilizowanego swiata: Leszek Kolakowski, a kryzys mysli mieszczańskiej" (Writer of the Civilized World: Leszek Kolakowski and the Crisis of Bourgeois Thought), by Doc Dr Hab Wacław Mejbaum, chairman, and Dr Aleksandra Zukrowska, adjunct professor, both of Philosophy Department, Szczecin University, by Piotr Rządca: "A 'Writer' Under the Microscope"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /A reader thirsting for worthwhile socio-political, journalistic, historical, or philosophical literature should not complain. During the last few years a number of interesting publications, whose difficulty varies, have appeared that help either directly or indirectly to understand and orient oneself in our times, to perceive connections with the past and main areas of struggle for the future./

The essay of these two authors, which has been honored by TRYBUNA LUDU, is one of these publications. Doc Dr Hab Wacław Mejbaum directs the department of philosophy at Szczecin University. He specializes in applications of the Marxist theory of epistemology and has authored more than 150 publications. Dr Aleksandra Zukrowska, an instructor at this same department, also writes about the Marxist theory of epistemology, has produced about 20 publications, and is presently preparing to defend her dissertation to become a docent.

The book, which I would like to encourage our readers to read, is titled "Writer of the Civilized World: Leszek Kolakowski and the Crisis of Bourgeois Thought."

Why have the authors so ironically described the hero of their book in its title, thus attacking his scientific qualifications? Is this attack justified? The reader himself must seek the answer. It is richly documented in this essay in an unsimplified manner, unlike the simplification that occurred during the polemical controversies with this writer, and without any offensive names. Rather the authors scientifically analyze the sources of his views and their connections with bourgeois thought. /This method of disputation with him awakens trust and permits the reader to draw his own conclusions./

The authors express their critical intentions and method of analyzing Leszek Kolakowski's views in their introduction. Among other things they comment: /"We treat Kolakowski's book (^HThe Main Currents of Marxism"--note by Piotr Rządca) as a theoretical document expressing the actual state of European liberalism's self-understanding . . . We use . . . the term liberalism as a name for a complex of ideological views accepted both by rightist socialist parties and by left-wing Christian democrats. Liberalism in this sense includes in any case parliamentary government and the socio-economic idea of private ownership of the means of production . . . liberalism in the contemporary ideological battle in Poland defines the minimum program accepted by all the groups that make up the so-called democratic opposition . . . The main currents of Marxism are to play the role of a theoretical foundation for the ideology of the democratic opposition . . . Clearly then, the criticism of the work under consideration is an essential task for intellectuals of the communist movement and of the Marxist tradition of philosophy."/

Further:

/"A critical essay should meet the essential rigor demanded in a scholarly work . . . the author is obliged to declare explicitly the epistemology he has adopted. This is a matter of intellectual honesty. Thus, clearly formulating one's own position in all questions under discussion belongs to the good traditions of Marxist criticism. When the critic, due to the state of current research, is unable to formulate a definite decision, he is obliged to state openly that the question remains open."/

The authors, in my opinion, fulfilled all these pledges in the introduction, for which we should also praise their work.

This reader would make only one timid critical remark: The authors write, "We aim however to express the matter in the simplest words possible, avoiding professional jargon . . ." In the first two chapters of the book (Philosophy at Twilight" and "Between Positivism and Existentialism"), the authors' use concepts that require some training in philosophy and that can be a barrier for a reader, but this is not belleslettres.

The value of this book does not lie simply in the criticism of L. Kolakowski's views, which are presented here thoroughly for the first time in many years.

/The essay also contains a review and analysis currents of bourgeois thought, shows the antinomy in the culture of the West, and presents the most important points of Marxist philosophy./

An aside: the following statement by the authors seems valuable. /". . . there is no problem in interpreting Marx's works. Only ambiguous, imprecise texts . . . need interpreting. What is termed interpretation of Marx turns out usually to be a cowardly (for hidden) attempt to correct the original. We understand perfectly why Kolakowski interpreted Marx while he was in Poland. The fact that he continues to do so in the "free West" shows how hard it is for a man to free himself from bad habits."/

Are they merely bad habits? Macław Mejbaum and Aleksandra Zukrowska convincingly show that they are not just bad habits. In many places in the book, they present evidence of the primitive nature of Kolakowski's views, his intellectual dishonesty, and his ideological prejudices, that prevent him from objectively judging many phenomenon.

The fourth chapter, which shows Kolakowski's attitude toward socialist culture, the practice of socialism (including the stalinist period) , is very interesting from this point of view. Another aside: the authors observe that they are not giving a scholarly characterization of this period, but they show that stalinsim was a peculiar revisionism, a return via Marx to the concepts of the vanquished: dogmatic form and revisionist contents. Against this background they present Kolakowski in Poland and the birth of the so-called democratic opposition as a tendency and a structural continuation of Stalinism. These are very interesting observations.

Returning, however, to the "civilized writer of the world, the authors end their critical essay about him by stating:

/Kolakowski remains a philosopher of the first half of the 20th century; he has retained a constant obsession of imagining the world as a contest between two spiritual forces: good and evil. The fact that in his imagination the capital of hell has moved from New York to Moscow does not refute our thesis but confirms it: Kolakowski remains a Stalinist a rebours."/

His theoretical orientation, as the authors write, is sufficiently misty to include traditional political orientations from left-wing Christian democrats to right-wing social democrats; it insures the reader a "light, easy, and pleasant" philosophy.

/"This political success is also a theoretical defeat. We do feel ourselves called to decide to what degree Kolakowski himself is aware of this defeat,"/ the authors conclude.

13021/13104
CSO: 2600/649

UNEXPLAINED 'MILLIONAIRES' FINED, ARRESTED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Aug 86 p 2

[Text] The appropriation of common property, receiving of stolen goods, tax offenses, speculation, bribery and corruption as well as foreign-exchange and smuggling offenses--there are the most frequent charges presented in just the second quarter of this year against nearly 300 persons who were unable to present legal sources for their personal incomes often ranging in the millions.

One hundred fifty-three of these were arrested. On account of the threat of property fines against them and unpaid taxes, property with a cumulative value of 631 million zloty was secured which included, among other things, 177 passenger automobiles, 22 trucks, 89 million zloty in cash, gold and jewelry valued at over 15 million zloty, nearly \$52,000 and 36,500 marks [FRG]. Among those suspected are 135 proprietors of skilled craft plants, privately owned shops and transport firms; 114 workers of the socialized economy sector; and 19 persons who never worked permanently anywhere.

Numerous examples of instituted criminal proceedings in these cases were made available to the PAP journalist in the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Bureau. Here are some of them:

An investigation was concluded by the RUSW [Regional Bureau of Internal Affairs] in Kalisz of Kazimierz B., proprietor of a privately owned fruit-vegetable processing plant in Czesochowa Province. It has been determined that the aforementioned bought 25,000 jars of pickled cucumbers at 110 or 113 zloty per jar over a period of several months in a state run fruit-vegetable processing plant in Stawiszyn (Kalisz Province). Subsequently, he sold these pickles as a product of his own processing plant in, among other places, the neighboring province of Katowice. However, he raised the price for them to 250 zloty per jar. The speculative profit amounted to 3.5 million zloty. This is also the amount that was secured for the anticipated property fines.

The Warsaw Bureau of Internal Affairs is conducting an investigation under the supervision of the public prosecutor's office of Leszek M., a Polish citizen

residing in Austria from 1981 who was accused in May of this year [1986] of smuggling more than 11,500 electronic watches valued at approximately 80 million zloty. He was arrested.

According to an initiated investigation, Jerzy Cz. and Janusz S., owners of a private fire fighting equipment repair shop in Slupsk Province, purchased fire fighting equipment in retail shops between 1984 and 1985 valued at more than 7.3 million zloty in order to resell it at a profit assessed at 5.3 million zlotys.

During the course of the proceedings conducted by the WUSW [Provincial Bureau of Internal Affairs] in Slupsk, the personal property of the accused valued at 3,850 zloty including, among other things, automobiles such as Volkswagen-Golf, Fiat 125, Robur and Zuk as well as RTV equipment was secured in view of the financial fines.

9853/13104

CSO: 2600/648

OVERTIME HOURS JUDGED NOT PRODUCTIVE

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Aug 86 pp 1, 2

[Text] How can the plan be saved? By working on free Saturdays. And how can wages be increased? By working on free Saturdays!

The truth behind both of these catches still used in many work establishments where various kinds of organizational shortcomings are patched up with overtime hours including, above all, working on free Saturdays is verified by data obtained from analyses of the ministry of labor, wages and social affairs.

In accordance with these analyses, during the period of the first 5 months of this year [1986] as compared with the same period last year the number of overtime hours rose 7.8 percent overall including 9.5 percent outside of continuous activity [ruch ciagly]. Man-hours worked during overtime hours constituted for 8.8 percent of the hours worked during normal hours. During the period between January and May of this year, the percentage share of hours worked during free Saturdays (outside of continuous activity) amounted to 55.9 percent. The average time per worker worked on free Saturdays between January and May was 26.9 hours.

The comparison between May of this year with May of last year also comes out in an unfavorable light. It follows from it that in May of 1986, a nearly 10 percent increase in overtime hours occurred (from 11.8 hours to 13 hours per worker) including an 8.4 percent increase outside of continuous activity; i.e., from 9 to 9.8 hours per worker.

9853/13104
CSO: 2600/648

BUCHAREST HOUSING PROBLEMS SOLVABLE, FRANK ADMISSIONS BY WRITER

Bucharest SAPTAMINA in Romanian No 31, 1 Aug 86 p 3

[Text] Journals of current affairs and television documentaries have a not particularly inspired habit of presenting the past through a few photographs of huts and hovels, and the present through prosperous images of some homes and housing complexes erected in exactly the same places. Basically that is the way things stood, but I have characterized this procedure as "uninspired" since in literature this is called "schematism"--the past was not exclusively black while the present cannot be exclusively white, life is more complex, an elementary dialectic of the truth paints a much more colorful picture. Finally, on the shoulders of this past, with all of its sins, has risen the country's present, a present that within a few decades and centuries will itself become the past...

Since I want to limit myself to construction, I will propose as the theme of these remarks the evolution of Bucharest. It is no shame to admit that the city still has hovels, dilapidated residences--mainly on the periphery but also in certain areas in the very heart of town like Tunari, Polona and Eminescu streets--that have remained as a reminder of some shadowy parts of a past when the wealth of the country went the way of foreign societies, of Western gambling houses. The overwhelming majority of timber houses have passed out of existence to leave the ground free and clear for the foundations of new construction. The zone of the belt line that unites the residential districts Cringas and Militar constitutes a small nucleus of progress that is telling evidence of everything that is being done, on a wide scale, in the capital. There, through the care of that great administrator that is the people's party, the foundations of great edifices have been laid, the splendid Lake Mori recreational complex has been established and, assuredly, the drawing boards of the architects and urban planners sparkle even now with the domes of other buildings, the esplanades of other plazas and floral mosaics. Yes, below street level some hovels still loom and, as if from the notes of Dinicu Golescu, people still come with pails to take the water needed for life from the street corner fountains and, yes, the fences are dilapidated and the sewage primitive--it is no shame to admit this but it would be shameful to keep ourselves aloof from it so that it might leaven in the dust of summers or the mire of winters; but that will not happen since very soon the earth scrapers and bulldozers of progress will tear them down as if they had never existed so that the people from these parts can move into new, sunny homes.

Construction in Bucharest is an inexhaustible subject; some buildings rise faster than we writers and publicists can write about them. This is not merely a sign of efficiency and efficacy, it is purely and simply a state policy that, while preserving all that was best from the past, heals the wounds of town and soul, raising "from the straw" (from the foundation) blessed nests for families.

And we should speak not only of residential construction, since the city has other priorities also that are felt at every step. Two of them are the initials inscribed on panels in red-white and white-blue: M. and D. That is, the metro and the Dimbovita river, work and self-sacrifice, grandeur and dynamism. Today even those natural skeptics who up until recently were wondering why a new subway was needed recognize how well they are served by it, how impeccable are its comforts, how quiet and elegant its cars, how inexpensive its transportation, and how quickly it goes from one end of the city to the other! As for the Dimbovita, as one who has written for years and years about the tragedy of this superb river, I cannot express how happy I am to the bottom of my heart on seeing how the revitalization is coming to life. If the first arrangements for the Dimbovita were carried out under the reign of the prince of the unification Alexandru Ioan Cuza, destiny has left to President Nicolae Ceausescu the honor of devising a new life for the guardian river of Bucharest, for the good of the city and for the good of present and future generations. Very soon the recreational boats will roam the blue water arteries of the river, very soon the terns will fly over the golden sands of the beaches, very soon the vegetation sacrificed today in part to widen the river bed will rise with renewed vigor, purifying the air and offering hospitality to peaceful legions of birds and bees.

Indeed, should we talk more about the Civic Center, the platforms of instruction, culture and sports, about the wide arteries and spacious markets that are recovering under our noses? Certainly it is sometimes difficult to get around and certainly the constant construction sites are inconvenient, but we must have patience and not for such a very long time, just till 1990--when we will celebrate 525 years since the city became the capital--when we will see how an ancient walled town can also be very modern...

Since I began with an elegy to some good parts of the past, I will end by referring to a very up-to-date text written in 1922 by Constantin Kiritescu: "Capitals live the history of their countries with special intensity. All the worries, passions and aspirations of the country are reflected in the frenetic life of the capital. Here they burst out with greater energy; from here their echo is reflected and carried to all parts of the world. The word of the capital is the last word of the country; the country thinks, feels, speaks and works through its capital." Try, I would ask you, to multiply Bucharest's triumphs today by the number of other places in the country and you will have a view of a country in full renaissance!

/12379

CSO: 2700/271

WESTERN JOURNALIST COMMENTS ON SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Sep 86 p 12

[Article by Viktor Meier: "Extraordinary Things on the Field of Blackbirds: Fear of the Albanians"]

[Text] Vienna, September--Since the unrest in Kosovo 5 years ago, Serbian newspapers and magazines have purported that one of the most evil goals of the Albanian "irredentists" is the desire to create an "ethnically pure Kosovo," and thus to systematically force the Serbs and Montenegrins, according to the 1981 census 14.7 percent of the population, to emigrate out of the province. However, the designation "ethnically pure" is being used increasingly by these very Serbian publications in a thoroughly positive sense, as, so to speak, a culmination of constructive nationalities policy in self-management Yugoslavia. Here it is question of creating "ethnically pure" Serbian towns, or of maintaining the "ethnically pure" existence of these towns. Pity the Albanian who attempts to buy a house in one of these "Serbian reservations," if anywhere then on the outskirts of town. This could supposedly only be motivated by deep-seated "irredentism," and it would clearly be necessary to determine where the money with which the purchase price was paid came from.

One of the goals being pursued by the so-called "extraordinary measures" in Kosovo--meaning the partial imposition of sequestration by the federal government and the Republic of Serbia--is the prevention of property sales by Serbs to Albanians and the cancellation of sales that have already been carried out. Here, the supervisory agencies in Belgrade are encountering the fact that many of these sale agreements have not yet been registered with the courts, because Albanians generally prefer to purchase land on the basis of their traditional common law, meaning only in the presence of witnesses, and both parties have a common interest in avoiding taxes. Through the ban on property sales from one nationality to another, the Serbs of Kosovo are, as in the feudal Middle Ages, for all intents and purposes bound to the soil.

The Conspiracy Theory

These two situations illustrate the absurd extent of the "Kosovo psychosis," which the Republic of Serbia has introduced into Yugoslav life with the strong support of the Serbian public and for which it has succeeded in enlisting the help of the federal authorities. An Albanian functionary in Kosovo recently

described the situation as this, much to the annoyance of the Belgrade magazine NIN: Under the present circumstances, he said, it is indeed normal that an Albanian whose dog bites a Serbian boy must answer for himself in court. However, the opposite had happened to him, a Serbian dog had bitten his son. There was nothing else for him to do, he said, than to magnanimously forgive this Serb in the interest of relations between the nationalities.

The Serbian newspapers and magazines reflect an almost panic-stricken fear of the Albanians. Every day, one reads about real estate sales not only in Kosovo, but also in southern Serbia, in Macedonia, in Montenegro, even on the Dalmatian coast. There can only be a "certain policy" behind these sales, secretly directed by someone. The fact that an Albanian ice cream and candy vender who works up to 16 hours a day on the coast, in Slovenia or even abroad for this reason also has some money is scarcely recognized as a reason, since the "conspiracy theory" is more interesting. It is already a fact, NIN reports, that incited soccer fans of the "Partisan" or "Red Star" teams in Belgrade are starting to overturn the vender stands of Albanians. There are reports of Albanian herders who allegedly take not only their own sheep, but "alien" ones as well, into their herds in order to move into unused pastures in the mountains, to "usurp social property" and "expand the Albanian ethnic boundaries." No one denies that the Albanians, whose total number in Yugoslavia is probably around two million, have a higher birth rate than the Serbs.

Atavistic fear of Albanians is also prevalent in Montenegro and Macedonia. According to a report in NIN, secret organizations have lured around 18,000 Albanians from Montenegro since 1981 for "temporary work" in the United States, often across the Mexican border. Behind the emigrants, arranging these opportunities, were supposedly--and how could it be anything else--"foreign agencies." In Montenegro, the displaying of the Albanian flag, which in Kosovo and even in Macedonia is officially recognized as the flag of the Albanian nationality, is prohibited. Also, NIN recently published a letter from a reader who reported that an Albanian in Macedonia was fired from his job and excluded from the party because in a translation into Albanian he had used the Albanian names for Macedonian places, such as "Shkupi" for "Skopje." Since at least 1981, letters from Albanians in Kosovo that are addressed to "Shkupi" instead of "Skopje" have been returned. Article 246 of the Yugoslav constitution states that the "languages of the nations and nationalities" in Yugoslavia have "equal rights; this must at least apply where the "nationalities," thus the minorities, "live."

Control Slips Away from the Party

The Slavic Macedonians are making an effort to reclaim the Muslims living in their republic as "Macedonians," thus strengthening the Macedonian element in their republic. However, Muslims and Albanians often lived mixed together, and the families intermarry. Albanians receive heavy prison sentences if they try to draw Muslims over "to their side," so to speak, especially where there are still local functionaries who attempt to do this through the naming process, for example. These tendencies are now leading to a declaration of war on the Islam religion on the part of the Macedonian authorities. "We will prohibit it," the mayor of Kumanovo categorically said recently, and he meant

by that Muslim religion classes for girls. The Yugoslav constitution provides no foundation for this. On the other hand, one reads in the Serbian newspapers, such as in POLITIKA, emotional articles according to which even the Turks of Kosovo are now being forced, under the pressure of Albanian "irredentists," to emigrate to Turkey. In the village of Mamusa alone, near Prizren, 43 households had allegedly reached that decision. According to the 1981 census, 12,500 Turks still live in Kosovo, around 8,000 of them in and around Prizren. The others left in the 1950s, at the time amidst strong Serbian approval. Many Serbs appear to think that their uncompromising animosity towards the Albanians is becoming somewhat unpleasant. Insinuations can be found in NIN, according to which apparently secret organizations advise the Albanians in Kosovo not to react violently to the "extraordinary measures," that the Serbs in Kosovo are through their behavior themselves putting arguments in the hands of the Albanians, for example through their refusal to accept the construction of a factory in their towns by the city of Belgrade. They would have to let only Albanians work in this factory, it was said. In Belgrade as well, the realization is awakening that this attitude destroys the last hope for normal coexistence between the two nationalities. But the attempted collected move of Serbs out of Pristina at the end of June also caused a lot of unnecessary trouble, NIN said. Many Serbs in Kosovo appear to be not at all willing to stay there, not even under federal supervision. They feel that the ban on land sales and other obstacles to their departure are unconstitutional, and are thus embarrassing the Serbian leadership, which lended such strong support to these measures.

Now there is a campaign from Belgrade against the "spontaneous" leaders of the Serbian "mass movement" in Kosovo, which was earlier so welcome to the Serbian leadership. "We do not want an alliance with self-appointed national leaders," Belgrade party secretary Milosevic is now saying, and he thus admits that control over the Serbian movement within and outside of Kosovo is threatening to slip away from the party. A Serbian functionary of the popular front organization, Skerovic, views the situation in even worse terms: "Entirely untenable," he says, is the theory according to which Serbs and Albanians could best unite with one another--without the party and without functionaries, and only with self-elected people: "This would be reconciliation with the class enemy."

12271

CSO: 2300/568

FORESEEN EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENTSIA QUESTIONED

East Berlin DIE WELTBUEHNE in German Vol 81 No 28, 15 Jul 86 pp 865-868

[Article by Prof Dr Manfred Loetsch of the SED Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences: "Intelligentsia Without End?"]

[Text] In communism, Juergen Kuczynski said some time ago (Footnote 1) (In the Weltbuehne survey "Works Not Yet Created" Vol 51/52, 1985), everyone will belong to the intelligentsia. This is a remarkable concept.

To begin with, ideas for the future do not constitute of instructions for posterity. Succeeding generations will arrange their lives according to their understanding, experience and needs.

Ideas regarding the future make sense in the present. They delineate what should be done to approach the goals which are considered to be meaningful. They are points of reference for today's actions. Contemplating Kuczynski's prognosis, the question presents itself whether a development is desirable which--if only in a broad general historical direction--would turn the entire population into what we think of today as "intelligentsia" (in the sense of a social class).

No doubt, the development of human knowledge cannot be conceived as having limits. But to the degree that the social stockpile of knowledge is growing, it becomes more and more difficult for any individual to assimilate the minimum considered to be elementary; not to mention a higher level. Even if more skillful methods of imparting knowledge (before long probably "electronic teaching aids") makes possible more effective teaching and learning processes, the path to what is considered to be basic knowledge at the time will get even longer. Even today there are countries, Japan, for example, where twelve years of schooling are standard for the great majority of the youth. Certainly there will come a day in the GDR when the question presents itself, whether something like the high-school graduation exam should not be the goal for more and more young people. In this instance too, it would be conceivable (though not today and within the next few years) to extend the path of education. But where are the limits? Can formal education be extended ad infinitum? Half a lifetime on the school bench?

I am concerned, as I mentioned, with foreseeable developments. In any case, things are different within the time periods which we are able to grasp today. The notion of constantly expanding the paths of education leading to "intelligentsia" today, until finally they encompass the entire population, seems rather unrealistic to me. And furthermore, it would most likely be a disastrous one in the end.

It is no accident that the XIth SED Party Congress stresses the necessity of purposively developing our job training. Starting in 1986, new job analyses and curricula are to be introduced, in which knowledge of informatics, automation technology etc. are given the rank they deserve within the profile of future specialists. This is the manifestations of a more deeply rooted concept. All--and particularly also international--experience has demonstrated that the scientific-technological revolution does by no means cause a decline in the demand for this type of training. On the contrary.

Countries, which in the past primarily supported an expansion of college or university education, must realize that this results in a serious deficit: high or key technologies also and in particular demand qualified skilled workers who indeed must know more and especially other things than in the past. Skilled workers in efficiency-equipment building, service mechanics, highly qualified automation specialists (skilled workers with control and operating duties on modern automatic systems), yet even masons, carpenters and other trades--all of these are, as far as we can see today, anything but historically vanishing phenomena.

Even if one thinks it possible that deserted factories are the mass scenario for future production processes (which I happen to doubt), one could argue whether as a reaction to mass productions and as a kind of counterbalance, skilled trade vocations might not see a veritable revival. Even today there are certainly indications which point in that direction. In one word: Occupations, vocations and qualifications, which are "intelligence non-typical" should not be neglected nor even belittled. In a world of diversity and wealth, which is the image Marxism holds of communist society, they too shall have their place. Even then there will be people who build closets for the intellectuals; or let us say: we hope.

Furthermore, it appears to me that J. K. is pursuing an erroneous line of thinking which I would like to call "extrapolative thinking." Worldwide, and thus also in the GDR, the number of people acquiring their education at colleges or universities took a sharp jump in the fifties till the seventies; their fraction in the overall number of working people doubled every ten years. The fascination of such a development makes it tempting to calculate what would happen if there were to continue: logically, the end point is not reached until the entire population is included. But here too the saturation point lies, at least within the calculable time periods, much earlier.

Since the mid-seventies, education quotas are stabilizing in fixed proportions; worldwide, the extensive push characteristic for the fifties to the seventies in the development of university student numbers is coming to an

end for the time being. It is not hard to see that we are turning the corner to a transition toward new growth strategies: intensively expanded reproduction.

Under our circumstances one has to contemplate the whole spectrum of qualification potentials. While unskilled or semi-skilled labor is to be pushed back further and finally subdued entirely (which in itself is an almost visionary, but anyway sufficiently optimistic idea), a diverse, abundant structure of qualifications will develop before this background, which starts with the specialist and ends in peak mental performances whose development has been given, including in this magazine, particularly intensive thought for some time.

And so I have arrived at my last argument against J. K.'s concept. The development of knowledge, it appears to me, should be thought of without limitations in its full breadth; there is no sensible reason for the assumption that intelligentsia were the resting point so to speak, the quiet harbor to be reached finally by the entire society. Everything is in motion, even the pinnacle of the pyramid of knowledge.

That which a society considers as intellect (aside from the fact that in a communist society, that is, one with social equality, the term loses its double meaning and no longer designates a social class but only a human quality), is historically changeable. If nearly all people in a society are illiterates, then the few, who can "only" read and write, will already be viewed as the learned class, the "predominantly mentally active ones." That which as late as the past century was adequate to be counted among the technical intellect would be nothing to brag about today. Even as late as the seventies it was an accepted notion in our country to consider as the intelligentsia any person who had acquired a college or university education, which could now be very much questioned. And among the scientific intellect the graduate, who only has his diploma and no other qualification, is even today more likely the beginner; long before, further degrees will be the standard qualification level; nobody knows what gradings mankind will come up with to describe required higher qualifications.

All of these are not academic considerations; we are dealing with current problems. We need the skilled worker as well as the master, the engineer as well as the highest qualified scientist. In communism, educational differences will cease to cause social differences--but a society homogenous in education and qualifications is difficult to imagine, nor would it be desirable. I would prefer a good cook any time to a microelectronic soup machine operated by engineers; it is not likely that people in communism would think otherwise.

13011/13104
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DUTCH DAILY VIEWS IRONIES OF LIFE BEHIND WALL

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD (Saturday supplement) in Dutch 6 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by Peter Michielsen: "The GDR's New Image of Itself"]

[Text] A dismal, chilly country behind a dismal, chilly capital; a dictatorship where people risk their lives when they flee across Europe's most heavily-guarded and most absurd border: the other Germany, the worse Germany.

The GDR does not have the best of images: qualifications such as those above are normally its lot. They smell of Ulbricht and orders to shoot, of barbed wire, the expatriation of critics and the sale of prisoners: the Wall as a symbol, a Wall of shame, of disgrace, permanent proof of the tutelage of the East German citizen, who every day is reminded of the fact that his state does not trust him. Indeed, this Wall is a contradiction of what the government would like so much to make its citizens believe concerning historical righteousness, moral superiority, the inevitable final victory of socialism, the whole myth of the better Germany.

After all, has this state, this GDR, not done its best for decades to create a New Socialist Man, free of the competitive impulse and pursuit of gain, with a socialist system of norms and values, shaped by a high level of schooling, with the emancipation of women and working-class children, the right to work, free medical care, education, inexpensive housing, generous maternity leave, a respectable income, low prices for the primary necessities of life?

Of course. This state is doing all this. And of course, this new socialist man, for whom the centrally planned structure of economy, politics and society is not merely acceptable but even self-evident, knows as long as the Wall stands that he is under tutelage, a subject who must know his place and must resign himself to the fact that others--faceless, sedentary bureaucrats--will in fact determine where he may go and where he may not. As such, the Wall is primarily a symbol of alienation, or the gap between theory and reality, or, as the East Germans say, between Marx and Murcks.

But the GDR is more. The GDR is also a state in which John Doe has resigned himself to just as many unpleasant things as the regime itself has in turn done. There is a new border, this time running through the GDR: the border between what two parties who are stuck with one another have come to see as

acceptable, as realistic, as necessary. A network of unwritten agreements has emerged.

This social contract has eased life in the GDR in recent years to a considerable extent. The German Democratic Republic offers a relaxed image to the foreign observer as well. Everything indicates that the government and the people are slowly accepting each other as they are, and that the black-and-white image of earlier days, when the regime and the people treated each other with an overdose of suspicion, has made way for realism.

The ideological legitimacy that the government previously pursued with such hard-handedness has been traded in for economic legitimacy: a rising standard of living is meant to legitimize the government. And this approach is working. The GDR is, so much more than it used to be, a state glowing with self-confidence, internally as well: this small GDR, so often given the cold shoulder, is one of the top ten industrialized countries in the world, a wholesale dealer in world records, by far the front runner in Eastern Europe in the area that is so decisive in the social contract: the standard of living. The state knows this. The citizens also know it.

The GDR is a republic with two faces. On the one hand, the consciously Prussian face of Europe's most brusque border guards and the goose step of its soldiers, the strong, always shrill and sharply-worded language of the newspapers, the visible militarization of a society that teaches its children to fire guns: a frontline state under fire from the enemy.

The other side of the coins show an enduring Biedermeier middle-class existence for his inhabitants, who are anything but revolutionary and who do not seem to be continually lying awake at night wondering whether they have done enough today in the class struggle and whether they have been vigilant enough against the ever lurking enemy.

The citizens of the GDR display a tendency towards values such as diligence and duty, law and order, obedience and hard work, but they manage to keep the work place strictly separated from their private lives, which are played out primarily behind closed doors, with geraniums on their window sills and the photographs of grandma on the mantle, with a beer and a little dancing at the local bar on Saturday nights to the sounds of James Last. This is where they enjoy being themselves, the citizens of the GDR, far from the big words, such as target figures, plan discussions, achievement pay, class struggle, socialist work morale and the ever-armed peace, far from the half truths of the last party congress, far from the great suppliers of quotes, Marx and Honecker, far from the officially decreed solidarity with the people of Angola.

It is not for nothing that the television melodrama "Dallas" is the most popular television program in the GDR--available on Western television, of course. It is not for nothing that the local television news is the least popular, with viewer ratings of 3 percent at seven-thirty, and only 0.2 percent a minute later. This is also telling.

Self-assurance has grown in proportion to the number of cars, of telephones, of apartments built, in proportion to the increased ability to hold up in comparison with the FRG, in proportion to the number of countries that have recognized the GDR, the number of East Germans who have broken world records and the growth in the differences between other East European countries and the GDR in terms of prosperity.

This increased self-confidence is unmistakable, on every level, and is moreover to the point. Of course, it is easy to see through it. If one follows the East German press, it appears that in fact everything here is successful: the latest industries fair is successful, the concert by the violinist from Azerbaidzhan, Honecker's state visit to Mongolia, the Rostock children's festival, the work of East German eye surgeons, the GDR swim team in Madrid, the Shakespeare festival in Weimar, every harvest, every plan, every initiative, and especially every party congress.

Before long, you have success coming out of your ears. But the fact that there are successes is indisputable.

The citizen shares in this pride, but will sooner attribute it to his own hard work than to the superiority of the system, and thus his identification with that system lags somewhat behind. This is especially obvious from the stubbornness with which the citizen throws himself into an inaccessible private life after his work is completed. On state time, this East German citizen is capable of rattling off his Marxist lesson like a pilgrim doing the Lord's Prayer, but at home he himself decides what he is going to do.

This strict delineation between what is Honecker's and what is the citizen's would be awkward if it did not constitute part of that unwritten arrangement between the regime and its subjects. The government has long since abandoned the pretense of pursuing the citizen as state property in his spare time as well: at home, the citizen is allowed to be himself, at home he does not have to act like a "generally developed socialist personality." Live and let live is a phrase that reflects reality better than the meaningless slogan that is still often seen hanging on unpainted train station facades in the GDR: "Let Socialism Triumph!"

The East German does not have a bad life. It is still a popular notion in the West that if the East German borders were to open up, the East German economy would collapse in one week and the West German in two weeks. This is a dubious notion. Most East Germans clearly do not want to permanently trade the East for the West, but rather at most--and this they would like very much--to have the right to see the Eiffel Tower sometime with their own eyes and to go bake in the Spanish sun for a couple hundred marks.

The GDR is, more than the hard West, a social republic, where the snug security of the collective offers consolation and where it can happen that--in glaring contrast to the Wall and the orders to shoot--a conveyor belt purchased with hard currency can be removed from a factory because the pace is a little too fast for the East German workers. The GDR affords the superficial Westerner an over-simplified image of tedium, grayness, second-rate newspapers on second-rate paper and matchbox automobiles.

But reality is, certainly for the inhabitants, less gray. There is a world of difference between liberalization and a straight jacket, between Honecker and Ulbricht.

If one talks to East Germans, one is told that separate toilets for management, servility towards the boss, the huge salaries of medical specialists and middle-class people squashed by unfair competition are no less immoral than all the miseries that the Westerner discovers on the assembly line in the GDR.

One is told that standard of living is not the same as quality of living, that many people in the GDR are very adept at experiencing more pleasure with fewer means, that the aggressive drive of earlier days has melted away and that 17 million East Germans genuinely do not wake up each day with the realization that they must again reconcile themselves with the loathsome Wall.

The East German may, as DIE ZEIT wrote recently, lack our Great Freedom, but he has many more small freedoms than is generally realized in the West, and he does not by definition get the worst of things whenever sets out to have a small confrontation with the authorities.

Every day, the East German citizen can assure himself from Western television that the FRG is a society in which, besides talent and ambition, the passionate use of elbows is necessary. For the East German who has that ambition, that talent and sharp elbows, as well as a great deal of adaptability, a thick skin and help from family members, Western television is seductive; for his fellow countryman who prefers the "gentle" GDR and knows that things are getting better for him every year, Western television is the opposite.

There was a time when this "first socialist experiment on German soil" nearly collapsed under the weight of the inferiority complex with respect to the larger, richer, freer twin brother in the West. This led to a well-rehearsed pseudo-indifference, a contorted attitude whereby the FRG became a foreign country, just as Ecuador and Gambia are foreign countries. A little of this contortion is gone now.

The need to compare is not entirely ineradicable, but the political aspect of the comparison is subject to wear and tear. It is no longer a question of freedom, and if East Germans contemplate whether there will ever be German reunification, then it is primarily from the point of view of free travel, an easier career for the good skilled worker and the reunion with family on the other side, and this without ever losing sight of the advantages of the East German social state, with its snug security in the work place, the numerous free facilities, the stable prices, the more than generous allowances, the near-impossibility of being trampled by others. The attractiveness of the FRG is no longer automatic.

It is not surprising in this context that a man such as Erich Honecker, the supreme leader, is popular. Honecker's closeness to the people is in glaring contrast to the approach of his predecessor. Ulbricht the ogre ("Goatee, gut and glasses is not the will of the masses," was the earlier poetry of the

people) considered the people his property. Honecker as well, but only in part. "Our Erich," ex-roofer's apprentice from Wiebelskirchen in the Saarland, has done a great deal to humanize the system, despite the Wall, chevaux-de-frise and orders to shoot: Our Erich with his straw hat, level-headed pragmatist, self-assured, and blessed with a sharp mind and a very well-refined political instinct, is not a bitter professional revolutionary like Ulbricht, not a daredevil, not a fighter, but rather a father of the people, with what Gunther Gaus called a secret yearning for an idyllic world.

The GDR, and many East German citizens are very much aware of this, has not done badly with Honecker, and many people are willing, once they have lowered their guard, to admit that they are holding their breath now that the Honecker era is drawing to a close, and now that a crown prince, Egon Krenz, is in the offing who is not immediately well-known for his closeness to the people.

The self-assurance of the government is translated into the ease with which East German functionaries handle issues that were previously so ticklish, and the matter-of-factness with which they draw reality into their policy. When Prof Rudolf Juerschik, head dramatist of the DEFA film enterprise, is asked about what kind of movies he makes for theater distribution, he explains that the East German potentially gets 1,800 films on his television screen each year, on five networks: two East German and three West German. This means that DEFA must concentrate on movies for theaters that are underrepresented in that block.

What ultimately results--films about social developments in the GDR--is actually less interesting than the phenomenon that film policy in the GDR is as a matter of course mapped out on the basis of what is being offered on five networks, and not on two, as was earlier the case.

This also applies to the content of the policy. Naturally, Juerschik says, despite all that has changed since 1971, a film on the relations between the two German states is still not possible in the GDR, although relaxation is noticeable here as well. It is not so much that propaganda is taboo, but the end no longer justifies the means: "Propaganda without artistic content is no good."

There are even actors who are grateful to Ulbricht for his hard policy: "In those hard times, a good audience was cultivated for us." People went to the theater to listen between the lines of scant truths. In the FRG, if someone bares himself politically, people say, 'Oh, that's it.' Things are different here." There are long lines for tickets to the theater.

It is with the same sense of matter-of-factness that one hears in East Berlin that the East German television viewer can get the three West German networks in color, thanks to the sale of an adaptor (the GDR has the PAL system, the FRG has the SECAM system). This adaptor does not have to be bought on the black market or smuggled in: it is available in the state-owned stores.

And this while at one point in the past the civilian militia patrolled around trying to catch East Germans watching West German television, judging from the position of their antennas. Now it is even encouraged. After all, West

German television is not a propaganda medium for enlightening the peoples of Eastern Europe, like the radio stations that broadcast towards Eastern Europe are, but rather a medium intended for West German viewers, and as such is rather lavish in its information on unemployment, poverty, bombings, neighborhood decay and the whole set of social problems, which means that there is more misery being broadcast on Western television than there is visual sustenance bearing witness to parliamentary democracy.

Or look at the quick rehabilitation of Frederick the Great, for decades branded as a militaristic imperialist before his time, the founder of an ugly Germany. The fact that Frederick was more is now being pointed out at a furious pace.

The exhibit about Frederick at the Neue Palais in Potsdam sheds light on him primarily as a philosopher, a composer, a lover of art and music, a correspondent and friend of Voltaire, a just ruler and even as a gourmet. A sensation in the GDR, where every day thousands stand in line for hours. A one-sided exhibit--Frederick the militarist is no longer to be seen: "We're already familiar with that image."

But with all its self-confidence and with all its justified pride in its own abilities, the GDR will not forget that it is at the same time a frontline state. That calls for caution. Economic experiments are taboo, no Prague Spring here, no Hungarian model, no self-management; all of this results only in tensions like those in Hungary and Poland, and the GDR, half Germany and half East Bloc country, cannot afford that.

As soon as ideology or self-image comes into question, the otherwise so often flexible GDR grows rigid. A reasonably tolerable society then becomes a straight jacket of house rules, dogmatic laws and regulations, references to threatening dangers, all wrapped up in an ultra-ugly, arrogant bureaucratic form of German that puts pressure on the citizen and warns him: here is your border, and as we all know in the GDR, it is made of concrete.

Both parties, the leadership and John Doe, know these rules, know their limits. People who are not content with this are beating their heads against a wall. Which is, however, slowly becoming less difficult, because the Wall is becoming porous.

The better Germany? The dividing lines become blurred. A little more travel, that is something that is wanted in the GDR. But beyond that? Beyond that, people are profiting from a relatively generous government, a government that is seeking closer relations. People are profiting from a considerable number of base prices that have not risen for decades, from an increasingly wide assortment of consumer goods, from continually greater opportunities. And otherwise, people are playing the game. People are adapting just as people everywhere have always adapted to a reality that they can do nothing about.

There is more aggression towards the Wall in the West than in the East: it is simply there, ugly but ordinary. Beyond this, the East German is more concerned with Friday afternoon, when he, together with his wife and children in his Trabant or Wartburg, will with abandonment join the backup of cars three lanes wide on his way to the dacha on the outskirts of Berlin or to family in Dresden to spend a nice, restful weekend.

STRUCTURAL SHIFTS IN LABOR MARKET ANTICIPATED

East Berlin WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT in German Vol 34 No 8, Aug 86 (signed to press 15 Jun 86) pp 1121-1137

[Article by Dr Reinhard Schaefer, staff member at the Central Institute for Social Sciences of the GDR Academy of Sciences, and Prof Dr Juergen Wahse, deputy department head at the same institute: "The Impact of Scientific and Technological Progress on the Structure and Qualification Levels of the Work Force"]

[Text] Scientific-technological progress, in particular the widespread introduction of microelectronics, communication and automation equipment, robot use and biotechnology, effects profound changes in the relationship of live and embodied labor as regards both the substance and nature of the work involved. It is a decisive factor that the subjective element in the work process is gaining in importance with regard to its qualitative role, that "man and his abilities, interests and needs makes all the difference to the accomplishment of all economic tasks."(1)

Status of Live Labor in the System of Modern Productive Forces

People currently engaged in the work process are confronting new challenges to an extent and at a rate unprecedented and unimaginable in earlier times. As the result of the development of science and technology, machines increasingly assume tasks that used to be exclusively the job of people. However, nothing is going to alter the basic man/machine relationship. "His (man's--authors' note) superiority is not a matter of degree but of substance...the total process that involves both man and equipment, is subordinated entirely to human--and that means social--purposes."(2) Man decides the objectives, and every transfer of functions from man to machine results in the achievement of a higher level of man's mastery of nature. This also offers him the possibility of setting his sights higher yet.

Live labor still holds the key even in the stage of comprehensive intensification, because it produces more use value by raising labor productivity in a specific unit of time and is also able to lower specific energy and raw materials consumption and counteract the trend to rising costs of energy sources and raw materials. The improvement of labor productivity presumes the effective combination of live labor with the respective

technologies and equipment, in other words the speed-up of scientific-technological progress. Labor productivity continues to be the outstanding source of economic growth, the centerpiece of the stable growth of efficiency.

Some people believe that scientific-technological progress, especially the effects of microelectronics in automated processes, result in a decline in the importance of live labor. Superficially some developmental trends appear to justify such opinions. The quantitative ratio of live and embodied labor, for example, is changing in favor of the latter. Automated communication equipment takes over some functions hitherto reserved for live labor. The production process is being increasingly objectified. It is decided more and more by the technical-economic parameters of the equipment and less and less directly by the human labor capacity. This has important consequences for the organization of labor. However, this primarily technological and labor organizational view represents only one aspect of automation on the basis of microelectronics.

The other aspect involves the socioeconomic element of the relations between embodied and live labor. In socialist production conditions this is characterized by qualitatively new considerations. Workers as the operators and supervisors of machine systems involving the large-scale use of microelectronics in the automated production process obtain a different status, demonstrated mainly in greater challenges to creative effort and greater responsibilities. These latter are not limited to a group of specialists, indeed they are an element inherent in the efficiency of live labor in the overall social reproduction process. Creativity and active commitment are qualities required to an ever growing extent. Knowledge, capability, experience and the sense of responsibility as well as the readiness to serve are increasingly important with regard to the further development of equipment and technologies as well as the full utilization of the efficiency potential incorporated in them, with regard to the necessary adjustments required in the production process, or in case of irregularities and breakdowns. In the social conditions of socialism it is imperative to recognize and resolutely utilize by way of research, development, technology and scientific labor organization the potential offered by personality developing working conditions and functions, inherent in the new technical systems.

Labor expresses a dual relationship. On the one hand it is the relationship between man and nature, "a process by which man handles, regulates and controls his circulation with nature by his own action."⁽³⁾ On the other hand the social conditions of man decide his work. The nature of work is the dialectic unity of its socioeconomic nature and its substance, the latter defined by the division of labor. Consequently, the nature of man's labor and his evolution are decided by the developmental standard and the interrelation of two factors: The standard of the productive forces as the expression of the standard in the confrontation of man and nature, and by the nature and maturity of the production conditions that characterize the socioeconomic conditions governing the accomplishment of the work.

It would be one-sided to restrict the role of labor to social production. Engels emphasized that "productive labor...turns into the means for liberating

man by offering each individual the opportunity to develop and use all his abilities, whether physical or intellectual."(4)

Labor affects essential qualities of each person: Creative thought and action, the sense of responsibility and discipline. Comradely cooperation and mutual aid at work, in particular, shapes the behavior of the worker even outside the labor process. From various aspects, therefore, the labor process turns into an important factor for the realization of the objectives of the socialist society: It provides the material bases for the satisfaction of the material and intellectual needs of the working people, it helps the evolution of versatile socialist personalities and, at the same time, the meaningful and creative organization of this process increasingly becomes a need of the working people.

The socialist society focuses on man in the unity of productive force and the development of personality.

Man continues to be the most important productive force, the subjective and motivating element of the system of productive forces, the "vitalizing fire of production."(5) This role of man is not diminished by the present and future processes of the scientific-technological revolution--on the contrary, it is even more important. Scientific-technological progress opens up to man "new historical prospects, novel dimension of creativity, a higher stage of the development and realization of progressive human traits."(6) New elements, tasks and functions come to the fore following the release of the working people from the fetters of mechanical manufacturing processes, repetitive and small, narrowly circumscribed operations, heavy and unhealthy physical labor. These new elements include the greater consciousness of the individual in its individual and collective activity, new challenges to its knowledge, abilities and skills and the qualifications and training involved therein, up to and including changed requirements on the working people's production discipline, the sense of responsibility, the creativity and readiness to perform. At the same time the individual grows more and more into his role as the subject of social-historical processes, the organizer of his own lifestyle. Consciousness, behavior, qualification and professional commitment are now as never before the decisive factors of productivity, the essential prerequisites for the economic and social use of the key technologies.

This combination of scientific-technological, economic and social progress is a dialectic unit that does not happen automatically.(7) The continued pursuit of the main task in its unity of economic and social policy, confirmed at the Eleventh SED Party Congress, represents the actual approach to the settlement of this problem. Only a resolute, performance oriented and dynamic economy, coupled with the full utilization of scientific-technological advances, offers a guarantee for man increasingly becoming the subject matter of social processes.

The mastery of scientific-technological advances by man, the principal production force, presents great challenges to the planning and management of the social reproduction process. At the same time it is an absolute necessity to respond to the internal developmental requirements of comprehensive intensification with regard to the further organization of the developed

socialist society. New issues, problems and tasks arise from comprehensive intensification for the total social manpower, in particular.

The Effect of the Developmental Trends of Scientific-Technological Progress on the Structures of the Social Labor Capacity

It is difficult to make general statements on the effect of scientific-technological progress on the substance of labor. On the one hand, the processes of scientific-technological progress are very diverse with regard to both their content and the time taken. That is why we need purposeful and detailed studies relating to the decisive present and future directions of scientific-technological advances, such as microelectronics, flexible automation and robot equipment, CAD/CAM, information equipment, and biotechnologies.

Further more, jobs are affected differently as regards their content, extent and even hours. This applies to jobs in the various branches of the national economy exactly as to jobs in the various departments of enterprises and facilities. For us to be able to make definite statements, it will be necessary to examine the diverse directions of scientific-technological progress and their effect on each individual job.

For the benefit of national orientation, the planning and forecasting of the social labor capacity, the development of socialist education, it will be necessary to reveal the fundamental trends of the effect of scientific-technological advances on the qualification requirements with respect to the total national manpower.

Any estimates must start with the combination of the heterogenous diversity of jobs into groups more or less equally affected or influenced by scientific-technological advances.

At the present time, the people employed in industry, the largest sector of the national economy, are classified structurally according to their jobs and in consideration of the following aspects:

-- According to industries or industry ministries (coal and energy; ore mining, metallurgy and potash; chemical industry, electrical engineering/electronics, and so on) as well as their subdivisions;

-- According to sphere of work, in other words the same field of action of employees in the enterprise labor process, regardless of the concrete type of operation. Important spheres of work, for example, are the actual manufacturing departments, production ancillary departments, production preparatory departments with some subdepartments such as R and D, design, technology, and so on;

-- According to main groups of activity, in other words the actual same activities, regardless of the particular sphere of work (production personnel, production preparatory personnel, management and administrative personnel, and so on).

Each of these structures results in separate findings and has its own independent justification.

Scientific-technological processes, especially the processes involving microelectronics, (such as automation, communication, CAD/CAM, office automation, and so on, make pretty much the same demands on the operators, regardless of the industry, combine, the producing or nonproducing sector of the national economy using these scientific-technological measures.

It is therefore not very helpful to use the classification by sectors and branches of the national economy for revealing the laws governing the development of the substance of the job and the skills needed. It is vital for such studies that the units investigated should be largely similar with regard to the nature of the job involved, while specifics are less important and may even be left aside. Otherwise any conclusions reached will tend to be unreliable, and sometimes no conclusions at all can be arrived at.

On the other hand, the sphere of work or main activity group structures appear well suited for arriving at conclusions about general trends of the development of manpower and qualifications. The current status of deliberations does not permit us to unequivocally decide whether the questions raised can best be answered by using the breakdown by spheres of work or that by main activity groups. The evidence presented by either structure offers advantages as well as disadvantages. We will attempt hereafter to use spheres of work to formulate the first trends of their development and, consequently, predicate the long-range developmental trends of the social labor capacity.

Spheres of Work in Industry and Their Manpower Structure

Spheres of work develop differently from the quantitative aspect (number of employees) and the qualitative aspect (structure of qualifications), because they are subject to different factors of influence. The manufacturing departments, for example, are mainly characterized by such processes of scientific-technological progress as the extent of mechanization and automation, the broad use of microelectronics and robot equipment and also by the volume and structure of the production assortment (essentially determined by the division of labor), the extent of innovation and product quality as well as by the use of scientific labor organization. All these factors are ultimately reflected in the volume and standard of production.

Manpower requirements for repair and maintenance in production ancillary departments are particularly affected by the quantity, age, quality and safety of equipment and plant as well as the timewise utilization of the latter. Furthermore, scientific-technological advances present new qualitative demands on rationalization and construction (new technologies, user specific devices, software production). The extent and standard of internal enterprise transportation, the technical control organization and quality control also affect the numbers and structure of personnel in the production ancillary departments.

The manpower requirements of the production preparatory departments are primarily affected by the volume of production renewal processes, the place

value of technology and production preparation for the rational organization of the production processes and also by the organization of labor processes in the production preparatory departments themselves (such as the role of CAD/CAM systems), that make it possible to generally use modern computer equipment from design through equipment and manufacture.

Management and production ensuring departments as well as the work spheres culture, social and welfare services, on the other hand, evolve in relative independence of the qualitative features of the production process.

The work spheres procurement and sales as well as cadres and training also are affected by independent factors (for example the development of materials and warehousing management and customer services; combine manpower figures, the extent of continued training required, and so on).

Though the development of the work spheres in various industries or combines reflects some specific features, general trends prevail with respect to the substance, tasks and structure of the individual work spheres. It is therefore quite feasible to arrive at conclusions for the manpower and qualification structures of the economic spheres and the national economy as a whole, resulting from the aggregation of manpower structures in the work spheres. They are directly connected to the phases of the reproduction process and considered fundamental structural aspects. These structural aspects represent a link between the social reproduction process and the reproduction of the labor capacity.(8)

When we analyze the work spheres, we are concerned with the proportion between the various work spheres from quantitative and qualitative aspects (distribution of the total manpower and the various grades of qualification on the work spheres) as well as with the qualification structure within the respective work spheres.

The numerically biggest work sphere of industry is the actual producing sphere; it accounts for more than 40 percent of all employees.(9) This is also the work sphere where scientific-technological advances currently have the greatest effect on the numbers of personnel, where it is primarily applied and therefore most affects job requirements. Consequently, the job content changes more rapidly and also more radically than in most other work spheres.

Furthermore, scientific-technological progress does more than change the job content in the producing sphere. It results in job savings, a decisive objective of the use of scientific-technological advances. The share of this work sphere in the total of employees declined by 4 percent from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's. Such a decline is the inevitable result for production per se. Studies have shown that a close and statistically ascertainable connection exists between the extent of job automation and the proportion of employees in these spheres, namely that this proportion drops with increasing automation.

The trend toward the diminution of jobs in the producing spheres is characterized by increasing demands on qualifications and, in particular, a strong rise in the proportion of skilled workers (less by a rise in the

proportion of university and technical school graduate cadres). Though the latters' percentage of the employees in this work sphere also rises, it continues to stay at a low level by comparison with other work spheres. This is a perfectly normal phenomenon, because the most demanding and complex job contents are concentrated on production preparation. The drop in the numbers of semiskilled and unskilled workers is well above average, a sign that many jobs with low requirements have been abolished.

The production ancillary spheres (including mainly internal enterprise transportation, repair and maintenance, device, tool, instructional and model construction as well as TKO [technical control organization] and quality control) account for more than 20 percent of the industrial labor force. This work sphere calls for qualifications more or less significantly above those needed in the producing spheres.

In contrast to the producing spheres, the share of the production ancillary departments in the total industrial labor force has risen by almost 6 percent in the period under review, an indication that the volume of these tasks and not only the substantial requirements of this sphere have increased to an extent calling for the expansion of the manpower employed. The new demands on the construction of rationalization aids play a special role. The construction of rationalization aids has assumed an entirely new status. It is the sector of production, that has shown the strongest development, produces a steadily growing share of equipment investments and therefore exerts a great deal of influence on the structure of the labor force and its qualifications.

In the production ancillary departments, too, the growth of personnel mainly involves skilled workers but not to such a great extent as in the producing departments, because production ancillary departments have lost fewer semiskilled and unskilled workers. This is obviously due to the fact that job demands have always been greater there, and fewer jobs were therefore held by relatively unskilled workers.

Production preparatory departments (research and development, design, planning, technology, and so on) account for more than 10 percent of industrial manpower. This percentage has risen faster than in all other work spheres, due to the growing volume of work and its increasing shift from direct production to production preparation. Production preparatory departments reveal a qualification structure with a share of university and technical school graduate cadres similar to that of the nonproducing sectors of the national economy, principally the health services, education and culture.

Changes in cadre personnel concentrate more on university graduates here than in all other work spheres. By comparison with university graduates, all other qualification levels display a declining percentage of cadres in the production preparatory departments. It appears that the percentages of technical school cadres and skilled workers (that had also risen in the course of earlier developments) have already peaked. The necessary rise in the proportion of university graduates evidently can no longer proceed at the exclusive expense of semiskilled or unskilled workers. Consequently it is now achievable only by increasing the personnel employed in this work sphere. Accordingly, more than half industry's intake of university graduates has been

hired for this work sphere. This is where the most challenging tasks in industry are increasingly concentrated.

Some 8 percent of industrial employees are involved in the management and production backing departments. This percentage tends to decline, a consequence of the ongoing rationalization of management and administration as well as the growing equipment of these departments with modern computer and office equipment.

The shift in the structure of qualifications here is concentrated less on a rise in the proportion of skilled workers than on that of technical school and university graduate cadres. This shows that the skilled worker percentage is close to its peak, in particular because the intake of skilled workers in this work sphere has lately been well below the average.

Producing departments and management and production backing departments both show a declining proportion in the industrial labor force. This is their common feature. Their qualification development, on the other hand, diverges quite sharply. The producing departments are mainly raising their percentages of skilled workers, the management and production backing departments primarily the percentage of their university and technical school graduate cadres. Consequently the producing departments make increasing demands on the qualifications of their skilled workers; the management and production backing departments have greater requirements on the knowledge and abilities of their university and technical school graduate cadres.

The Structure of the Total National Labor Force by Activity Features (Sectors)

Our earlier reflections on the development of the manpower potential were based on analyses of industry. In addition to this, we need to establish how the total manpower potential of the national economy is broken down by characteristic activities in order to arrive at conclusions on the development of the total national labor force.

There are superordinated activity structures and, therefore, substantial similarities between the various economic sectors, branches and combines of industry. Much the same applies to other producing branches and also to the nonproducing sectors of the national economy.

The sectors producing material use values carry on many activities comparable with those in the nonproducing sectors. This holds true on the one hand for management and planning, production preparation, administrative work and others, and on the other for such areas as repairs and maintenance, servicing, welfare facilities, cultural and social services, cadres and training, safety. We will therefore see effects of scientific-technological advances, that are fairly similar to those prevailing in the corresponding industrial work spheres.

Still, the structural breakdown of industry cannot simply be transferred to the other sectors of the national economy. The specific tasks of education, the health services, culture and art or even of commercial services, the retail trade and others cannot be classified with this structure. Though the

quantitative and qualitative development of these sectors depends on specific developmental trends of scientific-technological progress--exactly as do the producing sectors--, it is more affected by demographic factors and socio-economic objectives than in the producing sectors.

Two tasks therefore arise with regard to the structural breakdown by comparable activities of the total national labor force:

1. The definition of the sectors involving the total national labor force and characterized by the fact that they include comparable activities independent of their statistical classification with economic sectors. The breakdown by industrial work spheres is taken over to some extent, combined in other respects and also considerably expanded.

2. The ascertainment of the manpower and qualification structure of all producing and nonproducing spheres by sectors corresponding to the revised structure of the national economy.

The sectors thus include all workers who carry on comparable activities from the aspect of job content. In the education sector, for example, this includes all personnel directly involved with pedagogic tasks in the process of education and continuing education. It means the pedagogical personnel in the education system proper (nursery schools, schools, technical schools, universities, and so on) as well as instructors in all other branches of the national economy (such as enterprise vocational schools, adult education facilities, and so on).

On the other hand, the administrative personnel or repair and maintenance workers employed in facilities of the educational system, for example, are not included in the education sector but rather in the pertinent sectors of the national economy (in this instance management/administration or repair/maintenance respectively).

First estimates regarding the structures of the total social manpower by sectors on the basis of the example presented here are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. These tables are based on calculations by the authors, using statistical materials on the qualification structure of the personnel employed in the respective economic spheres and the structure of personnel employed in the industrial work spheres.

Table 1: Percentage Distribution on Sectors of Persons Employed in the GDR National Economy

Sectors of the National Economy	Percentage of Labor Force Employed
1. Production	26
2. Repairs/Maintenance	19
3. Production Preparation/Science	9
including science/research/development	4
4. Management/Administration	18
5. Commerce/Services	14
6. Health and Social Services	5
7. Education	6
8. Culture/Arts	1
9. Miscellaneous	2
Total National Labor Force	100

The ascertainment of the long-term development of these sectors of the national economy is difficult, contradictory and requires differentiated and interdisciplinary studies. Major shifts must be expected with regard to quantitative manpower ratios. Three dimensions of influence are decisive: The dynamism and developmental trends of scientific-technological advances, in particular the key technologies, involve changed and extensive requirements on the manpower structure. By way of the sex and age composition of the population, demographic trends tend to affect the manpower structure more from the aspect of changed needs and the ensuing capacity developments (specially in the education and social services). The socio-economic objectives are indissolubly linked with the further organization of the developed socialist society. They represent the basis for the utilization and scope of the new technologies in the meaning of the objectives of socialism and thereby affect the manpower structure.

Table 2: Qualification of the Total GDR Labor Force by Sectors (Percentages)

Sector of the National Economy	Qualification Structure				
	University Graduate Cadres	Technical School Graduate Cadres	Foreman/ Skilled Worker a)	Without Completed Vocation- al Train- ing	Reproduc- tion Ratio b)
1. Production	1	3	61	35	1.30
2. Repairs/Maintenance	2	4	71	23	1.36
3. Production Preparation/ Science	23	33	37	7	2.02
including science/ R and D	35	21	36	8	2.19
4. Management/ Administration	11	20	51	18	1.66
5. Commerce/services	1	4	62	33	1.32
6. Health and Social Services	14	45	17	24	1.83
7. Education	31	33	9	27	2.10
8. Culture/Arts	21	26	30	23	1.87
9. Miscellaneous	4	8	55	33	1.40
Total National Labor Force	8	13	53	26	1.52

- a) Skilled workers employed in the profession learned or one similar to it
b) The reduction ratio is calculated from the percentage of workers per grade of qualifications, weighted by the respective specific costs of training (workers without completed vocational training equal 1).

Developmental Trends of Qualifications by Sectors

The first considerations of the numerical development of employment may be summarized as follows:

Sector 1 (production) combines direct manufacturing not only of industry but also of construction, agriculture, forestry and the transportation system, though it is of course imperative to take into account the effects of scientific-technological advances with respect to their substance and the time involved. (10) On the basis of estimates and international trends, we may expect the proportion of employees in this sector to continue dropping substantially, mainly as a consequence of automation.

Sector 1 features the following contradictory developmental trends:

- Manpower savings by automation and the abolition of entire process stages on the basis of scientific-technological advances (for example by replacing mechanics by microelectronic components);
- Only slight effects on the numbers of employees whenever microelectronics merely replace or supplements other operating principles without

substantially changing the process course (for example for the purpose of achieving greater safety);

- An increase in the labor force in sectors manufacturing microelectronic components, control and regulation equipment and new consumer goods on the basis of microelectronics, if--due to the development of demand--output growth is greater than the rise in productivity. Still, these increases in productivity are significantly above the national average.

We should expect these developmental trends to make for an overall decline in the labor force employed in this sector.

Sector 2 (repairs/maintenance) will slightly increase its share but is likely to soon achieve satiety. Statistics prove that combines with a greater extent of automation, in other words those using modern capital equipment, employ significantly more workers for repair and maintenance than combines with a lesser extent of automation. Upon the transition to comprehensive and flexible automation as well as in conjunction with the growing need for the construction of rationalization aids in the various combines, repair and maintenance jobs involve quantitatively and qualitatively greater challenges on workers. The larger volume of repairs and servicing and, consequently, the greater responsibilities of the working people, is also due to the fact that the fixed asset stock per industrial worker has risen from about M41,000 in 1955 to around M158,000 in 1984 and, in some work places, already exceeds M1 million.

Inadequate repair and maintenance capacities on the one hand and mistakes by a worker on the other may result in considerable national losses. More extensive tasks for repairs and maintenance are also arising outside industry, in other sectors of the national economy. The sphere of repairs and maintenance has been vastly expanded by providing work places with communication and computer equipment in such fields as transportation, mail and telecommunication services, commerce and also the health services on the one hand and the establishment of more capital intensive work places in management and administration on the other. The increasing household use of technical consumer goods also results in more repair and servicing work.

In sector 3 (production preparation/science), in particular in research and development, design and planning or technology, highly important elements concerned in the introduction of microelectronics and other aspects of scientific-technological progress are prepared in terms of technology and labor organization. According this sector initially requires much additional manpower. The emphatic orientation to further processed products, qualification intensive production, the greatest possible novelty of the commodities produced, ranging to the preparations for automation and software development call for more personnel in R and D departments.

On the other hand, scientific-technological advances in this sector especially will result in considerable labor swaving by thre creation of CAD/CAM jobs. In 1986 we already have 1,500 such computer backed work stations. By 1990 we are supposed to have 85,000-90,000. This releases potential effects that are almost impossible to even estimate now.(11) Involved here may be new working

hour and manpower structures, changed job contents and also a greater proportion of creative activities.

It will need more thorough analyses to determine whether the creation of CAD/CAM work stations will be able to compensate this sector's additional manpower demands. In any case, CAD/CAM work places are bound to result in shorter working hours and a decline in the need for technical draughtsmen and part designers. There will also be changes in the structure of working hours, with a rise in the proportion of creative activity. Still, the increased manpower needs will presumably be compensated only in part by the expansion of the sphere of tasks for production preparation, so that an increase in the labor force remains the decisive process for this sector.

In the long run, sector 4 (management/administration) will slightly reduce its manpower. This trend is perceptible despite growing tasks related to planning and management, in state and economic management, administration, accounting and so on. An essential prerequisite is the use of efficient devices, office automation and the reorganization of administrative and clerical work based on the new performance possibilities. Text and data storage and processing, the compilation, re-use and passing on of texts and data depend largely on equipment based on microelectronics. A decline in manpower needs is thus quite possible in this sector, following the widespread introduction of integrated text and data processing. International estimates consider that 20-30 percent of the present jobs may be cut, because some 40 percent of clerical work could be automated.

Sector 5 (commerce/services) features an expanded performance offer and improved quality services, geared to the trend of the demand. This involves the need for additional manpower. Still, even here the introduction of communication equipment based on microelectronics, in particular with respect to all monetary and data processing and transmitting processes, produces counteracting factors that are linked to significant savings of time. These time savings are concentrated in the fields of monetary and credit services, retail trade, the postal and telecommunication services. Though there may be some absolute manpower savings in a few spheres, additional manpower needs tend to predominate in the sector as a whole, due to the improved performance standards in retail trade and services. Our social system aims to reduce off-work hours now taken up by domestic chores and thus provide more leisure. The main approach is the shift of these chores to social production.(12)

The size and structure of sector 6 (health services) is largely decided by sociopolitical objectives related to the preservation of the public health. These objectives range from prophylaxis and general out-patient treatment via comprehensive mobile and stationary treatment to modern pharmaceutical production. These same sociopolitical objectives are also affected by the working peoples' working conditions, job content, relations in the working collective, and so on, as well as by the meaningful organization of leisure. Other issues important in this context are comfortable housing, the .pa organization of vacations and leisure, access to culture, the arts and sports not forgetting environmental organization and control. These challenging objectives mean that this sector will require additional manpower.

The shift in the age structure discernible for the coming decades will also require the health services to make greater efforts with regard to the welfare of older people.

Obviously there will be some time savings due to scientific-technological advances such as modern diagnostic devices, laboratory and X-ray facilities, automated analyses, and so on. However, these savings are unlikely to result in a manpower decline. Instead the time saved will be used to more intensively care for our citizens.

Sector 7 (education) is largely affected by educational objectives and demographic developments. Both these dimensions indicate a very slight rise in the manpower needs of this sector. The educational emphasis in the coming decades will be on the improvement of the quality of education, adult education and qualification standards within the already existing and well developed qualification structure. The GDR has now arrived at a qualification structure (8 percent university graduates, 13 percent technical school graduates, 64 percent skilled workers/foremen) that cannot possibly expect the same rates of growth as in the 1960's or 1970's. Nor does the expected simple or even slightly diminished population reproduction indicate a need to significantly expand this sector.

Though the equipment available and based on microelectronics (classroom computers, audiovisual teaching systems) will affect the education system, it will not--and here the situation resembles that of the health services--usually result in time savings and a decline in personnel but rather in improved quality and the expansion of services. We may expect structural shifts within the education sector in so far as the need of instructors for adult education is likely to rise. This is due to the fact that the rapid development of scientific-technological advances requires knowledge to be renewed in ever decreasing intervals.

Sector 8 (culture/art) will expand in response to the growing demand for cultural services. This growing demand is affected both by the rising educational standard of the general public and the cuts in hours worked.

The gradual transition to the 40-hour week signifies new and more extensive tasks for this sector. A greater demand for cultural services is also to be expected following the change in the structure of off-work hours as the result of a rise in the proportion of real leisure.

Of course, if we take into account the dimensions of sector 8--less than 1 percent of total manpower--, a rise in its share hardly changes the national proportions.

In summation we may affirm the following:

Scientific-technological advances result in quite considerable structural shifts among the sectors of the national economy. Some sectors will have to increase their labor force, others will be able to reduce it--some even in absolute terms.

The qualification structure within the sectors varies substantially. These will decline very little in future, because different activities and requirements are bound to persist.

In general, though, it is safe to claim that scientific-technological progress as the predominant tendency involves the need for a higher standard of knowledge and abilities and, consequently, of qualifications. At the same time we must not overlook the fact that simple labor will continue to be needed despite this basic tendency. Such an assessment should not be equated with bourgeois theories regarding the general polarization of job requirements between skilled and less skilled work, executive and subordinated functions--a polarization that, moreover, is assumed to require passive acceptance.

The conclusions needing to be drawn from the structural development of the social labor capacity are of a complex nature. We would like to point out two crucial processes--the assurance of the socially necessary flexibility of the labor force and the guarantee of early and consistent re-education, oriented to national needs.

Greater demands on flexibility arise in the following fields:

- Mastery of a broader spectrum of specific professional techniques, technologies or processes,
- Mastery of bigger technological complexes,
- Mastery of work that is not customarily involved in the field of action of this particular occupation,
- Mastery of new tasks arising from the deployment of new equipment (man-machine communication by way of terminals, handling microelectronic subassemblies, changed key points and control tasks with regard to the observation and handling of novel technological processes). (14)

Education must take account of these requirements by the corresponding development of vocational curricula. However, the professional profile can be broadened to only a certain extent, by the time limits set on the one hand, and by the obsolescence and forgetting of knowledge and skills transmitted but not used on the other. Unduly wide ranging education usually goes at the expense of specific knowledge and skills, so that longer periods of familiarization are needed until the job performance is fully satisfactory.

Consistent continuing education, consonant with social necessities, is another general element in the pursuit of the satisfaction of the growing demands on qualifications. As the result of scientific-technological advances, human knowledge turns over at ever diminishing intervals. This is accompanied by the obsolescence of the knowledge, skills and abilities acquired in training. It is therefore impossible for schooling in one's youth to satisfy the greater and steadily new demands on qualifications. It used to be that the knowledge and skills acquired in vocational training sufficed for people's entire working lives. That is no longer the case. Continuing education is steadily gaining in importance in the conditions of the scientific-technological

revolution and, considered with a view to the whole of working life, assumes the same dimensions as early education. In this context we must consider continuing education as a multilevel process, ranging from cyclical continuing education courses via permanent continuing education by the work process itself, the exchange of experiences, concrete and task related further training to knowledge competitions in leisure hours, in special enterprise and social facilities, by literature, the press, radio and television. At the present time some 1.5 million working people are involved in organized adult education.

Just like early education, adult education must be organized as a process planned with a view to time and content, with the aim of always transmitting to the working people the socially required standard of education.

The changed qualification and employment structures of the future are largely based on material compulsions involved in scientific-technological progress. At the same time it is possible to actively influence them, and it is imperative in the interest of the working people to exploit this organizational scope as much as possible. "The continuing education of the working people therefore acquires primary importance for ensuring the necessary educational preparation...In cooperation with the educational institutions, combines and enterprises (bear) a great deal of responsibility for the early definition of the qualitative and quantitative requirements on continuing education."(15)

It is imperative, therefore, to strengthen long-range forecasting efforts with the aim of revealing the quantitative and qualitative changes in the structural development of the social labor capacity, to analyze the often contradictory processes and arrive at the appropriate strategic conclusions. The far reaching changes in the deployment structure of the social labor capacity are of the utmost importance for management, because the mastery of these structural shifts is one of the decisive factors deciding the achievable economic and social efficiency of scientific-technological advances. This applies quite particularly to the extent, the structure and content of education and continuing education. However, it is also necessary to foresee the social aspects involved in recruiting manpower for new tasks, and to organize them consciously and as planned.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Direktive des XI. Parteitages der SED zum Fuenfjahrplan fuer die Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaft der DDR in den Jahren 1986 bis 1990" [Eleventh SED Party Congress Directive to the 5-Year Plan for the Development of the GDR National Economy 1986-1990], Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1986, p 18.
2. H.Nick, "Man--the Vitalizing Fire of Production, EINHEIT, No 19/1986, pp 909f.
3. K.Marx/F.Engels, Collected Works, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1956ff, Vol 23, p 192.

4. Ibid, Vol 20, p 274.
5. Ibid, Vol 23, p 198.
6. W.Eichhorn I, "On the Meaning of Socialism and Man as the Main Productive Force," EINHEIT, No 12/1985, p 1086.
7. Ibid.
8. See K.Ladensack, "Comprehensive Intensification and the Enforcement of Suitable Manpower Structures," SOZIALISTISCHE ARBEITSWISSENSCHAFT, No 2/1985, pp 109f.
9. The situation does vary sharply in the various industries. Industries with a well below average of mechanization and automation employ 50-60 percent of their personnel in the producing departments.
10. Heinrich and Stegmann point out the specific developmental conditions in farming (see R.Heinrich/H.Stegmann, "Problems of the Development and Rational Use of the Social Labor Capacity in GDR Agriculture," WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT, No 3/1986, pp 355-357.
11. "Bericht des Zentralkomitees der SED an den XI.Parteitag der SED. Berichterstatter: E.Honecker" [SED Central Committee Report to the Eleventh SED Party Congress. Reporter: E.Honecker], Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1986, pp 29, 52.
12. In 1980, household chores in the GDR (meal preparation, laundry, cleaning and home care) amounted to 11 billion hours. Shifting these chores to social production by 20 percent involves the need for about 400,000 additional workers.
13. Even now every worker in the GDR works an average of 33 fewer days per annum than in 1960. This was done by reducing the hours worked weekly, by extending vacations and cutting working hours for working mothers and shift workers.
14. See M.Guder/P.Lorenz/G.Schneider, "On the Substantial Organization of Skilled Occupations from the Special Aspect of Professional Flexibility," FORSCHUNG DER SOZIALISTISCHEN BERUFSBILDUNG, No 2/1984, p 59.
15. "Eleventh SED Party Congress Directive....," as before, p 28.

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NEW LAW RESTRUCTURES, REASSIGNS TECHNICAL CURRICULA

East Berlin PRESSE-INFORMATIONEN in German No 96, 19 Aug 96 p 6

[Article by Dr Werner Kottowski, department head in the Ministry for University and Technical School Affairs: "Degree Programs in Individual Academic Specialities Under New Regulations"]

[Text] In future the education of engineering, economic and agrarian cadres will always conclude with graduation from college. Formerly this education proceeded at universities, colleges and technical schools. From now on and into the 1990's, it will be gradually converted to differentiated college studies. These measures represent another step toward the implementation of the "conception for the organization of the education and continuing education of engineers and economists in the GDR," resolved upon by the SED CC Politburo on 28 June 1983 and the "conception for the long-term development of the education and continuing education of agricultural engineers and economists at GDR colleges and technical schools" of 8 April 1986.

The switch to colleges will safeguard the necessary rise in standards, guarantee a more profound basic education and, therefore, greater flexibility and, at the same time, make it possible to more strongly orient specialized education to the respective assignments. By passing the final examinations, graduates earn the right to the appropriate professional titles and to take up employment. Some changes are arising with regard to earning a degree. The first academic degree in the above mentioned scientific spheres will no longer be linked to graduation from college within the framework of education. The present rules will continue to apply to all other fields of specialization.

Details are settled in the "Order on the Acquisition of a Degree by College Graduates--Degree Order," published in GESETZBLATT DER DDR Part I No 26 of 18 August 1986. Consequently, all college graduates in engineering, economic and agrarian specialities who successfully complete their studies according to the new conception will in future have the right upon graduation to earn the first academic degree. This may be done within the framework of direct postgraduate studies, normally immediately following graduation from college, or by correspondence courses for people in work.

This provision guarantees equality of opportunity for all college graduates in the respective fields of specialization. The degree is earned within the

framework of continuing education, regardless of the method of study. This enables every graduate to obtain a degree if this appears socially necessary or individually desirable for his further development. At the same time it is possible to realize greater demands on degree work. The order also settles the conditions and procedures to be observed and followed by the colleges, state organs, combines, enterprises, cooperatives and facilities as well as by the graduates themselves.

Graduates admitted to postgraduate direct studies for earning a degree should be persons who perform exceptionally well or are specially suited for the pursuit of scholarly occupations, significantly contribute to the accomplishment of research tasks in the sections or at their professional partners, or whose professional employment requires a degree. College teachers, the competent FDJ management organizations, future employers and the graduates themselves are entitled to submit the appropriate requests. Usually the director of the respective section will decide about admission. The graduate will be awarded a special grant upon beginning direct postgraduate studies. Within the framework of the already concluded labor contract, the future employer and employee agree that the graduate will start work usually 6 months after graduation from college and with a successfully defended thesis. The topic will be worked on at the respective college, a scientific facility or the future employer's enterprise. Employers will assist this type of degree acquisition with regard to content and by the provision of the appropriate material conditions. They are entitled to propose topics arising mainly from the tasks of the plan science and technology as well as objectives for the special scientific qualification of individual graduates.

College graduates may earn an external degree after starting and without interrupting their professional employment. The following conditions apply: Successful integration, direct cooperation in scientific-technological tasks or research topics with an independent and accountable share as well as active social involvement. The degree order regulates the modes of application by the graduates who, among others, need an assessment of their earlier professional and social activities as well as comments by their employers to accompany their application. The director of studies at the respective college decides on admission to the degree program on the proposal by the director of the particular specialized section and in coordination with the managements of the social organization. External degree courses must be completed within 12 months and with the defense of the thesis. In that period, students may be released for up to 60 working days. The enterprises will make sure that enough college graduates will be delegated to correspond to their cadre development plans. They will also provide the proper conditions for the successful and scheduled completion of these studies.

The degree order will take effect on 1 January 1987 and will be effective for the first time in spring and summer 1987 for graduates of those technical and economic specialities, who will complete their college studies in accordance with the new conception.

11698

CSO: 2399/554

OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO INCREASE IN JUVENILE CRIME

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 15 Jun 86 p 33

[Article by Michael Mara: "Juvenile Crime Causes Concern Among SED Members--Distinct Increase In Spite Of Intensified Ideological Indoctrination."]

[Text] From our correspondent. Although juvenile delinquency in the GDR does not have the dimensions as in the FRG, it is nevertheless rather a cause of concern to the SED. Very recently in particular, the "special importance of repressing juvenile delinquency" is being stressed. Although juvenile delinquency, according to communist view, is--like all criminality "foreign" to socialism, the SED so far has not been able to get a grip on it. On the contrary, the very offenses which previously had been attributed to capitalism, such as robbery, assault and rowdiness, registered a distinct increase during the past 15 to 20 years. The population is fully aware of this and is voicing demands for "stricter enforcement" or "more severe punishment", respectively.

The slight decline in juvenile delinquency overall within recent years, which is reported by some GDR media without any figures or statistical comparisons whatsoever, can hardly be considered a success to crime prevention and fighting. For the decline is a result of the decreasing numbers of juveniles and adolescents since 1980, not of a lowering of the comparatively high incidence of juvenile crime in the GDR.

This is evidenced by the fact that "as before, the vast majority of offenses is committed by young people up to the age of 25," explains the leading GDR juvenile criminologist, John Lekschas. The criminal lawyer from East Berlin confirms a "relatively high" incidence particularly for minors, which is above that determined at the end of the sixties. He concedes that it had not been possible "to achieve a noticeable decline in juvenile delinquency," but rather that it fluctuates about a rather constant mean.

This is quite remarkable considering that the GDR has developed a multiple strategy in its fight against crime: It equally includes law propaganda and legal education, as well as a tight supervisory and monitoring system plus stricter prosecution. For example, all youth events, down to an evening at the disco, are being policed by the disciplinary groups of the FDJ, which have been increased to a force of roughly 50,000 in the meantime.

As is the case with the approximately 160,000 police assistants, they are being trained and led by the people's police.

Not the least contributing fact to the specific problem area of juvenile delinquency is that a considerable percentage of young lawbreakers consists of repeat offenders. About half of those who relapse have committed their first offense before they reach 18. In other words: Every other juvenile becoming delinquent turns to a criminal career and thus contributes to the reproduction of the hard core of criminality in socialism's reality.

Since most juvenile offenders have already previously drawn unfavorable attention, the demand in the GDR is for "early influential action" upon "negative behavior patterns" in youths. The director of the East Berlin municipal court is of the opinion, for example, that with prompt and consistent reaction many a criminal development could be checked. In almost any case, the juvenile offenders were likely to give prior indications of negative behavior "which were not pursued," like truancy, for example.

While one faction wants to take more severe measures against juveniles with "negative behavior patterns," the problem lies deeper for others. Leschkas believes that the causes of juvenile delinquency in socialism are "not primarily within the personality of young offenders," but are found "in failures within the socialization process," ergo within the entire social sphere. Social contradictions are active here, which made it possible "that a kind of production and reproduction of juvenile delinquency is taking place."

With this opinion, the East Berlin juvenile criminologist clearly separates himself from those untenable voices in the SED who want to pass primary responsibility for juvenile delinquency in the GDR to influences of "class enemies" and flaws in the political-ideological education of the young. Leschkas emphatically rejects the claim that the prevention of crime "is primarily a matter of more intensive political-ideological indoctrination...." Likewise, he is against the "conformity strategy," that is, demanding of young people "to conform without opposition to anything the generation of educators is demanding from them."

The juvenile criminologist does not believe in conformity but creative activity, not in coddling but in self-responsibility, to give young people the possibility of indentifying with society and its goals. However, it does not look like these realistic views are starting to take hold in the SED and FDJ, in the security apparatus, and in the institutions of learning.

13011/9835
CSO: 2300/506

YOUTH HOSTEL ACCOMMODATIONS, SPECIAL PROGRAMS VIEWED

East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 12 Jul 86 p 3

[Interview with Peter Schaarschmidt, Management Director of FDJ Travel Agency 'Jugendtourist': "Horse-Back Riding in Ansprung, Paddling on the Dahme River"]

[Text] [Question] How many youth hostels are there in our country?

[Answer] The FDJ travel agency "Jugendtourist" has available a total of 268 facilities, 247 of which are youth hostels, 19 Jugendtourist hotels and 2 youth convalescence centers, the latter in Wendisch-Rietz on Lake Scharmuetzel and in Eckartsberga in the district of Halle. Almost daily available are a total of 25,000 spaces including the seasonal capacities--meaning accommodations which cannot be utilized year-round, in bungalows, for example--in cities interesting to tourists as well as in areas of scenic attraction. In addition, there are over 1,800 camping possibilities within the hostel territory.

[Question] Since 1980, youth hostel accommodations are being uniformly and centrally referred through the FDJ travel agency. What are the advantages as compared to the previous practice of referrals in the districts?

[Answer] This enables us to generally provide young people with more, and especially a larger, selection of youth hostel accommodations. Today the occupancy level is in the range of 77 percent, relative to all of the facilities and throughout the year (!). This has given us a considerable position internationally.

In the past, there were many cancellations, on short notice in part, by interested persons due to frequent multiple orders. With the help of a central referral system we were able to considerably reduce the number of multiple applications. By the same token, we are now able to offer more alternative options, referral possibilities are therefore greater.

[Question] Youth hostels--this we have found throughout the country--do offer considerably more than just a roof over your head...

[Answer] In order to make the stay in youth hostels even more eventful, methodically trained program instructors lend assistance to young people with

organization of hikes, sports events, discos, sing-alongs and many other activities. In their program offer, some youth hostels specialize primarily in specific features typical to the countryside.

[Question] ...which "Jugendtourist" probably utilizes especially for referral of organized theme trips.

[Answer] This is correct; through the principal organizations of the FDJ and the county commissions of "Jugendtourist" we are increasingly allocating theme trips (between 3 and 14 days) which then include services organized by us. Here are a few examples: a Goethe-Schiller route with an overnight stay in Weimar, a Theodor Fontane route with overnight stay in Werder, Karl May trips, Bauhaus excursions, a Thomas Muentzer route with overnight stay in Bad Frankenhausen. Besides there are interesting trips for active recreation: horse-back riding tours in Ansprung and Oberwiesenthal/Erz Mountains or in Barth, a rappelling course in Bad Schandau, windsurfing in Werder, paddling tours on Berlin's waterfronts, stays in Haldensleben with ceramics course, in Schwerin with classes in tailoring and fashion shows (combined with plant visits), pop gymnastics in Blankenburg, and many more.

[Question] Who can take part in such organized trips?

[Answer] All juveniles up to the age of 25, all FDJ members over 25, minors with a written permission from their legal guardian, children under the age of 14 accompanied by their parents or with the pioneer group.

[Question] And who can use a youth hostel in general?

[Answer] There is no fixed stipulation for this. Principally, every citizen may stay overnight in a youth hostel. But since the demand for accommodations still exceeds the available facilities, we are counting on the understanding of older generations that they do not stake a claim on the reasonably priced services of youth hostels geared to the recreational needs of young people. Of course, a youth hostel director would not turn away an older lone hiker if he still has room in his place.

[Question] While on the subject, here is the 64-thousand dollar question. Does a weary hiker have the right to a little corner under the hostel's roof even without reservation?

[Answer] All "Jugendtourist" facilities are instructed to accept single hikers for at least one night. If the normal spaces in the youth hostel are not sufficient, temporary housing is available for such cases. Of course, the housing capacity of any youth hostel has its limits which are set by regulations for safety, fire protection and hygiene. Have these been reached, then the hostel director cannot shelter the single hiker. Unfortunately, this frequently happens every year during the summer in facilities at the shores of the Baltic Sea; visitors with reservations take precedence, of course.

[Question] Hiking aficionados miss the youth hostel catalog which used to be available in book stores. Where can one get information on the network of youth hostels?

[Answer] The old catalog is obsolete, so that we have to prepare a new one. It should be available for purchase in 1988. At present, a GDR chart is being printed listing all "Jugendtourist" facilities, which will be for sale this year through postal mailings and in book stores. Any of the county commissions of FDJ travel agencies can furnish extensive general brochures.

13011/9835

CSO: 2300/506

POPULATION OUT-MIGRATION FROM KOSOVO DETAILED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jul 86 pp 18-20

[Article by Velizar Zecevic and Ljiljana Staletovic: "A Quarter of a Century in the Same Direction"]

[Text] "Come. We have work and wages for you." A few months ago a letter with this message was sent to Serbs and Montenegrins who had once worked at the "Trepca" factory in Titova Mitrovica and lived in the surrounding area. Dramatic in contents and message and emotional in tone and intent, the lengthy letter finished with the plea to "spread the word."

There has been no warmer invitation to return for over 20 years when Serbs and Montenegrins first began packing their bags and leaving Kosovo in groups, families, and as individuals. The sincerity of the letter writer, a worker from "Trepca," was effective because in recent days 108 individuals of Serb and Montenegrin nationality have returned to Titova Mitrovica, and they are already distributed throughout the work organizations with the recommendation that the work organizations hire them without going through the usual hiring procedures.

The letter from Titova Mitrovica and its impact, on the other hand, are not the only evidence that the majority of Serbs and Montenegrins who have out-migrated wholeheartedly wish that the numerous reasons which forced them out of Kosovo could be replaced by just one indication that would guarantee that they were wanted back in their old communities. But are they? Unfortunately there are no surveys or reports on Serbs and Montenegrins who have returned. It is not known how they live or how they feel about returning to their birth-place for the second time. This is a shame because they could possibly be the best observers of opportunities in Kosovo and of the scope and range of changes that have occurred in the province since 1981.

Existing/Nonexisting Phenomena

For the time being it can only be said that not many have returned: during the past four years in the very same Titova Mitrovica, a total of 196 Serbs and Montenegrins have returned, not counting those who responded to the invitation from "Trepca." During the same period 1,851 left the same opstina. Between 1982 and 1985, 18,150 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo, and 2,374

returned. The picture of Kosovo out-migration of Serbs and Montenegrins has not changed for decades: seven leave, one returns, and this means that the reasons for leaving and the reasons for returning have mostly remained the same or are at least quite similar.

Figures on out-migration were not precisely kept for just one year, 1981, when the Commission for the Prevention of the Out-Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins concentrated its attention on investigating the causes and did not document figures on the number of out-migrating Serbs and Montenegrins. The events in March, termed the counterrevolution, however, forced analysts of Kosovo to look back and incredulously assert that the out-migrations did not start with the Pristina demonstrations. The process had already been going on for 20 years.

Prior to 1981 the columns moving through the Ibarski Valley on the way to Vranje and Kursumlija or over Mt. Cakor remained, for the most part, outside the political purview--Serbs and Montenegrins out-migrating en masse could only be read about in statistical census reports. Nothing was written or spoken on the subject, so the causes for this nonexistent phenomenon were also--nonexistent.

The Demographics of Child-Bearing and Out-Migration

The demographic map of Kosovo began to change visibly, however, at the beginning of the 1960s. According to the census conducted during the first year of the sixties, in Kosovo there were 646,605 Albanians, or 67.2 percent; 227,016 Serbs, or 23.6 percent; and 37,588 Montenegrins, or 3.9 percent, etc. Ten years later the number of Albanians increased to 916,168, which then made up 73.7 percent of the population. There were 228,264 Serbs (approximately 1,800 more than 10 years earlier) or 18.4 percent, and 31,555 Montenegrins (6,033 less than 10 years ago), etc. In a brief interpretation of events in the sixties and seventies, perhaps it is important to note that Kosovo's population growth at that time was the largest in the country. In 1966 a total of 42,429 babies were born in Kosovo: 8,429 boys and girls were firstborn offspring; 2,450 newborns already had nine or more siblings. The significant demographic characteristic during these two decades was, therefore, the fact that the number of large families (those with nine or more children) increased at the rate of 2,000-2,500 per year.

The "birth-rate explosion," on the one hand, and out-migration, on the other, represent the two key explanations for new relationships in the numbers of Kosovar nations and nationalities. The total number of Serbs and Montenegrins decreased by approximately 4,000 inhabitants; the number of Albanians in the same period increased by approximately 270,000. The number of new Albanians alone was more than the total number of Serbs and Montenegrins combined in 1971.

The pattern of demographic movements in Kosovo during the next decade could be called, in short, nothing new. In 1981, alone, the year of the new census, the total number of Kosovo inhabitants increased by 48,111 newborns; the high birthrate continued; and population density and the total number of Kosovar

families also increased. The total number of Kosovars of all types, professions and nationalities increased by less than 340,000. Census statistics according to nationality (an expression from the statistical yearbook) reported the following: the number of Albanians increased by approximately 310,000, Muslims by approximately 32,000, and Gypsies by less than 20,000; Turks were recorded as numbering 12,530 (as opposed to 12,244 ten years earlier); the number of Serbs decreased from 228,264 to 209,497 (there were 197,033 in 1953) and Montenegrins decreased from 31,555 to 27,028 (31,367 in 1953).

The first professional analyses of the last two censuses pointed out that, in addition to a high birth-rate the key explanations for the new demographic situation included the rapid out-migrating of Serbs and Montenegrins.

Finally it was noted that for the past two decades 10,000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo for good annually or, in other words, a total of more than 200,000 Kosovars of Serb and Montenegrin nationality over the past 20 years.

An Ethnically Pure Settlement

The result of this long-term out-migration has been, in fact, the creation of an ethnically pure settlement. In fully half of the settlements in Kosovo today there is not a single Serb or Montenegrin to be found. For example, there are only 32 Serbs and Montenegrins in Glagovac according to the 1981 census. They have lived there for years, so it can be said that the out-migration from this opstina ended two decades ago. At the time of the census in the Dragas opstina, there were 114 families of Serb or Montenegrin nationality, in Kacanik 311, in Srbica 1,240, and in Podujevo 2,857. The largest number of Serbs and Montenegrins, 50,269, lived in the Pristina opstina, but in the past five years a large number has also left a total of 7,015. In Kosovo at the beginning of this year a new opstina, the twenty-third, was created--Malisevo. More than 38 thousand inhabitants--all Albanians--live on approximately 400 cubic kilometers, individual settlements--Banja, Jovic, Dragobilj, and Crna Vranja--still bear Serbian names.

According to the figures of the opstina commissions for the prevention of out-migration, 278 families out-migrated from Kosovo last year, 11 more than in 1984. As in previous years, out-migration was more pronounced in the villages; 90 families with 318 household members and 613 individuals departed, 63 families owned homes and landholdings. Eighty-nine urban families with 262 members and 486 individuals left Kosovo. Half of these families owned homes, and 20 percent had state-owned apartments. In the second half of last year, the majority of those who out-migrated, 1,490, were fit for work and 226 individuals had steady jobs. Fifty-five percent of those who out-migrated had high-school educations, 25.2 percent finished at a lower level, and 10.5 percent had trade school or college educations.

Last year 732 individuals left Pristina. In this opstina, and this holds true for the other opstinas as well, only a small number of Serbs and Montenegrins invest in the construction of apartment buildings because they

tend to buy plots of land and build homes outside Kosovo. Four hundred fifty individuals of Serb or Montenegrin nationality from the Pristina opstina alone, own homes or plots outside of Kosovo. In the second half of last year, the opstina court in Pristina recorded 46 real estate sales contracts with Albanian buyers and Serb or Montenegrin sellers.

The out-migration has also intensified in the Gnjilane opstina; the number of Serb and Montenegrin inhabitants decreased by 390 last year. Three hundred twenty-two individuals out-migrated from Titova Mitrovica, 314 from Pec, and 277 from Urosevac. From the opstina of Klina 165 inhabitants left their homes, 228 from Istok, and 331 villagers from Kosovska Kamenica. The Provincial Commission for the Prevention of Out-Migration does not have figures for 1981 because all its activity at that time was focused on investigating the causes of out-migration.

Data from successive years clearly demonstrates that out-migration from year to year is on the decline. In 1982, for example, 6,746 Serbs and Montenegrins left their homes, and in the following year 4,341 left. During the next year the number of those out-migrating dropped to 3,583, and last year "all of" 3,480 individuals out-migrated.

These numbers can be deceiving at first glance, however. One cannot conclude that out-migration is declining on the basis of these figures. On the contrary. These figures do not indicate the decrease in proportional representation of Serb and Montenegrin nationalities in the total number of Kosovo inhabitants. It is understandable that a decrease in the number of families will be followed by a decrease in the number moving out.

Why Are They Moving?

In the demands which they submitted to the opstina commissions, those who out-migrated cited as the most frequent causes for out-migration: the atmosphere of distrust following hostile demonstrations; the occurrence of hostile activities based on Albanian nationalism and irredentism; physical attacks and excesses; the feeling of being a minority; incomplete ideo-political differentiation in various settings, particularly in educational organizations; the opportunistic relationship of individuals in the struggle against declarations of nationalism and its interpretation in various settings; various forms of pressure; socio-economic problems....

Causes of Out-Migration

Although they do not cite it in their reasons for out-migrating, Serbs and Montenegrins charge that, for example, the elementary school in the village of Krajiste once named "Brothers Akcic," has been renamed "Skenderbeg." Dissatisfaction has also been expressed with mixing Television Tirana on the channel of the second program of Television Belgrade.

Kosovars also mention the issue of the origins of the billions which a number of Albanians have used to buy Serb and Montenegrin homes and property. This issue was discussed at the Socialist Autonomous Republic (SAP) of Kosovo

Assembly session held on 20 March of this year. At that time the Provincial Secretary for Internal Affairs, Rahman Morina, said that "there are no hidden forces financing these purchases. The sources of these funds originate, for the most part, from remittances from workers employed abroad."

Figures and Reality

The activities of 8 illegal organizations and 88 groups have been uncovered and blocked since 1981. One thousand two hundred individuals have been criminally prosecuted, and 3,000 individuals have been punished for misdemeanors. During the same period more than 3,000 were issued warnings, and measures were taken against a number of individuals prior to imprisonment.

In addition, last year 11 criminal and 9 misdemeanor charges were filed against refugees from Albania living in Kosovo for committing counter-revolutionary acts. There are now 807 Albanian refugees and their children living in the province. The majority, stated Morina, are loyal to Yugoslavia.

During the second half of last year, 62 criminal acts were recorded involving individuals of different nationalities; 51 of them involved Serb or Montenegrin victims. Criminal charges were filed against 94 perpetrators of these crimes. During this period, according to figures of the Provincial Executive Council, 2 rapes were recorded; 5 mild and 4 serious physical assaults; an equal number of violent confrontations; 11 incidents of provoking national, racial or religious hatred, discord, and discrimination and one sexual assault of a disabled person.

A Program for Return

The second half of last year was inundated with misdemeanors; 177 out of a total of 296 were committed against Serbs and Montenegrins.

Relations between nationalities led to vandalism, destruction of property, and damage to tombstones. Between June and December of last year, 19 of these cases were recorded; 10 were solved. In 6 cases the guilty parties were Albanians; 3 desecrations were carried out by Serbs or Montenegrins, and 1 by a Gypsy. Sixty-one fires broke out on property owned by Serbs and Montenegrins, but it has not been proven that they were set for hostile motives.


Seventy-five criminal proceedings were brought before judicial organs during the period cited. A total of 1,496 cases were tried involving different nationalities. The influx into the regular courts of these cases was 1.9 percent less than in the first half of the year, but the number of cases solved was 4.7 percent greater. During the same period 279 misdemeanor cases were tried in which the plaintiffs were Serbs and Montenegrins and the defendants Albanians. Out of a total of 249 fully prosecuted individuals, 236 were legal adults. Prison sentences were given to 78 individuals, and 151 were fined. For crimes related to public peace and order, 187 people were found guilty.

In October of last year, a program of measures and actions to facilitate the return of out-migrated Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo who wish to return, together with additional measures to discourage out-migration, were suggested by the Executive Council of Kosovo. After months of public discussion in the opstinas, this program was adopted at a session of the SAP Kosovo Assembly on 30 July. It was stated on six typewritten pages that, among other things, in the area of cadre policy, account must be taken more than ever before of cadre representation by all nationalities to achieve true national equality. Self-managing bodies in the organizations of associated labor, selfmanagement organizations and communities need to assess the possibilities for the return and employment of Serb and Montenegrin cadres who want to return to Kosovo, to consider the possibilities for including them in the opstina and provincial organs and organizations, and to resolve their housing problems. These measures will enable people who out-migrated during the past five years to return and members of their families to find work. These individuals will have priority in obtaining credit to open small farms, craft shops and other enterprises. Pupils and students will be allowed to enroll freely in schools and in colleges, and will have the right to obtain stipends, credit, and housing in student dormitories.

Table 1. Out-Migration of Serb and Montenegrin Nationalities by Opstina

<u>Opstina</u>	<u>Number of Serbs and Montenegrins in 1981</u>	<u>Out-Migration 1982-1985</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1. Vitina	8,548	605	7.1
2. Vucitrn	6,412	153	2.5
3. Glogovac	32	---	---
4. Gnjlane	19,386	1,245	6.4
5. Decane	1,132	56	4.9
6. Dragas	114	---	---
7. Djakovica	3,851	225	5.8
8. Istok	9,522	1,002	10.5
9. Kacanik	311	21	6.7
10. Klina	7,802	773	9.9
11. Kosovska Kamenica	14,873	974	6.5
12. Titova Mitrovica	27,930	1,851	6.6
13. Lepocavic	15,056	640	4.2
14. Lipljan	10,613	433	4.1
15. Orahovac	4,235	72	1.7
16. Pec	17,791	1,035	5.8
17. Podujevo	2,857	185	6.5
18. Prizren	12,189	705	5.8
19. Pristina	50,269	7,015	13.9
20. Srbica	1,240	48	3.9
21. Srpska Reka	3,595	274	7.6
22. Urosevac	18,638	836	4.5
Total:	236,526	18,150	7.6

Table 2. Nationalities in Kosovo, 1961-1981



Key:

- | | |
|--------------|-----------------|
| 1. Year | 4. Montenegrins |
| 2. Albanians | 5. Muslims |
| 3. Serbs | 6. Percentage |

Table 3. Out-Migration from Kosovo to Serbia (excluding Vojvodina)

Out-Migration Period	Total Out-Migration	Nationality		
		Serbs	Montenegrins	Others
TOTAL	110,675	79,032	10,724	20,919
1940 and earlier	2,113	1,361	86	666
1941-1945	1,967	1,440	178	349
1946-1960	18,071	11,828	1,541	4,702
1961-1970	34,227	25,039	3,425	5,763
1971-1975	22,792	16,756	2,451	3,585
1976-1981	28,617	20,915	2,829	4,873
Unknown	2,888	1,693	214	981

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END